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ABSTRACT 
Boycotts and Sanctions against South Africa: An International History, 1946-1970 
Simon Stevens 
 
This dissertation analyzes the role of various kinds of boycotts and sanctions in the strategies and 
tactics of those active in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. What was unprecedented 
about the efforts of members of the global anti-apartheid movement was that they experimented 
with so many ways of severing so many forms of interaction with South Africa, and that boycotts 
ultimately came to be seen as such a central element of their struggle. But it was not inevitable that 
international boycotts would become indelibly associated with the struggle against apartheid. Calling 
for boycotts and sanctions was a political choice. In the years before 1959, most leading opponents 
of apartheid both inside and outside South Africa showed little interest in the idea of international 
boycotts of South Africa. This dissertation identifies the conjuncture of circumstances that caused 
this to change, and explains the subsequent shifts in the kinds of boycotts that opponents of 
apartheid prioritized. It shows that the various advocates of boycotts and sanctions expected them 
to contribute to ending apartheid by a range of different mechanisms, from bringing about an 
evolutionary change in white attitudes through promoting the desegregation of sport, to weakening 
the state’s ability to resist the efforts of the liberation movements to seize power through guerrilla 
warfare. But though the purpose of anti-apartheid boycotts continued to be contested, boycott had, 
by 1970, become established as the defining principle of the self-identified anti-apartheid movement. 
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When South African anti-apartheid activist Albie Sachs went into exile in 1966, he entered a Ph.D. 
program in Britain. Doctoral study, he later joked, was just as stressful as underground political work 
in South Africa had been: “I discovered… this whole community of Ph.D. students, you get it all 
over the world, they all have that same rather haunted look, because it never leaves you, instead of 
going to bed worrying about the Special Branch, you’re going to bed worrying about your Ph.D.”1 
That my own doctoral experience was not nearly so terrifying – and was, indeed, tremendously 
enjoyable – is due to the support of many individuals and institutions. 
I have been especially fortunate in my teachers. David Reynolds, Erez Manela, Andrew 
Preston, and the late Ernest May introduced me to the craft of historical research and the field of 
international history. Many years later, I am still writing about issues they first raised with me. It was 
David who initially proposed international action against oppressive regimes as a topic of study. 
Professor May first directed my attention to the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
To have studied international history at Columbia over the past seven years has been an 
extraordinary privilege. Matt Connelly, Mark Mazower, Sam Moyn, Susan Pedersen, and Marilyn 
Young shaped this project from its earliest beginnings to its final draft, in ways too numerous – and 
too fundamental – even to begin to list. For their advice and encouragement, their questions and 
critiques, and their intellectual generosity, I am deeply grateful. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to 
Matt, a pioneering international historian and a model to aspire to, both as a scholar and as an 
adviser. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “First Recording: Albie Sachs,” vol. 13, Hilda Bernstein Interviews on the Experience of Exile, UWC-Robben Island 
Museum Mayibuye Archives, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town. 
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I did not enter the doctoral program at Columbia intending to write about South Africa or 
the anti-apartheid movement. Subsequently, Marcia Wright and Gail Gerhart were patient and 
generous in orienting me in South African history and historiography. In my final year, I have 
benefited from the advice of Saul Dubow, who proved that “dream mentor” was not an empty 
phrase. 
My experience of graduate school exemplified the cliché that you learn as much from your 
peers as from your teachers. I was privileged to study at Columbia alongside a cohort of brilliant 
historians, including Seth Anziska, Aimee Genell, Jessica Lee, Trent MacNamara, Tom Meaney, 
Ollie Murphey, Amy Offner, Keith Orejel, Justin Reynolds, Tim Shenk, Matt Swagler, Jeffrey 
Wayno, and Natasha Wheatley. Much of the original idea for this project was worked out in 
conversations with Stephen Wertheim, who has been a perceptive critic of its many subsequent 
iterations. 
Elements of the chapters that follow have been presented at many workshops, seminars, and 
conferences in the past five years. Thank you to all those who participated in these sessions, asked 
questions, and made critiques and suggestions. For their incisive comments and criticisms of draft 
chapters and papers, I am especially grateful to Marc DeVore, Andy Herod, Dane Kennedy, 
Philippa Levine, Ara Keys, Norman Levy, Srijan Sandip Mandal, Greg Mann, Will Mountz, Tim 
Naftali, Julio Rotemberg, Tehila Sasson, Ellen Schrecker, Sarah Seidman, Sarah Snyder, Anders 
Stephanson, Judith Van Allen, Robert Vinson, and Joanna Warson. In conceptualizing the project in 
its initial stages, I benefited additionally from the advice of Nigel Ashton, William Beinart, Mark 
Bradley, Alan Brinkley, Jan Eckel, Eric Foner, Evan Haefeli, John Iliffe, Akira Iriye, Robert Jervis, 
Adam McKeown, Anu Rao, Dan Sargent, John Thompson, and Robin Vandome. An invitation 
from Tom Zeiler to contribute to a roundtable in Diplomatic History forced me to begin clarifying my 
arguments at an early stage of the research. Later, Quinn Slobodian provided an opportunity that 
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prompted me to investigate both the Drum generation of South African writers and the stance of the 
eastern bloc more closely than I had initially planned. 
The external dimensions of white rule in southern Africa and the struggle against it are now 
becoming a vibrant and exciting field of research, and I am grateful to all those who are making it 
so. For generously sharing advice, unpublished work, ideas, and sometimes vigorous disagreement, I 
am indebted to Carol Anderson, Gavin Brown, Nick Grant, Christabel Gurney, Ryan Irwin, 
Genevieve Klein, Emma Lundin, Eric Morgan, Jamie Miller, Sue Onslow, Joe Parrott, Igor 
Castellano da Silva, Rob Skinner, and Lydia Walker. 
As an international history, this dissertation touches upon many topics on which I am far 
from expert. In addition to many of those thanked above, Jeffrey Ahlman, Peter Alegi, Jean Allman, 
David Gordon, Dipika Guha, Tanya Harmer, Jennifer Hart, Marja Hinfelaar, Jill Kelly, Matt 
Kennedy, Liz Lundeen, Giacomo Macola, Dan Matlin, and George Roberts all patiently answered 
my queries and offered advice. Hakim Adi, Jan-Bart Gewald, Aled Goddard, Leslie James, Lee 
Jones, Steven Jensen, Ollie Murphy, and Bruce Murray shared unpublished research. 
The research and writing of this dissertation was made possible by fellowships from the 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and the Department of History at Columbia University, the 
Center for the United States and the Cold War at New York University, the Miller Center of Public 
Affairs at the University of Virginia, and the Josephine De Karman Fellowship Trust. Additional 
archival research was funded by grants from the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation, Harvard 
Business School, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, the Scowcroft Institute of International 
Affairs, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the Graduate Student 
Advisory Council at Columbia. The Department of International History at the London School of 
Economics provided an institutional home during my research in Britain. At the University of Cape 
Town, Vivian Bickford-Smith was a magnanimous host. 
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Even with such extensive financial and institutional support, the research for this 
dissertation would not have been possible without the hospitality of family, friends, and friends-of-
friends on three continents. Those who gave me shelter, food, and friendship during my travels 
include Gary Barnett and Lien Thi Huynh, Susan and PJ Bishop, Nat Clokey, Ioana Dumitrescu, 
Tommy Dyer, Cat and Ian Cronshaw, Lucy Fry and Nick Devlin, Tyler Hester, Rob King, Kay 
Negishi, Lindsay Noll and Luke Leafrgren, Jenny Repogle, Claire Timperley and Mike McGahan, 
Adam Van Auken, and Christine and Ben Welby. Candy Butler made possible my extended stay in 
Hogsback, where Suzanne Kleintjes permitted me to take over a corner of Butterfly’s Bistro as a 
makeshift study. Ben Jackson and Rós Ní Dhubháin hosted me in London at sub-economic rent, 
and Ben even allowed me persuade him to write his master’s thesis on international markets and 
apartheid South Africa. Marianne Kinney must have felt at times that I had moved into her 
apartment permanently.  
I did almost all of my research travel without a car, and am grateful to all those who helped 
with transport. My extended research in the archives of the ANC was made possible by daily lifts 
from Jackie Dewet, Tracey Gardner, and Maya Van Gent of the University of Fort Hare. Nick 
Varley took time out of his vacation to drive a stranger around Pretoria. A ride from Tom and Patsy 
Mountz saved me a very circuitous bus journey in Texas. 
I am grateful to the archivists at all of the repositories I visited. Many of them went far out 
of their way to assist me, including Tansy Barton and Charles Harrowell at Senate House Library; 
Mosa Maamoe and Mark Snyders at the National Heritage and Cultural Studies Centre at the 
University of Fort Hare; Lucy McCann at Rhodes House; Gabriele Mohale, Michele Pickover, and 
Zofia Sulej at the Wits Historical Papers Research Archive; Andre Mohammed at the Mayibuye 
Archives; and Neels Muller at the Archive of the South African Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation. Closer to home, the staff of the Interlibrary Loan office, the Scan & 
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Deliver service, the off-campus shelving facility, and the circulation desk at Butler Library responded 
to my inordinate demands upon their time with unfailing helpfulness and good humor. 
Life in New York was enriched immeasurably by the companionship of non-historians, who 
heard much more about boycotts and sanctions against South Africa than they could ever have 
bargained for. For their friendship, intellectual stimulation, and endless arguments, thanks especially 
to Adam Cox, Maria Jose Bermeo, Huw Green, Marianne Kinney, Jessie Munton, Neil Russell, Eric 
Shieh, and all the members of the Breakfast Club. They will recognize much in what follows, though 
arguments on Scotland and the national question will have to be pursued elsewhere. 
I am indebted to my parents, Margaret and Richard, for their inspiration, love, and support 
at every step. Much of the writing of this dissertation was completed in the wonderful seclusion of 
their cottage in Fforddlas. Margaret took the dictation of my first attempt at a work of history, 
before I was able to write myself, and – more recently – has fielded my constant requests for advice 
with equal patience. Richard allowed me to hijack his vacation, and joined me as a research assistant 
in Lusaka. My sister Helen is not only an inspiration as a writer, but assisted in innumerable smaller 
ways as well. 
Most of the arguments below were first developed in conversations with Emily Baughan, 
who has lived with this project for the past four years. Reading every word of this dissertation is the 





Strategies of Struggle 
 
By the time Nelson Mandela was elected the first black president of South Africa, in non-racial 
democratic elections in 1994, millions of people around the world had taken part in some kind of 
anti-apartheid activity. So had many governments, international organizations, and non-
governmental organizations of all kinds. Indeed, it has already become a cliché to observe that the 
struggle against apartheid was one of the largest, most widely supported, most significant, and most 
influential transnational movements of the twentieth century. At the heart of this globe-spanning 
mobilization was the concept of boycott: the refusal to interact or engage – and efforts to encourage 
or coerce others not to interact or engage – with another entity, its products, institutions, or 
representatives. By the 1970s, acceptance of the principle that apartheid South Africa should be 
boycotted was how the self-identified anti-apartheid movement defined itself.  
Efforts to boycott South Africa took many forms. These included consumer boycotts of 
South African goods such as fruit, wine, cigarettes, and lobster tails; sanctions (boycotts enforced by 
governments) on trade and investment with South Africa; diplomatic boycotts (the refusal to have 
diplomatic relations with South Africa and the expulsion of South Africa from intergovernmental 
organizations); sports, cultural, and academic boycotts of interaction with South African institutions 
or individuals in those spheres; disinvestment (boycotts undertaken by firms withdrawing or 
liquidating their investments in the country); divestment (the boycott of publicly-held corporations 
by shareholders) against firms with investments in South Africa;1 industrial boycotts (the refusal by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The terms “disinvestment” and “divestment” are now often used interchangeably. In this dissertation I distinguish 
them using the definitions given here. This is how the two terms were usually used by activists and observers in South 
Africa and the United States during the period under study. (In Britain, “disinvestment” was often used to denote both 
forms of action). 
 2 
organized labor to handle or transport South African goods, sometimes also referred to as “black 
bans” or “worker sanctions”). 
Some of these forms of action were novel: though there had been calls in the United States 
for boycotts of sporting, cultural, and academic interactions with Nazi Germany in the 1930s, for 
instance, the anti-apartheid boycotts in these spheres were the first organized, sustained campaigns 
of their kind.2 Other kinds of boycotts have much longer histories. Indeed, the practice of 
boycotting long predates the term itself, which comes from Captain Charles Boycott, a British land 
agent in colonial Ireland who in 1880 was the target of a campaign of social and economic ostracism 
organized by the Irish Land League, which left him unable to obtain labor, goods, or services from 
the local community.3 Consumer boycotts are as old as the birth of “consumer society” in the 
eighteenth century, when consumer goods began to be manufactured in large quantities in Britain 
and elsewhere. Two of the first consumer boycotts were boycotts of slave-produced sugar by anti-
slavery activists in Britain,4 and boycotts of British products by American colonists in the period 
before the Declaration of Independence of the United States.5 Economic sanctions by states have an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Calls for boycotts of sporting relations with Germany focused on the 1936 Berlin Olympics and on the German boxer 
Max Schmeling. See Lewis A. Erenberg, The Greatest Fight of Our Generation: Louis vs. Schmeling (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 57, 75-76, 112-113; Allen Guttmann, The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic 
Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 70-81; David Clay Large, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936 (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 69-109; David Margolick, Beyond Glory: Joe Louis vs. Max Schmeling and a World on the Brink 
(New York: A.A. Knopf, 2005), 31, 35, 39, 118, 204-13; Robert G. Weisbord, Racism and the Olympics (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2015), 25-48. 
On efforts to organize boycotts of various forms of cultural interaction with Nazi Germany, see Thomas 
Doherty, Hollywood and Hitler, 1933-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 174-85, 293-310; Gerald M. 
Monroe, “The American Artists Congress and The Invasion of Finland,” Archives of American Art Journal 15, no. 1 (1975): 
15; Dorothy Connell Carroll, “Cultural Boycott – yes or no?” Index on Censorship 4, no. 1 (March 1975): 35. On calls to 
boycott academic interactions with Nazi Germany, see Stephen H. Norwood, The Third Reich in the Ivory Tower: Complicity 
and Conflict on American Campuses (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
3 Charles Arthur Boycott, Boycott: The Life Behind the Word (Ludlow, UK: Carbonel Press, 1997); Joyce Marlow, Captain 
Boycott and the Irish (London: Deutsch, 1973). 
4 Clare Midgley, Feminism and Empire: Women Activists in Imperial Britain, 1790-1865 (London: Routledge, 2007), 41-64; 
Charlotte Sussman, Consuming Anxieties: Consumer Protest, Gender, and British Slavery, 1713-1833 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000). 
5 Larry G. Bowman, “Virginia and the Continental Association” (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1966); T.H. 
Breen, “‘Baubles of Britain’: The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present 119, 
 3 
even longer history: Thucydides records that imposition of trade sanctions on Megara by the 
Athenian leader Pericles was one of the causes of the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century BC.6 
 In their efforts to end apartheid, South Africa’s system of white-dominated racial 
segregation, opponents of that system grappled with the fundamental question of how to bring 
about political change in a repressive society. While this is a question that political actors have 
grappled with throughout human history, opponents of apartheid did so within an international 
system that was being transformed by the creation of new international institutions and the 
globalization of trade, investment, sport, and culture. What was ultimately unprecedented about their 
efforts was that they experimented with so many ways of severing those various globalizing forms of 
interaction, and that boycotts ultimately came to be seen as such a central element of their struggle. 
Outside South Africa, action against apartheid took many other forms too, of course, from 
fundraising for the “defence and aid” of South African political activists on trial and in prison, to 
pickets and sit-ins at South African diplomatic missions, to providing material assistance and military 
training to the exiled South African liberation movements.7 But it was the extensive use of boycotts, 
at multiple non-governmental and governmental levels, that distinguished the struggle against 
apartheid from many other political struggles – and that politicians and political activists on diverse 
international and domestic causes have subsequently often sought to replicate. Reflecting on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
no. 1 (May 1988): 73-104; T.H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
6 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Martin Hammond, ed. P.J. Rhodes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
32, 68-69, 72; Philip A. Stadter, “Plutarch, Charinus, and the Megarian Decree,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 25, no. 
4 (1984): 351-372. 
7 On “defence and aid” see, especially, Al Cook, “The International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa,” in 
South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 3, pt. 1, International 
Solidarity and Support (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004); Denis Herbstein, White Lies: Canon Collins and the Secret War against 
Apartheid (Oxford: James Currey, 2004).  
On the use of pickets and sit-ins, see, especially, Gavin Brown and Helen Yaffe, “Non-Stop Against Apartheid: 
Practicing Solidarity Outside the South African Embassy,” Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political 
Protest 12, no. 2 (2013): 227-34; Gavin Brown and Helen Yaffe, “Practices of Solidarity: Opposing Apartheid in the 
Centre of London,” Antipode 46, no. 1 (January 2014): 34-51. 
 4 
death of Nelson Mandela in 2013, the British comedian and activist Mark Steel captured the lesson 
that is frequently drawn from the movement of which Mandela became the figurehead: Mandela’s 
“most important achievement,” Steel argued, “was to prove that bastards and their bastard regimes 
can be overthrown, against seemingly impossible odds, by all of us, as no one knows which unsold 
grape was the one that finally brought down a tyranny.”8 
 The question of what role external boycotts and sanctions played in the transition to 
democracy in South Africa in the early 1990s remains a topic of heated debate among scholars and 
activists.9 Much relevant archival material, in South Africa and elsewhere, currently remains classified 
or otherwise unavailable to researchers.10 This dissertation shifts chronological focus and turns the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Mark Steel, “Tributes Have Flooded In,” marksteelinfo.com, 7 December 2013, https://perma.cc/5DSC-46FS. 
9 It is notable, however, that very few professional historians have published research on this topic. Since 1994, 
important contributions to this debate – primarily by economists, political scientists, scholars of sports and cultural 
studies, and former participants – have included: Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons 
from South Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Jennifer Davis, “Sanctions and Apartheid: The Economic 
Challenge to Discrimination,” in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, eds. David Cortright 
and George A. Lopez (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); Jon Gemmell, The Politics of South African Cricket (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 179-204; Adrian Guelke, South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999); 
Lorraine J. Haricombe and F.W. Lancaster, Out in the Cold: Academic Boycotts and the Isolation of South Africa (Arlington, VA: 
Information Resources Press, 1995); Richard Hengeveld, and Jaap Rodenburg, “The Impact of the Oil Embargo,” in 
Embargo: Apartheid’s Oil Secrets Revealed, eds. Richard Hengeveld, and Jaap Rodenburg (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 1995), 194-205; Jonathan Hyslop, “The South African Boycott Experience,” Academe 92, no. 5 
(September-October 2006): 59-64; Lee Jones, Societies Under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do Not) 
Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 52-92; Philip I. Levy, “Sanctions on South Africa: What did they do?” 
American Economic Review 89, no. 2 (May 1999): 415-420; Merle Lipton, Liberals, Marxists, and Nationalists: Competing 
Interpretations of South African History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 90-96, 165-171; Anton David Lowenberg 
and William H. Kaempfer, The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid: A Public Choice Analysis (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1998); Robert Kinloch Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the 
Apartheid Years (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 620-71; Rob Nixon, Homelands, Harlem and Hollywood: South African Culture 
and the World Beyond (New York: Routledge, 1994), 131-54; Kenneth A. Rodman, “Public and Private Sanctions against 
South Africa,” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 313-334; Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, and C. Paul 
Wazzan, “The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African 
Boycott,” Journal of Business 72, no. 1 (January 1999): 35-89; Les de Villiers, In Sight of Surrender: The U.S. Sanctions Campaign 
against South Africa, 1946-1993 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 165-207; Elisabeth Jean Wood, “An Insurgent Path to 
Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests, and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador,” 
Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 8 (October 2001): 862-85; Stephen Zunes, “The Role of Non-violent Action in the 
Downfall of Apartheid,” Journal of Modern African Studies 37, no. 1 (March 1999): 137-69. 
10 In the late 1990s the Investigative Unit of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission collected documents relating to 
the actions of the National Party government, especially during the 1980s. These included the records of key decision-
making bodies such as the State Security Council. This massive document collection was subsequently deposited at the 
National Archives in Pretoria, but has not been processed and is largely inaccessible to researchers. Catherine Kennedy, 
“Opening the TRC Archive: a SAHA case study,” Archival Platform, 7 August 2014, https://perma.cc/R5LL-KQYL. On 
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question around. Even to ask the question of whether or how boycotts and sanctions “worked,” we 
first need to understand how their advocates intended them to work. This dissertation thus asks two 
interrelated questions. First, how and why did boycotts become such a prominent element of the 
global struggle against apartheid? And second, how did boycott advocates believe that boycotts 
would contribute to achieving the ultimate objective of ending South Africa’s racist regime? 
 Despite the explosion of research in the last two decades on both the internal and external 
dimensions of the struggle against apartheid, these are not questions that have concerned previous 
scholars. Existing studies take the use of boycotts by anti-apartheid activists for granted: boycotts 
are treated self-evident and natural responses to apartheid – and therefore responses that do not 
require explanation. The sociologist Håkan Thörn, for instance, notes in his influential study of the 
anti-apartheid movement in Britain and Sweden that boycotts were the movement’s “most 
important form of collective action.”11 But Thörn offers no explanation for why and how this came 
to be the case. Researchers with different geographical expertise and different thematic concerns 
have suggested a diverse array of origins or starting points of the campaigns for sanctions, 
disinvestment, and boycotts against South Africa. But these are usually treated as moments when a 
truth – that South Africa should be boycotted – was first revealed. The subsequent story then 
becomes one of growing recognition and support for this self-evident truth.  
Calling for boycotts and sanctions was a political choice, however. It was not inevitable that 
international boycotts would become indelibly associated with the struggle against apartheid. As this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
archival access in South Africa, see Kate Allan, ed., Paper Wars: Access to Information in South Africa (Johannesburg: Wits 
University Press, 2009); Verne Harris, Archives and Justice: A South African Perspective (Chicago: Society of American 
Archivists, 2006), 269-349, 383-426; and, more generally, Matthew Graham, “Finding Foreign Policy: Researching in 
Five South African Archives,” History in Africa 37, no. 1 (January 2010): 379-87; Jamie Miller, “South African Political 
History Archives,” Archives Made Easy, 18 April 2011, https://perma.cc/7VLW-UPCT; Sue Onslow, “Research Report: 
Republic of South Africa Archives,” Cold War History 5, no. 3 (August 2005): 369-75. 
11 Håkan Thörn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2006), 8. See 
also Håkan Thörn, “The Emergence of a Global Civil Society: The Case of Anti-Apartheid,” Journal of Civil Society 2, no. 
3 (December 2006): 258; Rob Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in 
Britain and the United States, c.1919-64 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 11, 151, 201-2. 
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dissertation shows, most leading opponents of apartheid both inside and outside South Africa 
showed little interest in the idea of an international boycott of South Africa in the years before 1959. 
Domestic consumer boycotts were a prominent feature of many twentieth-century anti-colonial 
struggles: between the 1920s and the 1950s anti-colonial movements in Africa and other parts of the 
world urged colonial subjects not to purchase goods imported from the imperial metropole.12 In 
most cases, however, these boycotts of the imperial power were not internationalized beyond the 
colony itself.13 Algerian nationalists, for instance, consciously fought their struggle for independence 
from France not only in Algeria, but also in the international arena.14 But neither they nor their 
supporters abroad sought to organize international boycotts and sanctions against France as part of 
that struggle. In the case of South Africa, this dissertation seeks to denaturalize the boycott. It shows 
that international boycotts and sanctions first became prominent forms of opposing apartheid in the 
specific circumstances prevailing inside and outside South Africa in 1959 and 1960, and analyzes the 
reasons why opponents of apartheid subsequently made conscious political choices to incorporate 
particular kinds of international boycotts into their repertoires of action. 
 It is not only the use of boycotts by the anti-apartheid movement that has traditionally been 
treated as self-evident. So too has their purpose. It is now almost universally assumed that the 
purpose of boycotts and sanctions was to exert pressure on the South African government itself to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For an in-depth study of the use domestic consumer boycotts by anti-colonial activists in Uganda, for instance, see 
Dharam P. Ghai, “The Bugandan Trade Boycott: A Study in Tribal, Political, and Economic Nationalism” in Protest and 
Power in Black Africa, eds. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 755-70. On 
the use of boycotts by Kenyan opponents of colonial rule, see below, pages 117-18. 
13 Perhaps the most notable exception was the nationalist movement in Indonesia, which in 1947 called on supporters 
outside Indonesia to boycott Dutch goods. In Australia, labor unions operated an industrial boycott against Dutch 
shipping from 1945 to 1949. See below, page 166. 
14 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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alter its discriminatory policies and negotiate with the opponents of apartheid.15 In part, this reflects 
beliefs that characterize the study of sanctions more generally. The assumption that the purpose of 
sanctions is always to compel a “target” government to comply with changes in policy demanded by 
the “senders” of sanctions underlies almost the entire subfield of political science devoted to 
studying whether sanctions “work.” As one recent critic of this theoretical literature observes, the 
prevalence of this unquestioned assumption has meant that scholars “have virtually ignored the 
mechanisms by which [sanctions] are supposed to operate.”16 In the case of boycotts and sanctions 
against South Africa, their various advocates – as we shall see – expected them to contribute to 
ending apartheid by a variety of different mechanisms, from bringing about an evolutionary change 
in white attitudes through promoting the desegregation of sport, to weakening the state’s ability to 
resist the efforts of the liberation movements to seize power through guerrilla warfare.17 
 The absence of these various alternative models of change from existing studies of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See, for instance, Douglas Booth, “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports Boycott,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 38, no. 3 (July 2003): 477; Colin Bundy, “National Liberation and International Solidarity: 
Anatomy of a Special Relationship,” in Southern African Liberation Struggles: New Local, Regional and Global Perspectives, eds. 
Hilary Sapire and Chris Saunders (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2013), 216; Connie Field, Have You Heard from Johannesburg: 
Seven Stories of the Global Anti-Apartheid Movement, Episode 7, Free at Last, DVD (San Francisco, Clarity Films, 2010); 
Christabel Gurney, “‘A Great Cause’: The Origins of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, June 1959-March 1960,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 26, no. 1 (March 2000): 123, 144; Haricombe and Lancaster, Out in the Cold, 7, 12; Gregory 
Houston, “International Solidarity: Introduction,” in SADET, Road to Democracy, vol. 3, pt. 1, International Solidarity, 21; 
Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 43; Eric J. Morgan, “Into the Struggle: Confronting Apartheid in the United States and South Africa” (Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Colorado, 2009), 54-55; John Nauright, Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa (London: Leicester 
University Press, 1997), 135, 156; Skinner, Foundations of Anti-Apartheid, 119, 185, 194; Thörn, Anti-Apartheid, 61, 72. 
            Rare analyses of alternative mechanisms of change by which advocates of boycotts and sanctions expected them 
to work, include Tom Lodge, “Sanctions and Black Political Organisations,” in Sanctions Against Apartheid, ed. Mark 
Orkin (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), 34-51; Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC 
since 1960 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 10-12. See also footnote 17 below. 
16 Jones, Societies Under Siege, 1, 6. Earlier critiques of what James Lindsay called “the naiveté of the research on trade 
sanctions” include James Barber, “Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument”, International Affairs 55, no. 3 (July 1979): 
367-84; James M. Lindsay, “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: a Re-examination,” International Studies Quarterly 30, 
no. 2 (June 1986): 153-71. 
17 For two of the only previous analyses to address this issue explicitly, see Newell M. Stultz, “Sanctions and Models of 
Change in South Africa,” South Africa International 13, no. 2 (October 1982): 121-29; Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, 
“How Sanctions Work: A Framework for Analysis,” in How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa, eds. Crawford and 
Klotz, 25-42. 
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struggle against apartheid reflects a tendency to read history backwards from 1994. It is now almost 
universally assumed that the purpose of boycott campaigns was always to bring about the end of 
apartheid in the way in which it ultimately occurred. In her classic 1987 study of The Making of 
Apartheid, the sociologist Deborah Posel showed that liberal, Marxist, and Afrikaner nationalist 
scholars of that topic – for all their heated debates and disagreements – shared the underlying 
assumption of a “grand design” or “comprehensive master plan” for apartheid. Confronted by the 
scale of the Afrikaner nationalists’ achievement in social engineering, this earlier generation of 
scholars had concluded that the making of apartheid had been “an essentially systematic, cumulative 
process, which proceeded according to a single pre-existing plan,” and in doing so had 
“fundamentally misrepresent[ed] the political processes whereby apartheid was built, greatly 
exaggerating the extent of the continuity, control, and long-term planning involved.”18 As research 
agendas have shifted to studying the “unmaking” of apartheid, scholars in our own time have 
produced almost a mirror image of this interpretation.  
The political scientist Tom Lodge noted while the struggle against apartheid still continued 
that there was a tendency for many participants in South Africa’s political struggles to re-interpret 
history “with the wisdom of hindsight… as the careful unfolding of a continuous grand strategy”: 
past intentions would be recast to conform with unintended consequences and new strategic 
perspectives.19 After the “miracle” of South Africa’s transition to non-racial democracy in the 1990s, 
such a teleological reading of the past has exerted an even more powerful pull, on both former 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Deborah Posel, The Making of Apartheid 1948–1961: Conflict and Compromise (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 1-5. 
19 Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (London: Longman, 1983), 153. Lodge was referring specifically to 
discussions of black politics in the 1950s, but his comment applies more generally. A similar observation is made by 
Howard Barrell in his classic but never published study. Howard Barrell, “Conscripts to Their Age: African National 
Congress Operational Strategy, 1976-1986” (D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1993), 4. 
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participants and researchers.20 Such an approach has the effect of homogenizing anti-apartheid 
strategy across time: the story becomes essentially a cumulative one, of gradually increasing support 
for, and effectiveness of, a grand strategy that been elaborated early on and that remained consistent. 
One recent study of anti-apartheid activists in Britain and the United States concludes, for instance, 
that “the latter part of the 1950s would see the emergence of forms of anti-apartheid activism that, 
in terms of strategic initiative, would set the framework of the movement for the duration.”21 
 What is missing from such accounts of strategic continuity is what one scholar calls the 
dialectic between “structure and struggle.”22 The “structures” within which opponents of white 
supremacy were operating, both domestically and internationally, did not remain static. South 
African politics, society, and economy underwent dramatic changes in the second half of the 
twentieth century. So too did the international system: the creation and transformation of 
international institutions, decolonization and the independence of much of Africa, shifting 
geopolitical configurations, the expansion of multinational corporations, and the globalization of 
sport were among the many changes that transformed the international environment in which 
opponents of apartheid were operating. Unsurprisingly, therefore, they altered the strategies and 
tactics of their struggle over time, as their perceptions changed of the opportunities and constraints 
presented by circumstances both in South Africa and internationally, as they sought to learn from 
the successes and failures both of their own past efforts, and of political struggles elsewhere. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See also the discussions of teleology in Stephen Davis, “Cosmopolitans In Close Quarters: Everyday Life In The 
Ranks Of Umkhonto We Sizwe (1961-Present)” (Ph.D. Diss, University of Florida, 2010), 10-15, 200-202; Saul Dubow, 
The African National Congress (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000), xiii-xiv, 106-7; Ryan Irwin, “The Gordian Knot: 
Apartheid & the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order, 1960-1970” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2010), 326-27; 
Daniel R. Magaziner, The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968-1977 (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2010), 4-5. 
21 Skinner, Foundations of Anti-Apartheid, 117; see also 11, 201, and Rob Skinner, “The Moral Foundations of British Anti-
Apartheid Activism, 1946-1960,” Journal of Southern African Studies 35, no. 2 (June 2009): 399, 415, as well as Simon 
Stevens, “The External Struggle Against Apartheid: New Perspectives,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism, and Development 7 (forthcoming). 
22 Dale T. McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography (London: Pluto Press, 1997), xiv. 
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 That such issues have received little study is in part a consequence of changing currents in 
the historical discipline in the past two decades. Dane Kennedy, a historian of the British Empire, 
neatly summarizes the shift that has occurred in the study of the colonial (and, indeed, the 
postcolonial) world as a reorientation of scholars’ interests “from politics to cultures, from 
institutions to identities, from the intentions of imperial elites (‘the official mind’) to the experiences 
of colonial subjects (‘subalterns’ in all their variety).”23 These reorientations of scholarly interest have 
been so complete – and so simultaneous – that there is a danger that our histories create the 
impression that “subalterns” had cultures, identities, and experiences, but not (“high”) politics, 
institutions, and intentions. Thus despite a renaissance in the study of “grand strategy” in recent 
years, scholars in this tradition have retained an almost exclusive focus on the strategic thinking of 
western elites.24 Similarly, while historians have taken a new interest in international institutions, they 
have focused predominantly on the ideas and policies of the western governments and elites that 
initiated and shaped them.25  
 Historians have, of course, recently begun to pay much more attention to the growing role in 
international politics of non-state actors, both western and non-western. But here too they have 
generally been more interested in culture and ideology than in strategy. One of the most vibrant sub-
fields within this new international history, for instance, is the history of human rights. The focus of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Dane Kennedy, “The Imperial History Wars,” Journal of British Studies 51, no. 1 (January 2015): 12. 
24 One notable exception is Matthew Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of 
the Algerian War for Independence,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no. 2 (May 2001): 221-45. See also 
“Part III: Strategy from Below,” in Lawrence Freedman’s magisterial Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 245-456. On the revival in the study of grand strategy, see John Lewis Gaddis “What is Grand Strategy?” 
(Karl Von Der Heyden distinguished lecture, Duke University, Durham, NC, 26 February 2009); Thomas Meaney and 
Stephen Wertheim, “Grand Flattery,” The Nation, 28 May 2012, 27-31. 
25 See, for instance, in the case of the United Nations: Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for 
Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea 
(New York: Penguin, 2012); Stephen Wertheim, “Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy in World 
War II” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2015). Important exceptions include Roland Burke, Decolonization and the 
Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 59-91; Irwin, Gordian Knot; 
Meredith Terretta, “‘We Had Been Fooled into Thinking that the UN Watches over the Entire World’: Human Rights, 
UN Trust Territories, and Africa’s Decolonization,” Human Rights Quarterly 34, no. 2 (May 2012): 329-60. 
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most scholars in this new field of inquiry has been primarily on the content, geographical scope, and 
salience of “rights talk” in the past.26 But the danger of too narrow a focus on the history of human 
rights is not only, as Samuel Moyn suggests, that it can obscure the significance of other ideologies 
that may have had far greater salience than human rights to the historical actors we study.27 It is also 
that we lose sight of, or simply take for granted, the strategies and tactics that advocates of human 
rights – and of other idealisms – have used in their efforts to realize their objectives. Indeed, the 
ideology of human rights and the strategies to secure human rights are sometimes simply conflated: 
in one recent study of anticolonial activists in Cameroon in the 1950s, for instance, “the ideology 
and the practice of human rights” themselves become a “liberation strategy.”28 “Human rights talk” 
might have been used to express the ultimate objectives for which groups were struggling. More 
instrumentally, rights talk might have been deployed for tactical reasons to win support or a hearing 
for a political struggle in certain constituencies or institutional venues. But invoking human rights is 
not in itself a strategy. 
 In the case of South Africa, historians have studied the ideologies, moral economies, and 
imagined futures that animated those who opposed apartheid, exploring their relationship to ideas of 
human rights, race, nationalism, Christianity, and socialism.29 But the question of precisely how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Samuel Moyn, “Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography of Human Rights,” Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science 8 (December 2012): 123-40. 
27 Samuel Moyn, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 in the History of Cosmopolitanism,” Critical 
Inquiry 40, no. 4 (Summer 2014): 365-84. 
28 Terretta, “Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and Africa’s Decolonization,” 332. 
29 Among the most notable studies of these topics are Saul Dubow, South Africa’s Struggle for Human Rights (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2012); Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba [Oyama Mabandla], Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the 
South African Communist Party in Exile (London: James Currey, 1991); David Everatt, The Origins of Non-racialism: White 
Opposition to Apartheid in the 1950s (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009); Irina Filatova, “The Lasting Legacy: The 
Soviet Theory of the National-Democratic Revolution and South Africa,” South African Historical Journal 64, no. 3 
(September 2012): 507-37; Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978); Magaziner, The Law and the Prophets; Oliver M. Murphy, “Race, Violence, and Nation: African 
Nationalism and Popular Politics in South Africa’s Eastern Cape, 1948-1970” (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 
2013). 
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apartheid’s opponents planned to get from the present to the futures they imagined has received 
much less attention. In 1985, while the struggle against apartheid still continued, the sociologists 
Dennis Davis and Robert Fine published a trenchant critique of scholars and activists studying social 
movements in general, and South African liberation movements in particular, for their “inclination 
to avoid thorny questions of strategy and tactics.” Instead, 
definite strategic decisions may be naturalised as the only possible response to a particular 
situation or set of ‘structural predeterminations’. They may be idealised as rational modes of 
action which make sense in the context of their application. They may be ignored in favour 
of a celebration of the struggle or a denunciation of its suppression… Left out of the picture 
is the conscious, rational side of social movements: their capacity to make programmatic and 
operational choices, to learn from the past and from theory, to combine their own 
experience with the experience of other movements abroad, to question themselves through 
debate and criticism and to rebuild afresh.30 
If Davis and Fine’s charge that “the question of strategy has not yet been adequately ‘de-natured’ 
nor opened up to critical thought” was true in the 1980s (when they were among a small group of 
scholars – many of them leftist critics of the African National Congress and the South African 
Communist Party – who sought to draw lessons from the past for future anti-apartheid strategy31) it 
is all the more applicable to scholarship today. And it applies not only to the study of domestic 
resistance to apartheid, but also to its international dimensions – and indeed to the study of 
transnational activism more generally. 
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popular structural Marxism). Ciraj Rassool, “History Anchored in Politics: An Interview with Martin Legassick,” South 
African Historical Journal 56, no. 1 (2006): 32. 
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 The spectacular growth of transnationally connected social and political movements in the 
twentieth century was significant not only because these movements transcended the nation state 
borders that often bounded the studies of earlier generations of scholars, nor only because they 
often constructed new ‘imagined solidarities’ beyond the state. Such movements were also 
significant because they sought to find ways to project power and influence across national borders 
in an increasingly globalized world. This dissertation analyzes the shifting role of one set of ways of 
trying to do this – external boycotts, in their various forms – in the strategies of those seeking to end 
apartheid, inside and outside South Africa. 
This is necessarily an international history. The global anti-apartheid movement was, in the 
words of United Nations official E.S. Reddy, “a coalition of anti-apartheid organisations and 
individuals, as well as a growing number of governments, which in the 1960s was able to secure the 
active involvement of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and many other international organisations. This was a 
coalition which encompassed the world and consisted of international, regional, national and local 
bodies.”32 We already possess many fine-grained studies of the anti-apartheid activity of particular 
organizations or governments,33 or in particular countries or regions.34 By taking a step back, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 E.S. Reddy, “AAM and UN: Partners in the International Campaign Against Apartheid,” in The Anti-Apartheid 
Movement: a 40-year Perspective (London: Anti-Apartheid Movement Archives Committee, 2000), 40. 
33 Such as, for instance: E.K. Dumor, Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa: An African Response to Apartheid (Accra: Ghana 
Universities Press, 1991); Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Enuga S. Reddy, “The United Nations and the Struggle for Liberation in 
South Africa,” in SADET, Road to Democracy, vol. 3, pt. 1, International Solidarity, 41-139; SADET, Road to Democracy, vol. 5, 
African Solidarity; Vladimir Shubin, The Hot ‘Cold War’: the USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008); Pauline 
Webb, ed., A Long Struggle: The Involvement of the World Council of Churches in South Africa (Geneva: WCC Publications, 
1994). 
34 The only attempt to tell a global history of the struggle against apartheid has been in video form: Field, Have You Heard 
from Johannesburg. Thörn, Anti-Apartheid and Skinner, Foundations of Anti-Apartheid each focus on activism in two countries 
(Britain and Sweden, and Britain and the U.S., respectively). Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle 
Against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995) includes brief case studies of three countries (Britain, the 
U.S., and Zimbabwe), and three intergovernmental organizations (the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the 
Organization of African Unity). The most comprehensive account of activism around the globe is SADET, Road to 
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dissertation seeks to analyze major shifts in the strategic and tactical perspectives that animated 
much of that activity. It does not seek to narrate the history of the anti-apartheid activity of 
international, regional, national and local bodies in every part of the world. Instead, it focuses on 
moments of strategic and tactical innovation, analyzing how and why new ideas emerged and spread 
(or were resisted) about the role that various forms of boycotts might play in the struggle against 
apartheid. 
Such new ideas did not emanate from a single group of protagonists in one part of the 
world. Most anti-apartheid campaigners outside South Africa understood their activities to be acts of 
“solidarity” with the South African opponents of apartheid, and – especially – with the two 
liberation movements that came to be officially recognized by the Organization of African Unity: the 
African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).35 But this did not mean 
that non-South African opponents of apartheid simply took directions from the South African 
movements. The campaigns for boycotts and sanctions against South Africa were not a 
straightforward case of what the political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have 
theorized in their study of transnational advocacy networks as “the ‘boomerang’ pattern of 
influence,” according to which, “when channels between the state and its domestic actors are 
blocked… domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to 
bring pressure on their states from outside.”36 The development of anti-apartheid boycott campaigns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Democracy, vol. 3, International Solidarity, but this consists of individually-authored chapters that each focus on activity in a 
single country, region, or organization, and gives little sense of the interactions between them. 
35 This understanding contributed to the cautious, ambiguous, and in some cases hostile response of many foreign 
opponents of apartheid to the emergence of new movements inside South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, including the 
black consciousness movement and the independent trade union movement. See, for instance, Christabel Gurney, “The 
1970s: The Anti-Apartheid Movement’s Difficult Decade,” Journal of Southern African Studies 35, no. 2 (June 2009): 472, 
481; Genevieve Klein, “The British Anti-Apartheid Movement and Political Prisoner Campaigns, 1973-1980,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 35, no. 2 (June 2009): 464-65. 
36 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), 12-13. See also Rob Skinner, “Struggles on the Page: British Antiapartheid and Radical 
Scholarship,” Radical History Review 119 (Spring 2014): 217. 
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was a much more interactive process between South African and foreign opponents of apartheid 
than this call-and-response model would suggest. Indeed, as we shall see, ideas about new forms of 
external anti-apartheid action were often first developed by bodies that were not exclusively 
concerned with the struggle to overthrow apartheid, and that believed that such anti-apartheid 
actions would also contribute to the achievement of their other domestic or international objectives. 
In writing this history, I have therefore drawn upon the vast documentary record created by 
individuals, organizations, and governments that were involved in taking part in, debating, 
monitoring, or resisting anti-apartheid activity around the world.37 In the course of researching this 
dissertation I consulted archival collections in more than seventy repositories in six countries. In 
addition, I have also drawn upon on those collections of documents that have now been digitized.38 
Some of these collections – like the archive of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, now held by 
the University of Oxford, and the microfilmed (and now digitized) records of the American 
Committee on Africa  – have been mined extensively by previous scholars. Others have been rarely, 
if ever, used by researchers of this topic.  
I have nevertheless barely scratched the surface of the potentially relevant material that is 
held around the world. As a study of political strategy, this dissertation is not a social history of how 
the anti-apartheid struggle was experienced “from below” by grassroots participants. Within the 
(often non-elite) bodies whose activities I analyse, my focus has been on elites, on the leaderships 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Peter Limb, Richard Knight, and Christine Root, “The Global Antiapartheid Movement: A Critical Analysis of 
Archives and Collections,” Radical History Review 119 (Spring 2014): 161-77. 
38 On relevant digitization projects, see, for instance, Allen Isaacman, Premesh Lalu and Thomas Nygren, “Digitization, 
History, and the Making of a Postcolonial Archive of Southern African Liberation Struggles: The Aluka Project,” Africa 
Today 52, no. 2 (Winter, 2005): 55-77; Richard Knight, “The African Activist Project: Preserving the History of the 
Solidarity Movement,” Peacework 35, no. 382 (February 2008): 4-6; Christopher Saunders, “Digital Imaging South Africa 
(DISA): A Case Study,” Program: Electronic Library and Information Systems 39, no. 4 (2005): 345-52. 
 One problem that has accompanied the increasing availability of so much relevant primary source material 
online is that scholarly citations now frequently suffer from “link rot.” To avoid this, in citations in the footnotes below 
to online sources that can be accessed without a subscription, I provide links created using the Perma.cc archiving 
service developed by Harvard Law School Library. 
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that were (usually) responsible for defining strategy and tactics. And I pay particular attention to 
bodies located in Britain and the United States. Of course, Britain and the United States were far 
from the only places where there were organized and enduring campaigns against apartheid. But it 
was the variety and extent of the economic, political, and cultural connections between these two 
states and South Africa that helped produce the variety and extent of the efforts by opponents of 
apartheid to target those connections by campaigns for various kinds of boycotts.  
I also pay much closer attention than most previous studies of external anti-apartheid activity 
to other forms of resistance used by South Africans themselves inside the country. If we wish to 
understand how boycott advocates believed that external boycotts would contribute to ending 
apartheid, we cannot study external anti-apartheid activity as a discrete phenomenon, analytically 
separable from those other forms. This dissertation therefore analyzes how South African and 
foreign opponents of apartheid understood various forms of anti-apartheid activity – internal and 
external – to relate each other, and thus to the ultimate objective of bringing apartheid to an end. 
These understandings not only varied between different groups and individuals, but changed 
dramatically over time. Previous studies of external anti-apartheid action, in contrast, have tended to 
exaggerate the consistent significance of international action in the strategies of South African 
opponents of apartheid, and thus to underplay the strategic significance of domestic action, 
including the South African liberation movements’ “turn to violence” after 1960.39 This 
interpretative tendency is part of a broader scholarly trend. If the fundamental issue for earlier 
generations of students of international history was the question of war and peace, recent research 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See, for instance, Connie Field, “Response,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 5 (November 2012): 812; Irwin, Gordian Knot, 
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Commenting on the literature on the internal struggle against apartheid in the 1980s, Gay Seidman notes that 
“Recent social movement analysts appear reluctant to engage directly with movements’ use of violent tactics, remaining 
silent about the interplay between violent and nonviolent tactics” and suggests that one reason may be researchers’ 
“discomfort around [the] morality” of the use of violence. Gay Seidman, “Guerrillas in their Midst: Armed Struggle in 
the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement,” Mobilization: An International Journal 6, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 111-27. 
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has focused more on the role of what one scholar calls “unarmed forces” in the history of 
international relations.40 Indeed, the pioneering international and transnational historian Akira Iriye 
excludes “military” bodies from the category of “international nongovernmental organizations” by 
definition. For Iriye, then, “A history of international relations as seen through the activities of 
nongovernmental organizations” becomes a history of peaceful “transnational cooperation,” that 
stands in stark contrast to the violent and conflict-prone history of relations between states.41  
When historians bring such assumptions to the study of the struggle against apartheid, the 
result is profoundly misleading. The reader would never guess from most studies of external anti-
apartheid activity that for nearly three decades leading strategists of both the ANC and the PAC 
were focused on the “seizure of power” by armed force.42 The ANC and the PAC may never have 
posed a serious military threat to the South African state, let alone have come close to riding tanks 
victoriously into Pretoria, as Mao Tse-Tung entered Beijing in 1949, Fidel Castro entered Havana in 
1959, and the North Vietnamese army entered Saigon in 1975. But it is only with the “enormous 
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condescension of posterity” that we can simply ignore ANC and PAC strategists’ beliefs at the time 
that they would do so.43 If, however, we choose not to ignore those beliefs, then our research 
question becomes how boycotts and sanctions were (or were not) believed by contemporary actors 
to relate to this model of change. 
This dissertation, therefore, analyzes how various forms of external boycotts emerged and 
developed as elements of the struggle against apartheid, and how they were understood in relation to 
other forms of action against apartheid as these too changed over time. Chapter 1 shows that in the 
period between the Second World War and the end of 1958, most leading opponents of apartheid 
inside South Africa were uninterested in international boycotts and sanctions as a means to assist 
their struggle. They were instead focused on domestic campaigns against apartheid. Boycotts by 
South African consumers and commuters became a prominent feature of domestic resistance to 
apartheid in this period, but the specific objectives they were intended to achieve could not have 
been assisted (and in some cases might have been hindered) by attempts to organize counterpart 
international boycotts. Indeed, the earliest discussions of using international economic boycotts 
against the racist policies of the South African government occurred not in South Africa itself, but in 
India. In 1946 India had become the first country in the world to impose economic sanctions against 
South Africa. This action was intended as a unilateral effort to compel the South African 
government to the negotiating table on the specific issue of its treatment of Indians in South Africa. 
When South African Indian leader Yusuf Dadoo subsequently called for India’s action to be 
replicated by other states, the Indian government did not support him. Dadoo subsequently dropped 
the idea and like other South African resistance leaders focused over the next decade on domestic 
campaigns. 
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Chapter 2 analyzes the specific conjuncture of circumstances that caused boycotts of South 
African goods to break out across the world in the fifteen-month period beginning in December 
1958. It shows that, contrary to the assumptions of existing studies, this was not the result of an 
initiative by the ANC. When the All-African People’s Conference (AAPC) in Accra, Ghana passed a 
resolution in December 1958 calling for African states to impose sanctions against South Africa, this 
was primarily a consequence of the advocacy of Reverend Michael Scott, a former missionary in 
South Africa who was at time one of the only outspoken supporters of the idea of sanctions. 
Meanwhile, though both the ANC and the newly-founded PAC remained focused on resisting 
apartheid inside the country, the fact that the AAPC resolution coincided with decisions by both 
congresses to launch domestic consumer boycott campaigns gave important inspiration and 
legitimacy to the subsequent efforts to organize consumer and industrial boycotts overseas. Those 
overseas boycott efforts were in large part the result of efforts by a single individual, Kenyan labor 
leader Tom Mboya. Crucially, the incipient boycott campaigns gained the support of the British 
Labour Party and – as a result of Mboya’s efforts – the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU). Though both organizations adopted the boycott of South African goods primarily 
in order to appeal to constituencies outside South Africa, rather than to influence events inside the 
country, their support further spread and entrenched the idea that overseas opposition to apartheid 
could best be expressed in the form of boycott. 
Chapter 3 investigates the four year period after the Sharpeville Massacre, when, for the first 
time, the leadership of the South African Congress movement came to believe that international 
economic sanctions could play a significant role in their efforts to overcome apartheid. This first 
occurred in the specific circumstances that prevailed immediately after the massacre: almost all 
options for resisting apartheid domestically were closed down, the South African economy appeared 
suddenly vulnerable, the United Nations was being transformed by the entry of sixteen new African 
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states, and non-governmental boycotts had already been gaining popularity around the world at the 
exact moment that the massacre occurred. The ANC now embraced sanctions. So too did the 
governments of the independent African states, which had previously opposed the idea. Initially, 
most advocates of sanctions believed that they could contribute to the struggle against apartheid by 
creating economic hardship that would lead both white business and white voters to defect from the 
ruling National Party. Even after Nelson Mandela and other Congress leaders gave up hope in the 
idea of a peaceful transition to democracy and turned to armed struggle, they continued to believe 
that sanctions could play a crucial role by facilitating that struggle by degrading the state’s capability 
to resist it. The campaign for sanctions reached its apogee in 1964, when an independent “Group of 
Experts” appointed by the UN Security Council endorsed the idea. But though many African, Asian, 
and Soviet bloc states unilaterally broke off trade with South Africa, the African bloc ultimately 
proved unable to exert sufficient leverage on Britain and the United States to compel them to 
acquiesce in a compulsory sanctions regime. 
The fourth and final chapter analyzes the five-year period after the collapse of the effort to 
secure governmental sanctions through the United Nations. As both the African states and the 
South African liberation movements became disillusioned with the United Nations – and with each 
other – both the ANC and the PAC focused increasingly exclusively on the use of guerrilla warfare 
to achieve the armed seizure of power. They no longer expected international action to play a 
significant role in facilitating this. But they did fear that if their guerrilla operations ever managed to 
pose a military threat to the South African state, the west might intervene on the side of the 
government. Anti-apartheid campaigns in the west were now focused on reducing the likelihood of 
such an intervention. Inspired by the efforts of new left groups who shared anti-apartheid activists’ 
disillusionment with achieving political change through governmental action, boycott campaigns 
were now redirected at western firms with investments in South Africa. At this stage, the organizers 
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of these campaigns did not expect to be able to compel firms to disinvest. The campaigns were 
intended to create a constituency that would oppose western intervention in the future war that 
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Yusuf Dadoo was desperate to get to the United Nations in 1948. The headquarters buildings of the 
new international organization were still under construction in New York, and the UN General 
Assembly was being held that year in Paris. South Africa’s new National Party government, elected 
in May 1948, was determined to stop Dadoo getting there. Dadoo was the president of the 
Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of South Africa (CPSA). In September, after he had boarded his plane out of the country, he was 
hauled off by a customs officer and told that his passport was being confiscated on the orders of the 
Minister of the Interior. Since no airline would allow him to travel without his passport, Dadoo 
immediately attempted to sue the Minister in the Supreme Court for its return.  
Unwilling to wait for the legal wrangling to be resolved, Dadoo instead chartered a private 
plane to take him out of the country. The aircraft’s owners demanded that the TIC put up £100,000 
as a guarantee in case the government impounded the plane, but in the event the ageing Dakota – 
with Dadoo the only passenger on board – was allowed to leave without further obstruction. Having 
finally made it to London, however, Dadoo was then refused a visa by the French authorities. 
Sympathetic friends in Britain attempted to hire a helicopter: their plan, according to one account, 
was “that Dadoo should land on the grounds of the Palace at which the UN session was taking 
place, as that was international territory.” When the scheme fell through, Dadoo finally had to 
reconcile himself to sending a young South African Indian living in London in his place.1 
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 The year before, Dadoo had called for a “world trade boycott” to compel the South African 
government to comply with a United Nations resolution on its treatment of Indians in South Africa. 
His herculean efforts to get to the UN in 1948 reflected the importance attached to international 
action in the period immediately after the Second World War by some South African opponents of 
white supremacy. Racial segregation had been institutionalized in the Union of South Africa since its 
creation in 1910, in the wake of the Anglo-Boer War. By the 1940s, a system of separate, 
subordinate, and largely powerless political institutions had been created for Africans, and African 
land ownership was restricted to so-called “native reserves.” There had been brief hopes that the 
Second World War might mark the beginning of a move towards reform: Prime Minister Jan Smuts 
famously declared in 1942 that “segregation has fallen on evil days.” The pass law system, which 
restricted Africans’ movement within the country, was briefly relaxed. But in 1943 Smuts broke an 
earlier promise that he would not introduce new segregation legislation during the war. The 
government passed new laws that further extended segregation to South Africa’s Indian population, 
the descendants of indentured laborers and migrants who had come to southern Africa in the late 
nineteenth century. 
 In 1946, the government of India responded to Smuts’ anti-Indian measures by imposing 
trade sanctions against South Africa. Inside the country, radical leaders of the South African Indian 
Congress (SAIC) launched a campaign of passive resistance to attract international attention and 
action. Representatives of the passive resisters also traveled to New York to lobby delegates at the 
first session of the UN General Assembly. When the General Assembly subsequently passed 
resolutions on the treatment of Indians in South Africa and on the status of the South African-
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administered territory of South West Africa, the news was greeted with euphoria by South African 
opponents of segregation. 
 This chapter begins by analyzing India’s imposition of sanctions in 1946, and the efforts by 
Dadoo and other South African Indian activists to internationalize their struggle. It shows that the 
idea of boycotting South African trade originated in India, where there was already a long tradition 
of economic boycotts. Indian sanctions advocates expected sanctions to work in the way usually 
assumed by political scientists: they believed they would compel the South African government to 
comply with their demand that it enter into talks with the Indian government regarding the 
treatment of Indians. The Indian sanctions initiative was also a unilateral one: sanctions advocates 
believed that Indian economic leverage alone would be sufficient to achieve this outcome. 
Subsequently, the Indian government refused to take up Dadoo’s call for sanctions to be adopted on 
a multilateral basis in order to increase the pressure on South Africa. No other state responded to 
Dadoo’s appeal. 
 Though they did cause considerable economic dislocation for a short period, India’s 
sanctions failed to alter the course of the South African government. Indeed, the South African 
position became even more intransigent after the general election of 1948, in which Smuts’ United 
Party was defeated by the Afrikaner nationalists of D.F. Malan’s National Party, committed 
segregationists who had run on a platform of apartheid (apartness or separateness). Dadoo’s 
unsuccessful attempts to get to the UN later that year were in fact the last gasp of a strategy of 
internationalization that was subsequently abandoned. Instead, as the leaders of the SAIC, the 
African National Congress, and the Communist Party began to cooperate increasingly closely in the 
1950s, their strategic focus was internal. Many leading figures in what became known as the 
Congress Alliance travelled abroad in the 1950s, and international solidarity and support was 
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welcomed and encouraged. But international action was not now expected to play a significant role 
in liberating South Africa from white minority rule.  
A few individuals and organizations in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere, made 
occasional suggestions of using various kinds of economic pressure against South Africa. But – with 
the important exception of the Caribbean – none of these generated much interest or support 
among opponents of apartheid either inside or outside South Africa. Though various kinds of 
boycotts became an increasingly central focus of the Congress movement’s activity in the 1950s, 
these were domestic campaigns whose objectives did not lend themselves straightforwardly to 
internationalization. Indeed, this chapter shows that Congress leaders had several reasons to believe 
that international economic boycotts might in fact be detrimental to the strategies they were 
pursuing in this period. 
Rather than economic isolation, it was the idea of some form of cultural and sporting 
boycott of South Africa that gained some traction in this period and around which an incipient 
transnational network began to crystallize. The network of groups and individuals inside and outside 
South Africa who took up this idea were in most cases connected only peripherally – if at all – to the 
Congress Alliance. Colin Legum, an émigré South African journalist who became involved in the 
campaign in Britain, later observed that one of the “remarkable features” of the sports boycott was 
that “it was initiated, promoted and sustained by individuals and groups outside of the structures of 
the anti-apartheid movement.”2 The initiators of the early cultural and sports boycotts saw them as 
means not to exert direct pressure on the intransigent National Party government, but to promote 
inter-racial harmony and an evolution in white attitudes by desegregating South African sports and 
culture. This model of evolutionary change through the transformation of culture had little appeal 
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for the leaders of the Congress movement, who remained optimistic that they could achieve rapid 
political change through their domestic campaigns. 
 
I. ‘The best and surest measure which India can adopt to bring South Africa to her knees’: 
India’s Imposition of Sanctions. 
In March 1946, India, then still part of the British Empire, announced its intention to sever its trade 
relations with South Africa. India thus became the first country in the world to impose economic 
sanctions against South Africa because of its government’s racist policies.3 Indeed the earliest 
discussions of imposing economic sanctions against South Africa took place in India, not in South 
Africa itself. Both the use of economic boycotts and concern about the treatment of Indians in 
South Africa and elsewhere had deep roots in Indian politics. India’s most prominent anti-colonial 
leader, Mohandas Gandhi, had first come to fame when he led South African Indians in civil 
disobedience campaigns against segregatory legislation in South Africa in the early twentieth century. 
Subsequently, in the years following Gandhi’s return to India in 1915, both the Indian colonial 
government and the anti-colonial Indian National Congress (INC) frequently expressed concern 
about discrimination against the Indian diaspora in South Africa, British East Africa, and elsewhere. 
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At almost the same moment that Gandhi was launching his first satyagraha (truth-force) campaign in 
South Africa, radical nationalists in Bengal responded to the British partition of the province in 1905 
by launching a campaign of swadeshi (indigenous manufacture) and boycott of British goods. From 
1920 onwards, swadeshi was taken up by the INC under Gandhi, who encouraged Indians to wear 
home-spun cloth, rather than imported fabrics.4  
 The idea of using of economic boycott to counter discrimination against Indians overseas 
was raised as early as 1919, by Satyendra Sinha, then Under Secretary of State for India, a moderate 
nationalist and former president of the INC, and the first Indian member of the British House of 
Lords. When the South African parliament passed new anti-Indian laws that year, Sinha suggested 
that India should retaliate by legislating to prohibit “all forms of intercourse with South Africa.” As 
a first step, the Government of India did threaten to deny Indian mining concessions to South 
African companies.5 In 1923, Srinivasa Sastri – a leading member of the Indian Liberal Party and a 
former representative of the Indian government in London – responded to the British government’s 
decision in favor of unequal representation of Indians and white setters in the legislature of the 
British colony of Kenya, by calling for the Indian government to boycott the 1924 British Empire 
Exhibition in London and to bar the importation of British goods into India.6 Sastri’s call was not 
taken up by either the Indian central or provincial governments, though some of those who would 
later play leading roles in imposing sanctions against South Africa were involved in the efforts to 
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implement it at provincial level. Narayan Bhaskar Khare – an INC member of the Legislative 
Council of Central Provinces and Berar – unsuccessfully attempted to pass a resolution forbidding 
departments of the provincial government from purchasing goods manufactured anywhere in the 
British Empire outside India. Among the supporters of Khare’s resolution was Govindrao 
Deshmukh, another INC legislator, who explicitly linked his support for Khare’s resolution to the 
restrictions on trade, franchise, immigration, and land purchase imposed on Indians in some British 
colonies.7 
Following these abortive efforts to organize governmental boycotts, the INC organized a 
non-governmental consumer boycott to counter discrimination against Indians overseas in 1937. 
This time the flashpoint was the British island protectorate of Zanzibar, off the coast of East Africa, 
where new laws were introduced that cut Zanzibari Indian traders out of the clove business. In 
response, the INC established an All-India Clove Boycott Committee to co-ordinate a boycott of 
the island’s main export. The campaign was remarkably effective: by the end of the year Zanzibar 
had already lost £30,000 in revenue. In May 1938, the Zanzibar government negotiated a settlement 
with representatives of the Indian government and the INC, and removed the offending 
restrictions.8 
By 1943, when the Smuts government in South Africa passed a “Pegging Act” that restricted 
sales of property to Indian South Africans, there had thus been several previous attempts by Indians 
to organize economic boycotts to oppose discrimination against Indians overseas. Narayan Bhaskar 
Khare, who had broken with the INC in the 1930s and subsequently became, in his own words, “a 
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relentless and irreconcilable critic of Gandhi and Gandhism,” was now the member of the Viceroy’s 
Executive Council in charge of the Department of Indians Overseas. (Khare speculated that the 
Viceroy had appointed him to this cabinet position in the belief that his “anti-Gandhism” would 
prove helpful to the British).9 Khare immediately responded to the Pegging Act by securing the 
passage by the Indian Central Legislative Assembly of a “Reciprocity Act.” Reciprocity, which been 
repeatedly suggested by INC members of the Assembly – including Govindrao Deshmukh – since 
the mid-1930s, empowered the Government of India to treat residents of other parts of the British 
Empire in the same way that those British possessions treated Indians. In October 1944 the Indian 
Government announced that it would begin enforcing the Reciprocity Act against South Africa. 
India’s premier hotel, the Taj Mahal in Bombay, was one of several hotels and temples that 
subsequently put up large notices declaring that “South African Europeans are not allowed.”10 
Given that there were just one hundred and twenty white South Africans in India at the 
time, and that they were usually unidentifiable, the enforcement of reciprocity was, however, 
essentially symbolic, as Khare himself recognized.11 Deshmukh – a friend of Khare’s for more than 
two decades – had been suggesting since the early 1940s that economic sanctions would be a more 
effective measure. After taking office, Khare became an enthusiastic supporter of the idea: in 1943 
he commissioned Lanka Sundaram, the editor of the New Delhi journal Commerce & Industry, to 
study it further.12 
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Sundaram’s study, for which he recruited two prominent South African Indians resident in 
India as co-authors, concluded that “trade and economic sanctions are the best and surest measure 
which India can adopt to bring South Africa to her knees.” Citing the success of the clove boycott in 
securing the rights of Indians in Zanzibar, Sundaram and his co-authors argued that trade sanctions 
against South Africa could be similarly successful. Their report found that India’s economic leverage 
with South Africa lay not in reducing Indian consumer demand (as in the case of the clove boycott), 
but in cutting off supply: South Africa’s dependence on Indian jute sacks as packing materials for 
agricultural produce, and the use of Indian oil seeds, fats, and wax in the manufacture of South 
African soap and other products meant that a cessation of Indian exports to the country would 
cause “considerable paralysis of the Union’s economy” and thus “make an impression on the Union 
government and its white population.”13 By the end of 1944 majorities in both the Legislative 
Assembly and the Viceroy’s Council wanted to impose trade sanctions against South Africa. The 
British cabinet in London, however, refused to allow “what amounts to a declaration of economic 
warfare by one part of the Commonwealth on another in the middle of the war.”14 
 By January 1946, when Smuts announced his intention to introduce new anti-Indian 
legislation to replace the expiring Pegging Act, the possibility that India might impose trade 
sanctions on South Africa had thus already been extensively discussed in political circles in India. 
The discussions in India also generated some interest among Indian activists in South Africa, though 
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there was initially no unanimity on the idea.15 Smuts’ announcement, however, had a galvanizing 
effect on the South African Indian Congress, which had for several years been divided between “old 
guard” moderates who had traditionally led South African Indian political organizations, and a 
younger generation of more confrontational “radicals,” led by Yusuf Dadoo in the Transvaal and by 
Monty Naicker in Natal. When Smuts refused to countenance an SAIC delegation’s request that he 
convene a conference with the Indian government to discuss the position of Indians in South 
Africa, the SAIC’s warring factions temporarily united around a new approach. The Congress’s 
traditional approach of sending deputations to try to persuade the South African government to 
change its mind clearly offered no further hope in the immediate future.16  
In February 1946, the SAIC’s national conference passed a sweeping resolution “to mobilise 
all the resources of the Indian people in this country to take every possible measure to secure the 
lapsing of the Pegging Act and to oppose the proposed legislation.” Specifically, the conference 
resolved to send a deputation to India to ask the Indian government to impose diplomatic and 
economic sanctions if the South African government refused to convene a roundtable conference to 
discuss the proposed legislation. The SAIC, meanwhile, would immediately “prepare the Indian 
people [in South Africa] for concerted and prolonged resistance.” A further resolution affirmed the 
SAIC’s “faith and hope in the principles of which the foundation of the Charter of the United 
Nations is based” and stated that “as an unrepresented minority,” the South African Indian 
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community “claims its human rights to be heard before the General Assembly and Security Council” 
of the new United Nations Organization (UNO).17 
 The SAIC’s resolution represented a significant internationalization of the South African 
Indian community’s struggle against segregation. Indians in South Africa had always maintained 
close links with India, in both the personal and political realms.18 The Second World War further 
magnified interest in international affairs: allied leaders’ declarations of war and peace aims had 
raised hopes about major economic, social, and political change in the South African Indian 
community, as they did in many other parts of the world. South African Indian leaders were 
especially struck by the contrast between Smuts’ introduction of segregationist legislation at home 
and his reputation as an international statesman credited with drafting the ringing preamble to the 
United Nations Charter, including its invocation of “fundamental human rights.” This point was 
made repeatedly by the leaders of the SAIC deputation that had visited Smuts. SAIC secretary A.I. 
Kajee, for instance, “appealed to General Smuts as the originator of the preamble of the UNO 
charters to put into practice the principles of those charters in his own country.” When Smuts 
refused to budge, Kajee told him that by introducing the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian 
Representation Bill, he might gain support among those white South Africans obsessed with Indian 
“penetration” into white areas, but that he would “lose his international soul.” The approach the 
SAIC adopted in the wake of the meeting reflected Indian leaders’ hopes that by internationalizing 
their own struggle they could force Smuts to rethink this choice.19 
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 In India, the Viceroy’s Council had in fact decided to impose sanctions against South Africa 
on March 6, 1946, even before the deputation sent by the SAIC met with Archibald Wavell, the 
British Viceroy, to present their requests.20 As the beleaguered Wavell recorded in his journal, he had 
“managed to keep [the imposition of trade sanctions] in abeyance for about two years.” But the war 
effort against the Axis was no longer an obstacle. And the imposition of sanctions against South 
Africa was one of the few issues on which there was agreement between the INC and the Muslim 
League, whose divisions would lead the following year to the partition of independent India and 
Pakistan. Britain’s new Labour government, committed to a rapid withdrawal from India, expressed 
its regret at the Council’s decision, but did not attempt to intervene. On March 12, the same day that 
Wavell met with the SAIC delegation, Khare announced publicly that India’s efforts to arrange a 
roundtable conference with South Africa had failed, and that the Indian government therefore 
intended to impose economic sanctions. Two weeks later, as the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian 
Representation Bill received its second reading in the South African parliament, the Indian 
government formally gave the required three month notice of the termination of its trade agreement 
with South Africa.21 
 The other two concrete suggestions made by the SAIC delegation – withdrawing the Indian 
High Commissioner and bringing the issue before the United Nations – were subsequently also 
accepted by the Viceroy’s Council. The High Commissioner quietly set sail in May, leaving the 
Indian High Commission in South Africa in the charge of a junior official. Meanwhile Khare, as 
Wavell confided to his journal, had become “entranced with the prospect of ha[u]ling Smuts before 
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the bar of world opinion as a naughty boy.” Anomalously, India was a founder member of the 
United Nations, despite not yet being independent. A study by Khare’s department concluded that 
taking the complaint to the UN might have “considerable effect” on the South African 
government’s treatment of Indians. Smuts planned to ask the first session of the new UN General 
Assembly to approve the annexation of South West Africa, the former German colony over which 
South Africa had been granted a “mandate” by the now-defunct League of Nations in 1920. The 
South African government’s desire to maintain “a most spotless appearance” while making this 
request would give India leverage, the study argued. In June, therefore, when the Asiatic Land 
Tenure and Indian Representation Act became law, the Indian government formally requested that 
the issue be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly.22  
In South Africa, meanwhile, Indian radicals organized to give effect to the “concerted and 
prolonged resistance” called for in the SAIC’s February resolution. The still-cautious national 
leadership of the SAIC left the planning up to the more confrontational provincial leaders in Natal 
and the Transvaal, who established a Joint Passive Resistance Council (JPRC) to coordinate a 
campaign of civil disobedience when the new anti-Indian legislation went into force. The campaign 
took the form of selected volunteers pitching tents on an empty housing plot in Durban that the 
new law prohibited Indians from occupying. Each time the protesters were arrested, the JPRC 
assigned a new batch of selected volunteers to occupy the plot and be arrested in turn. By early 
October a total of almost 750 protesters had been jailed. On 24 October 1946 a “UNO batch” of 
355 passive resisters – by far the largest batch yet – occupied the plot to coincide with the opening 
of the UN General Assembly in New York.23 Indeed, more than any other campaign in South 
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Africa’s history – before or since – the strategy of the JPRC’s passive resistance campaign was 
premised on its international impact. Though the campaign took its inspiration from Gandhi’s 
satyagraha campaigns in South Africa in the early twentieth century, the campaign’s organizers placed 
little store in Gandhi’s belief that exemplary sacrifice and suffering could bring about a change of 
heart on the part of the oppressor. Rather they hoped that the arrest of resisters in South Africa 
would provoke an international outcry. Pressure from the Indian government and/or from the 
United Nations would then, it was hoped, force the South African government to agree to a 
roundtable conference with India.24  
 In addition to these efforts to attract international attention, the JPRC also sent two 
representatives, H.A. Naidoo and Sorabjee Rustomjee, to attend the UN General Assembly in New 
York. Naidoo was a labor organizer and leading radical in the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) who, like 
Yusuf Dadoo, was also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of South 
Africa. Rustomjee, a leading member of the ‘old guard,’ had led the SAIC deputation to India earlier 
in the year. While other old guard moderates remained aloof from the passive resistance campaign, 
Rustomjee had returned home inspired by the discussions he had held with Gandhi and Jawaharlal 
Nehru. He had led a batch of resisters during the first month of the campaign and was sentenced to 
three months of hard labor. After his release in October, he flew immediately to New York. 
 Rustomjee was also responsible for arranging the presence of a third South African in New 
York. Influenced by Nehru’s advice that Indians in South Africa should start co-operating with the 
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African majority in the country in their opposition to racial discrimination, Rustomjee concluded 
that the deputation to the UN would have greater impact if it included an African. He therefore 
asked Alfred Xuma, president of the African National Congress, to join him.25 Founded in 1912, the 
ANC is celebrated today as Africa’s oldest liberation movement. Despite occasional flirtations with 
mass mobilization, for most of the period before the Second World War the Congress was a small 
pressure group, led by members of the tiny African professional middle class. After a period in the 
1930s when it had been essentially moribund, it had been revitalized and reorganized by Xuma, who 
became president in 1940. A new branch structure was established, and paid-up ANC membership 
increased, from a thousand in the 1930s to five and a half thousand in 1947.26 Though committed to 
“educat[ing] the people to know they were being oppressed,” Xuma was cautious of mass action and 
remained wedded to the politics of respectability and moderation. Like most of his predecessors, he 
preferred to advocate for Africans’ interests through petitions, memoranda, and deputations to 
South African government bodies. Rustomjee’s suggestion that he join the JPRC deputation to 
petition the United Nations in New York was thus an extension of Xuma’s preferred approach into 
the international arena. Xuma responded enthusiastically, and Rustomjee sent him a suitcase of cash 
to cover his travel expenses.27 
 The issues of South West Africa and South Africa’s treatment of Indians dominated the UN 
General Assembly session. Smuts himself had traveled to New York to make the case for annexing 
South West Africa. Nehru, the leader of the new “interim government” that had assumed office in 
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India in September, had embraced Khare’s idea of appealing to the United Nations and appointed a 
high-powered delegation led by his sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit. Nehru’s government assigned 
great significance to the UN in the postwar international order. “The world was full of hope,” 
Pandit later recalled. “The Charter of the United Nations was a challenge to the most cynical, and it 
was a moment in time when it seemed possible to remold the world to a design in which justice, 
equality and opportunity would help establish the peace for which an exhausted humanity yearned.” 
Once in New York, Rustomjee, Naidoo, and Xuma worked closely with Pandit’s Indian delegation 
on both the South African Indian and South West African issues. Xuma submitted to the UN a 
lengthy memorandum – also published as a pamphlet – in which he argued that South Africa, “by 
reason of its own policy of race and colour discrimination,” was not fit to administer South West 
Africa.28 
The Indian and South African efforts were also assisted by the radical Council on African 
Affairs (CAA), led by Paul Robeson and Alphaeus Hunton, who provided publicity, logistical, and 
lobbying support, On November 17, for instance, Pandit, Xuma, and Naidoo all addressed a mass 
meeting on South Africa organized by the CAA. The intensive lobbying by the Indian delegation, by 
the CAA, and by Xuma and JPRC deputation paid off. South Africa, backed by Britain and the 
United States, had argued that the UN was not competent to discuss its treatment of Indians 
because this was a matter within its domestic jurisdiction, as defined in Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter. But after a tense twelve-hour debate on December 8, thirty-two of the fifty-four members 
of the General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution that declared that the treatment of Indians in 
South Africa should conform with previous agreements between the Indian and South African 
governments, and with the UN Charter, and that asked the two governments to report to the 
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Assembly’s next session on the measures they had taken to ensure this. By one vote, the resolution 
thus secured the two-thirds majority necessary to pass. Three days later, the Assembly dealt Smuts 
an even harder blow, when it rejected his request to annex South West Africa and instead adopted a 
resolution drafted by the Indian delegation that invited the South Africa to submit a United Nations 
trusteeship agreement for the territory.29 
The UN resolutions on the treatment of Indians and on the status of South West Africa 
were greeted with elation in the black communities of South Africa. Africans and Indians held 
“United Nations Victory Day” meetings around the country. Xuma returned home to a hero’s 
welcome: ANC Secretary General James Calata wrote to him in January that “People everywhere are 
talking about you and congratulating you for your recent achievements… You fought a good fight 
over there. Your people in Africa admire you and are proud of your leadership. You have brought 
your enemies to their knees.” At a rally of several thousand Africans and Indians organized by the 
NIC, Xuma told the crowd that “If India comes of age, there is hope for world peace.”30 The JPRC, 
meanwhile, having achieved its immediate objective of attracting international attention, scaled back 
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the passive resistance campaign, deciding that batches of volunteers should now be sent to the 
resistance plot once a week rather than every day.31 
 In the course of 1946 the Indian government had taken three measures to pressure the 
South African government to agree to a roundtable conference: the economic sanction of breaking 
off trade, the diplomatic sanction of withdrawing the High Commissioner, and the referral of the 
dispute to the UN General Assembly. Advocates of economic sanctions had been divided on the 
extent and nature of the impact they expected trade sanctions to have. While, as we have seen, some 
Indian sanctions advocates believed that an Indian embargo would cause “considerable paralysis,” 
Rustomjee’s SAIC delegation to India had expressed the belief that sanctions “may mean very little 
material loss to South Africa” and had emphasized instead their “moral value.”32 In fact, in the short 
term the sudden cessation of imports from India did have a significant material impact. Without 
Indian groundnuts there was an immediate shortage of oil for making soap: in early August 
newspapers reported an “acute” soap shortage and a run on remaining stocks. Moreover, many 
South African farmers used jute sacks from India to pack and transport their produce. At the start of 
August – a fortnight after India’s legal prohibition on trade with South Africa went into effect – a 
ship carrying a large cargo of sacks docked at Cape Town, but on the instructions of the Indian 
consignors it was not unloaded. No further shipments followed. Though the South African corn 
harvest had begun, farmers without sacks to pack their corn hesitated to begin threshing. South 
African importers immediately began making arrangements to purchase packing materials from 
elsewhere, but this could not alleviate the shortage immediately, and the effects were felt well into 
1947. South African farmers were forced to start recycling previously used sacks. One of the most 
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tragic consequences of the Indian embargo was the death in early 1947 of at least twenty-three black 
South Africans in Natal. They had eaten food stored in re-used sacks that had previously contained 
arsenic compounds for sheep dipping.33  
 Though India’s sanctions thus had a material impact on South Africa in the months 
immediately after their imposition, they did not have either the moral or the political effect their 
advocates had hoped for. Welcoming the Indian embargo, Dadoo had expressed the hope that the 
“crisis of the first order” caused by the shortage of soap, sacks, and other products would “drive 
home to the European people the hard lesson that their rulers cannot carry on with impunity, and 
this with their consent, the policy of racial and colour oppression.”34 In the event, however, the 
immediate effect of the sanctions was to exacerbate animosity against Indians amongst whites. Anti-
Indian animus quickly coalesced around the idea of a retaliatory boycott. In January 1947 a group of 
white farmers in the Transvaal who were suffering from the shortage of grain sacks initiated a 
boycott of stores run by Indians. In March, four hundred delegates at an “Indian Boycott Congress” 
resolved that “the Indians must be systematically excluded from the economic life of this country, so 
that it will not be worth their while to remain in South Africa.” In many small farming towns, Indian 
stores were picketed: shoppers who patronized them were ostracized, intimidated, and sometimes 
assaulted.35 
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  Any hope that the combination of India’s diplomatic and economic sanctions and the 
resolutions of the General Assembly might cause the South African government to change course 
was dashed in the course of 1947. Though Smuts was angered and disappointed that the 
international organization he had helped to found had now given him his “first great knock,” he was 
unwilling to comply with its resolutions. In the immediate term, the most significant direct outcome 
of the confrontation at the UN was that he did not receive international approval for the formal 
annexation of South West Africa. Instead, Smuts announced that South Africa would continue to 
administer the territory “in the spirit” of the original League of Nations mandate, and would report 
annually to the UN “for information.” But the South African government would not submit a new 
trusteeship agreement, as the General Assembly had requested. And regarding the treatment of 
Indians, the Smuts government was immoveable. In response to the General Assembly resolution, 
the Minister of the Interior immediately announced that the Asiatic Act would not be repealed.36 In 
April, Smuts declared in parliament that the boycott of Indian stores was “the direct result of the 
harm, bitterness, and injustice brought about by the Indian government’s sanctions” and suggested 
that the situation could only be resolved by discussions between the two governments. But no round 
table conference ensued. Though Smuts and Nehru did begin a personal correspondence, Smuts 
refused to accept Nehru’s precondition that any negotiations between the two governments should 
be on the basis of the General Assembly’s resolution.37  
Until this point, advocates of trade sanctions in both India and South Africa had discussed 
them in the context of the two countries’ bilateral relations, as a means of pressuring the South 
African government to agree to a roundtable conference with the Indian government, as it had done 
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twice before, in 1926-27 and 1932. The model had been the consumer boycott of Zanzibari cloves 
in 1937-38, when Indian economic leverage had been sufficient to compel Zanzibar’s rulers to 
negotiate a rapid retreat from their new anti-Indian measures. But in July and September 1947, in 
light of Smuts’ refusal to heed the requests of the Indian government and the General Assembly, 
Dadoo now attempted to globalize the sanctions campaign, calling for all UN member states to 
sever their diplomatic and trade relations with South Africa. Dadoo hoped that the South African 
government would then be forced to comply with the General Assembly’s demands in order “to 
stave off [the] serious economic crisis” that a multilateral trade embargo would cause.38  
This was the first time a South African resistance leader advocated worldwide economic 
sanctions against South Africa.39 It did not, however, meet with a positive response. In October 
1947 the JPRC again sent Rustomjee and two other representatives to New York to work with the 
Indian delegation at the second session of the General Assembly. Dadoo instructed the JPRC 
deputation to call for a world-wide boycott of South African goods. But even the Indian delegation 
rejected the idea and apparently prevailed on the JPRC representatives not to publicize it.40 The 
Indian government advised its delegation that though the idea of a General Assembly resolution 
recommending sanctions against South Africa might seem “alluring,” a draft sanctions resolution 
was unlikely to be adopted, since “In the present stage of its existence, the Assembly is not likely to 
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throw down a challenge which may involve desertions from the membership of the United Nations 
and weaken the authority of that organisation.”41 Committed to the UN as an institution that could 
lay the basis of a new world order, the Nehru government was unwilling to risk undermining it in 
this way.42 Dadoo’s appeal for a multilateral sanctions regime thus had no immediate effect. The 
only two governments to maintain trade sanctions against South Africa were India and Pakistan, the 
two successor states after Britain’s final withdrawal from India in August 1947. 
At the United Nations, the Indian government’s caution proved prescient. The dramatic 
confrontation between Smuts and Pandit had been one of the most salient moments of the 1946 
UN session. But in 1947 the General Assembly was dominated by debates on the future of Palestine. 
A South African diplomat reported with relief that “Mercifully for us at U.N.O. it looks as though 
the other bigger and more disturbing issues at the Assembly… have taken the edge off both the 
Indian complaint and S[outh] W[est] A[frica].”43 A small stir was created by the arrival at the UN of 
Reverend Michael Scott, a British priest who had moved to South Africa in 1943, and had quickly 
become a committed opponent of racial discrimination. Scott had first come to international 
prominence the year before for being one of the only whites to participate in the passive resistance 
campaign against the Asiatic Act. He had traveled to South West Africa earlier in 1947, and had 
been asked by Chief Hosea Kutako of the Herero people in South West Africa to represent them at 
the UN. It was, Scott wrote later, “a very serious matter indeed, to go outside one’s own nation in an 
appeal to the nations of the world.” But given the “deteriorating” situation, “it seemed now as if the 
only hope for the African people was an appeal to the conscience of the world.” The Indian 
delegation to the UN appointed him an “official adviser” so that he could obtain a visa to visit New 
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York.44  
Despite the interest generated by Scott’s presence, however, the Indian delegation was 
unable to replicate the success it had enjoyed the year before. The draft resolution the Indian 
delegation submitted on the treatment of Indians – which expressed regret at South Africa’s failure 
to accept the 1946 resolution as the basis for negotiations and called for talks between the 
governments of India, Pakistan, and South Africa on that basis – was twice watered down, and then 
still failed to win the two-thirds majority needed to pass the General Assembly. The Indian 
delegation’s draft resolution on South West Africa likewise failed to secure a two-thirds majority. 
Instead the General Assembly simply adopted a resolution that again urged the South African 
government to adopt a trusteeship agreement.45 
The historian of international governance Mark Mazower has argued in his analysis of the 
1946 session of the General Assembly that “it was over South Africa and its policies that the global 
possibilities inherent in the United Nations institutions first emerged.” But it was also over South 
Africa and its policies that the limitations of those same UN institutions became rapidly apparent, as 
the South African government ignored the 1946 resolutions with impunity. In her study of the 
efforts of African American activist W.E.B. du Bois and the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to petition the UN to intervene to protect the human 
rights of African Americans in the United States – an effort in part inspired by the General 
Assembly’s 1946 resolution on Indians in South Africa – the historian Carol Anderson has shown 
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that “in the span of three short years [from 1944 to 1947], the [NAACP’s] hope of the UN as a 
powerful weapon for systemic change had dissolved into the reality of the United Nations as little 
more than a pawn in the Cold War.”46 The views of the JPRC leadership in South Africa followed 
exactly the same trajectory over the same period. In the pamphlet they published in New York in 
October 1947, Rustomjee and his fellow JPRC delegates noted that “the apparent inability of [the] 
United Nations to enforce its Charter is giving rise in many parts of the world, no less than in South 
Africa, to serious doubts as to whether the United Nations really can insure world peace and bring 
about freedom for all.” Such doubts were only reinforced later that year when the General Assembly 
failed even to pass a resolution on the treatment of Indians in South Africa.47   
The JPRC had predicated its strategy on the belief that the spectacle of civil disobedience 
would provoke effective international intervention. When this did not materialize, the organizers 
struggled to maintain interest in their ongoing campaign. Numbers of resisters declined rapidly after 
the December 1946 UN resolution. In October 1947 the JPRC organized a “UNO batch” of 
resisters, as it had the year before, but the number of volunteers was much smaller. A mass meeting 
called that month to relaunch the campaign attracted a crowd of just a thousand, compared to the 
seven to ten thousand who had attended similar rallies a year earlier. After another attempt to revive 
passive resistance in January 1948, the JPRC called off the faltering campaign in June, just as the new 
National Party government of Prime Minister D.F. Malan assumed office.48 
The unanimity of SAIC activists in February 1946 on the need for India to impose sanctions 
had meanwhile rapidly splintered. With the exception of Rustomjee, the conservative “old guard” of 
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the SAIC had remained aloof from the JPRC’s passive resistance campaign. The wealthier Indian 
merchants who had traditionally dominated the SAIC were especially concerned about the rapid 
spread of the retaliatory boycott of Indian stores. In a speech in April 1947, A.I. Kajee, who had 
served as SAIC secretary from 1927 to 1946, described the treatment of Smuts as the UN as a 
“humiliation” for all South Africans, and called on India to withdraw its sanctions and restore full 
diplomatic relations, “in order to remove the Indo-Union dispute from the purview of the UN.” 
The next month Kajee, P.R. Pather, and other old guard moderates broke from the NIC to form a 
new Natal Indian Organisation (NIO) as a vehicle for their preferred approach of dialogue rather 
than confrontation. The NIO was especially critical of Dadoo’s “mischievous” proposal for 
worldwide sanctions: Pather argued that Dadoo’s appeal would do “irreparable harm to the South 
African Indian cause.”49 In India too, some former sanctions advocates now backed away from the 
idea, including Bhawani Dayal Sanyasi, one of the co-authors of the study Khare had commissioned 
in 1943 that had argued that Indian sanctions could “bring South Africa to her knees.” In February 
1949, Sanyasi called on the Indian government to rescind its sanctions. Sanctions had failed to 
achieve their objective, he argued, and were now “purposeless and detrimental to the interest of our 
own people.”50 
Dadoo himself did not publicly reverse his call for multilateral sanctions, but he recognized 
that they were unlikely to be forthcoming. The treatment of Indians in South Africa had become a 
“hardy annual” on the UN’s agenda, he wrote in 1949, a few months after his abortive efforts to get 
to the General Assembly in Paris, but this had not stopped the new National Party government 
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from introducing even more “drastic and stringent” anti-Indian measures. One of the new 
government’s first pieces of legislation was the Asiatic Laws Amendment Act of 1948, which 
repealed the provisions in Smuts’ 1946 law for the Indian community to be represented in 
parliament by four white MPs elected on a separate electoral roll. (The provision had never been 
implemented, in the face of unanimous Indian rejection of such differential representation). By 
appealing to India for sanctions and “inciting world opinion” at the UN, Malan argued, South 
African Indians had proven they were a “foreign element” with no right to representation.51   
The National Party government was equally defiant of the UN’s resolutions on South West 
Africa. With help from non-governmental organizations in New York, including the International 
League for the Rights of Man and the NAACP, Michael Scott continued to attend the annual 
sessions of the General Assembly as a representative of the Herero people. Scott won a series of 
procedural victories. In 1949 the General Assembly’s committee on trusteeship allowed him to 
present an oral petition on conditions in South West Africa, even though he did not represent a 
member state. And in 1951 the committee voted to invite “representatives of the indigenous peoples 
of South-West Africa” to participate in oral hearings themselves. But though Scott’s dogged 
persistence thus helped to transform the United Nations, opening up its procedures to greater 
participation by non-state actors, it did not transform the situation on the ground. South West 
Africa was incorporated into South Africa in all but name in 1949, when the South West Africa 
Amendment Act gave white settlers in the territory direct representation in the South African 
parliament. The National Party government ended its predecessor’s practice of submitting reports to 
the United Nations in accordance with the requirements of the original League of Nations mandate. 
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And when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory opinion to the General 
Assembly in 1950 that the mandate was still in force and South Africa must continue to adhere to its 
stipulations, Malan’s government simply ignored it. The following year the government declared 
Scott himself a “prohibited immigrant” and refused to permit the invited South West Africans to 
travel to the UN in 1951.52 
For Yusuf Dadoo, the “impunity” with which the South African government acted only 
underlined “the weakness of the United Nations Organisation in taking effective action.” Dadoo laid 
the blame for this squarely on what he called “the shameful role played by the United States of 
America, Britain, the white Dominions and the colonial Powers making it almost impossible for the 
United Nations to take effective steps against South Africa.” He castigated the Indian government’s 
approach of refusing to propose multilateral sanctions because of this western opposition and of 
instead submitting weaker resolutions designed to attract broad support in the Assembly. “A 
watered-down resolution without proper sanctions to enforce the decision of the United Nations 
can, in present circumstances, serve no useful purpose,” Dadoo argued. “Such a resolution can only 
help to maintain the illusion which has lasted long enough that something is being done by the 
United Nations.” If India proposed a stronger draft resolution calling “for the most drastic action in 
terms of the Charter,” it might fail to pass but its defeat on the floor of the General Assembly would 
at least serve to “unmask the role of the imperialist Powers.”53 
India declined to take this approach, however. Nehru’s government ignored calls from the 
NIO and others to rescind its sanctions policy. In August and September 1948 Indian 
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representatives successfully fought off an attempt by the new National Party government to have 
India’s sanctions ruled illegal at a twenty-two-nation conference in Geneva on the new General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).54 The Indian government meanwhile continued its efforts 
to achieve a resolution to the dispute through the UN. After the anti-climax of 1947, the third 
session of the General Assembly passed a resolution in May 1949 inviting the governments of India, 
Pakistan, and South Africa to “enter into discussions at a roundtable conference” on the issue of 
South Africa’s treatment of Indians. Representatives of the three governments did in fact meet for 
“talks about talks” in Cape Town in early 1950, but the Indian and Pakistani governments 
subsequently withdrew from the planned roundtable conference when, just before it was to take 
place, the South African government passed the Group Areas Act.55 The National Party government 
was keen to remove the irritant of the annual debates at the UN on the treatment of Indians, but not 
at the cost of any delay to the implementation of apartheid. Indeed, it was in 1950 that several of the 
cornerstones of apartheid were set in place. The Group Areas Act enabled the government to 
proclaim designated urban areas to be for the exclusive occupation of a single racial group. The 
Population Registration Act assigned a racial category to every member of the population. The 
Immorality Amendment Act made interracial sex illegal. And the Suppression of Communism Act 
not only made the Communist Party itself illegal but gave the government broad powers against 
anyone committed to bringing about radical change. 
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II. ‘The national liberation of Africans will be achieved by Africans themselves’: The 
Primacy of Domestic Strategies of Resistance 
In the 1940s, the advocates of exerting economic pressure on South Africa, both within the Indian 
government and the South African Indian Congress, had focused on governmental sanctions on 
trade. Although the consumer boycott of Zanzibari cloves was an important model to some Indian 
sanctions advocates, neither they nor Dadoo suggested extending the governmental boycott of trade 
with South Africa into the non-governmental sphere. The only prominent figure to make such a 
suggestion in this period was George Padmore, a prominent Trinadadian pan-Africanist organizer, 
journalist, and propagandist who was then based in London. Padmore, who had written 
enthusiastically about the debates on economic sanctions in India in 1944, came to believe that non-
governmental boycotts could be used to support the struggles against the South African government 
not only of Indians but also of Africans. He reported in February 1946 that “British colonial experts 
in London” feared that a boycott of South African goods might be organized in British colonies of 
West Africa. A boycott organized by West African labor unions and backed by the main anti-
colonial nationalist groups in the region would cause “unemployment and serious political 
repercussion” in South Africa, Padmore argued, and might force the South African government to 
grant Africans’ demands. “Today,” Padmore concluded, “the natives of West Africa hold in their 
purse the economic key to the salvation of their black brothers in South Africa.”56 
 Padmore’s enthusiasm for industrial and consumer boycotts of South African goods was not 
shared, however, by the African nationalist organizations inside South Africa that he intended them 
to help. And Dadoo’s call for governmental trade sanctions was not only ignored by the Indian 
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government. It was not taken up further inside South Africa either. Indeed, rather than seeking to 
cause an “economic crisis” through sanctions, some of Dadoo’s comrades in the Communist Party 
believed that the Party should be trying to promote the growth of South Africa’s manufacturing 
sector. Founded by socialist white immigrants in the 1920s, the CPSA had torn itself apart in 
sectarian disputes during the 1930s, but enjoyed a resurgence during the Second World War. As the 
Party basked in the reflected glory of the Soviet Union’s struggle against Nazi Germany, its formal 
membership increased from less than three hundred in 1939 to around two thousand by the end of 
the forties; the circulation of the Guardian newspaper, the CPSA’s unofficial mouthpiece, reached 
fifty thousand by 1945.57 Though the relationship between nationalism and socialism remained the 
subject of heated debate within the Party, Communists took a renewed interest after 1941 in 
strengthening the ANC, which many had previously dismissed “either as irrelevant or as a potential 
handicap in the struggle,” given the Congress’s elitist, middle-class character and organizational 
disarray. The CPSA General Secretary, Moses Kotane, was one of three prominent African 
Communists on the ANC National Executive by 1945.58  
From the late 1930s onwards, leading members of the CPSA also threw themselves into 
organizing black workers into labor unions. It was a propitious time for labor organizing, as the 
massive growth of secondary industry during the war caused rapid African urbanization and 
proletarianization.59 In 1945 the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) – which had 
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been established on the Rand four years earlier and in which Communists occupied the majority of 
leadership positions – claimed a total membership of 158,000 workers in 119 unions.60 Labor 
organizing efforts suffered a severe setback in August 1946, when the Smuts government brutally 
crushed a week-long strike by seventy thousand African miners, killing at least nine and injuring over 
a thousand. CNETU never recovered from this blow. But members of the CPSA were nevertheless 
impressed by what Joe Slovo – an up-and-coming white lawyer on the Party’s Johannesburg District 
Committee – called “the awesome potential of the new social force which was emerging – the black 
proletariat with its collective instruments of struggle.”61  
This new social force was the product of secondary industrialization, a process that some 
Communists believed they should actively seek to encourage. In September 1947 – the very same 
month that Dadoo instructed the JPRC delegates to call for worldwide sanctions – the CPSA-
aligned Guardian newspaper launched a “buy South African goods” campaign. This was not directed 
at overseas consumers, but at the Guardian’s own South African readers, whom the paper feared 
were prejudiced in favor of foreign-made imports. But the logic of the paper’s argument that 
“buying South African means jobs for South Africa’s workers” would have been incompatible with 
attempting to reduce overseas sales of South African products either by the trade sanctions that 
Dadoo was calling for or the industrial and consumer boycotts that Padmore had advocated.62  
When South African resistance activists talked about “the boycott” in 1946-49 they were 
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referring not to isolating South Africa internationally, but to the boycott of differential political 
institutions within the country. This had been a subject of heated controversy in black politics since 
the mid-1930s, when the South African government had established new, segregated political 
structures to represent Africans, including a national “Native Representative Council” (NRC). While 
leaders of groups including the ANC and the CPSA had ultimately decided to participate in NRC 
elections, advocacy of “non-collaboration,” including the boycott of all segregated political 
institutions, became the defining feature of small group of Trotskyists led by I.B. Tabata, who in 
1943 founded the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM).63  
Little more than a footnote – if that – in most histories of the liberation struggle in South 
Africa, the NEUM’s ideas had a significant influence that extended far beyond the Movement’s own 
following, which was concentrated in the coloured community of the Western Cape. Perhaps most 
importantly, the boycott policy was taken up by the ANC Youth League, formed in 1944 by a 
younger generation of Congress activists who were frustrated with Xuma’s ongoing reliance on 
advancing African interests by petitions, memoranda, and deputations.64 Prominent Youth Leaguers 
such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo were inspired by the grassroots 
mobilizations during the ferment of the war years, including the proliferation of wildcat strikes, the 
series of bus boycotts over rising transport costs in the Johannesburg township of Alexandra from 
1940 to 1944, and the growth of squatter movements. For the Youth League, boycotting the NRC 
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was a necessary step in turning the ANC away from a reliance on pleading for government 
concessions, and towards an embrace of these kinds of mass struggles.65  
The boycott controversy came to a head during the suppression of the miners’ strike in 
August 1946. When the government refused to allow the NRC members to visit the site of the 
police attack on the strikers, the Council unanimously adopted a motion to adjourn indefinitely. 
Acceding to pressure from Youth League militants, an “emergency conference” called by Xuma in 
October resolved to boycott future elections for the NRC and for “Native Representatives” in the 
South African parliament. A coalition of communists and members of the ANC’s liberal old guard 
reversed this policy the following year, however. Both groups feared that by boycotting elections to 
segregated bodies they would simply be denying themselves a useful platform to oppose segregation 
and ceding the field to more pliant representatives. Professor Z.K. Matthews and other ANC leaders 
therefore participated in the NRC elections in 1947.66 And in 1948 Sam Kahn of the CPSA became 
the first Communist to win election to parliament as a “Native Representative” for the Western 
Cape. One of Kahn’s exploits was to insert of the full text of The Communist Manifesto into the 
parliamentary record, meaning that it could not be banned and would always be available from the 
government printer. For Joe Slovo Kahn’s performance as an MP provided “an excellent example of 
the way in which critical participation can sometimes do more to expose the iniquity of an institution 
than a thousand boycotts.”67 
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Among those who did call for the boycott of segregated political bodies during this ongoing 
controversy, this advocacy did not translate straightforwardly into enthusiasm for international 
economic boycotts of South Africa. The strategic vision of ANC Youth Leaguers was focused on 
action by African people themselves, inside South Africa. The Youth League Manifesto, drawn up in 
1944, declared that “the national liberation of Africans will be achieved by Africans themselves. We 
reject foreign leadership of Africa.”68 By “foreign,” the Youth Leaguers meant all non-Africans, both 
inside and outside South Africa: they opposed cooperation with communists, both white and black 
(all were seen as adherents of a “foreign ideology”), with white liberals, and with the Indian 
Congresses. In January 1947, the Youth League’s deputy president, A.P. Mda, had congratulated 
Xuma on his visit to the United Nations, telling him that his “monumental work over in the States 
will go down in history.”69 But the Youth Leaguers subsequently showed no interest in following up 
Xuma’s overseas campaigning. Despite the euphoric reception given to Xuma after his return from 
New York, no ANC representative was sent to the General Assembly’s second session in 1947, or to 
any of the four annual sessions thereafter. Indeed, the historian John Soske has found that in the 
course of 1947 African newspapers in Natal began characterizing India as a potential new empire 
and South African Indians as its agents. As early as March 1947, for instance, Inkundla Ya Bantu, 
edited by ANC Youth League leader Jordan Ngubane, warned of “the imperialistic ambitions of the 
new India,” and suggested that “certain Asiatics might support our own cause so that they should 
have our people’s support for their expansionist ambitions.”70  
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As Youth League leaders increased their influence within the ANC, they shifted the 
Congress towards more confrontational domestic action. In December 1949, a year and a half after 
the National Party government took office, Youth League leaders secured the support of the ANC’s 
annual conference for a new “Programme of Action.” The Programme committed the ANC to the 
Youth League’s policy of boycotting “all differential political institutions” and to employing “the 
following weapons: immediate and active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-co-operation and 
such other means as may bring about the accomplishment and realisation of our aspirations.”71 The 
cautious Xuma, who argued that the ANC needed to develop mass support before it could 
undertake these kinds of mass actions, was ousted from the ANC presidency. The Youth Leaguers, 
who believed, conversely, that only by launching mass action would the ANC be able to win mass 
support, engineered Xuma’s replacement by James Moroka, a prominent African doctor who was 
prepared to endorse their position. Seven Youth Leaguers were elected to the ANC National 
Executive, including Walter Sisulu, who took up the powerful post of Secretary-General. When 
Xuma resigned from the Executive altogether in early 1950, another Youth Leaguer, Nelson 
Mandela, was co-opted to replace him.72 
The ANC’s new Programme of Action was more a catalog of methods to be used than a 
detailed strategic program. As the political scientist Tom Lodge concludes, the Youth Leaguers 
“were never to demonstrate any clear conception of exactly how and in what order these tactics 
should be employed to achieve their goal of ‘national freedom’. Rather it was assumed that in the 
course of an almost mystic communion between leaders and the popular classes the path would 
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become clear.”73 On 26 June 1950 the ANC made its first attempt to employ one of the methods 
enumerated in the Programme, a “national stoppage of work for one day as a mark of protest 
against the reactionary policy of the government.” The previous month the SAIC, the Communist 
Party, and the Transvaal ANC had pre-empted the new ANC leadership by organizing their own 
“stay-at-home,” to protest against low wages and the government’s “banning” of Dadoo and other 
leading Communists. In Johannesburg, this May Day stay-at-home had been observed by a 
significant proportion of African workers but ended in violent clashes with police, in which nineteen 
people were killed. 
Before the May strike ANC Youth Leaguers had tried to disrupt the efforts of its organizers 
– one white communist remembered Mandela as the “heckler and disrupter in chief” – but in the 
wake of the government’s vicious response they joined with the CPSA and the SAIC to organize the 
second stay-at-home on June 26 to protest the killings and the imminent passage of the Suppression 
of Communism Act. This time, however, the response from black workers in the Transvaal was 
disappointing; the ANC would subsequently not attempt to organize another nationwide political 
strike until 1958.74 But the initiative marked the beginning of a remarkably rapid turnaround in the 
views of leading Youth Leaguers on cooperation with Communists and with other ethnic groups. 
The CPSA, meanwhile, dissolved itself immediately before the Suppression of Communism Act 
came into force. In 1953 some of its former leaders established a new South African Communist 
Party (SACP) as an underground organization whose members worked through the ANC, the SAIC, 
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and their allies.75 
In 1951, the ANC and its new allies began making plans to implement another strand of the 
Programme of Action by launching a campaign of civil disobedience. A joint planning committee 
including Sisulu of the ANC and Dadoo of the SAIC devised a ‘Defiance Campaign’ of six “unjust 
laws,” including the Group Areas Act and the Suppression of Communism Act. According to the 
plan, selected volunteers would engage in civil disobedience of these laws in Johannesburg, Cape 
Town, Port Elizabeth, and other major cities. In subsequent stages of the campaign the number of 
volunteers and the number of sites of defiance would be increased, before finally there would be 
“mass action during which as far as possible the struggle should broaden out on a country-wide scale 
and assume a general mass character.”76 
The Defiance Campaign, which was launched on June 26, 1952, was understood by most of 
its national organizers mainly as a means of developing a mass following for the ANC and its new 
allies. Like the Indian passive resistance campaign of 1946-48, the Defiance Campaign closely 
followed the form of Gandhi’s satyagraha campaigns. But, as Slovo later wrote, few if any of the 
leading organizers “believed seriously that through filling the jails, or by other forms of self-inflicted 
suffering, they could thaw the ice-cold heart of white supremacy.”77 Rather, in the words of Indian 
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youth leader Ahmad Kathrada, “the underlying motivation was to transform the ANC into a 
people’s organisation.” Indeed, the ANC-SAIC planning committee was explicit about this when it 
proposed the campaign: the objective was to prepare for later stages of the struggle against apartheid 
by using mass action that would “gradually embrace larger groups of people, permeate both the 
urban and rural areas and make it possible for us to organise, discipline and lead people in a planned 
manner.”78 
The organizers of the Defiance Campaign did not see it primarily as a way of attracting 
international attention and intervention, as Dadoo and other Indian leaders had seen passive 
resistance six years earlier. The passive resistance campaign was an important inspiration for the 
Youth Leaguers who turned the ANC towards civil disobedience, and the organizers of the Defiance 
Campaign included leading passive resisters like Dadoo. But the strategic rationale of the Defiance 
Campaign was quite different. In 1946-48 the JPRC had sent some of its most prominent leaders to 
India, the UN, and elsewhere to mobilize international support and action, and had carefully 
coordinated their campaign in order to maximize its international impact. In early 1952, in contrast, 
Mary Benson, a white South African based in London who was serving as secretary to Reverend 
Michael Scott, urged Sisulu that it was “important and urgent” for the ANC “to have their own, 
African, representatives” overseas. Sisulu replied, however, that there was “no question of being able 
to send [the ANC’s] own people abroad at this time.” Scott continued to attend the UN General 
Assembly every year to campaign on the South West Africa issue. The ANC “wholeheartedly 
supported” Scott’s work, Sisulu explained, but it was “wholly preoccupied in organising” the 
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Defiance Campaign inside the country.79 
In terms of transforming the ANC into a mass organization, the Defiance Campaign enjoyed 
considerable success. More than eight thousand volunteers were arrested for acts of civil 
disobedience, such as using “white” entrances or facilities at post offices or train stations or (for 
non-African volunteers) entering African townships without permission. Chief Albert Lutuli, who 
succeeded Moroka as ANC president in December 1952, reported that in the course of the year the 
formal membership of the ANC had rocketed from seven thousand to one hundred thousand.80 The 
Defiance Campaign definitively established the ANC as the pre-eminent organization opposed to 
apartheid, an outcome that had been by no means assured in the 1940s. The NEUM, previously the 
ANC’s chief rival, was left increasingly marginalized. Nevertheless, the campaign began to flag in 
October, and there were few new volunteers. In late October and November riots broke out in Port 
Elizabeth, Kimberley, and East London. Police killed more than two hundred Africans in these 
violent clashes, and hundreds more were injured. Six white bystanders, including a Catholic nun, 
were killed by rioters. The ANC national leadership was horrified and immediately suspended the 
campaign in those areas.81 In January 1953, after the government introduced harsh new penalties for 
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civil disobedience, including flogging and jail terms of three years, Lutuli officially called off the 
flagging campaign nationwide.82 
 Generating international action was not the primary objective of the Defiance Campaign, as 
it had been for the 1946 Passive Resistance Campaign. But ANC and SAIC leaders did believe that 
international support could help them prosecute the campaign inside the country. It would boost the 
morale of the volunteers, and might also restrain the government’s response.83 Above all, the 
campaign needed money. The joint secretaries of the campaign, Walter Sisulu of the ANC and 
Yusuf Cachalia of the SAIC, sent out reams of letters to organizations overseas requesting 
contributions. Fundraising was “one of the greatest handicaps our people are faced with,” Sisulu 
explained in one letter. “We need money for propaganda, and to assist some of the needy families of 
those people who are going to court imprisonment.”84 The organizers’ appeal for funds evoked a 
considerable response: British diplomats in Pretoria reported in November 1952 that funds raised 
overseas were “directly helping to keep the campaign alive.”85 
In Britain, John Collins, Canon of St Paul’s Cathedral, had become interested in South 
Africa after reading Cry the Beloved Country, the 1948 novel by the liberal South African writer Alan 
Paton. Collins was the founder of Christian campaign group Christian Action. He now threw 
himself into supporting the Defiance Campaign, urging his congregation to “support the cause of 
the ANC with love,” soliciting donations from wealthy friends, and writing appeals in the church 
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press.86 In the United States, a small group of liberal pacifists and civil rights activists (including civil 
rights leaders Bayard Rustin and A. Philip Randolph) established a new group, Americans for South 
African Resistance (AFSAR), to support the campaign. George Houser, a Methodist minister and 
executive secretary of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), became secretary of the group, and 
began corresponding with Sisulu, Cachalia, and other South African opponents of apartheid. 
AFSAR published a small and irregular newsletter about the campaign and appealed for funds to 
support it: it sent $1,500 to South Africa in the course of 1952.87 
The Council on African Affairs also mobilized to support the Defiance Campaign, though it 
had been greatly weakened since its heyday in the mid-forties, when it had assisted Xuma and the 
JPRC deputation at the UN. In the era of McCarthyist anti-communism, the prominent role in the 
Council of radical critics of the United States like Paul Robeson attracted harassment from the U.S. 
government, and liberal bodies like AFSAR and the NAACP now kept their distance. The efforts by 
CAA director Alphaeus Hunton to organize a coalition of civic, religious, and labor leaders in 
support of the Defiance Campaign were rebuffed. Nevertheless, the CAA organized a large rally in 
Harlem in April 1952 in support of the Defiance Campaign, followed by a week-long picket of the 
South African consulate in New York. By the end of the year the CAA had collected $2,000 to send 
to the campaign organizers in South Africa.88  
The Defiance Campaign also generated new attention at the United Nations. Debates on 
both South West Africa and the treatment of Indians in South Africa had become annual events at 
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the UN. Now in 1952 the Assembly considered the issue of apartheid itself for the first time, after 
India and twelve other Asian and Middle Eastern states requested that the “Question of race conflict 
in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid” be added to the agenda. Despite the 
opposition of South Africa itself, which continued to insist that the UN was not competent to 
discuss its domestic policies, and of Britain and the U.S., the General Assembly voted in favor of 
India’s proposal to establish a three-man “Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of 
South Africa.” The South African government refused to cooperate with the Commission or allow it 
to enter the country, however. And in 1955 and 1956 it withdrew its delegation from the General 
Assembly to protest the ongoing inclusion of the apartheid issue on the agenda. After submitting 
detailed annual reports for three years on the racial situation in South Africa, the Commission was 
disbanded in 1955, though the General Assembly continued to pass resolutions every year calling on 
the South African government to alter its racial policies. The South African government, meanwhile, 
continued to ignore them. 
 By the time of the Defiance Campaign, some overseas opponents of apartheid had already 
gone beyond Sisulu and Cachalia’s requests for “moral and material support,” and sought on their 
own initiative to exert economic pressure in support of the struggle in South Africa. Though the 
Indian and Pakistani governments made no attempt to persuade other governments to join them in 
cutting off trade with South Africa, the Indian action sparked interest in the idea elsewhere. 
Newspapers in Trinidad, where – as in southern and eastern Africa – there was a substantial 
population descended from Indian indentured laborers, reported on the Indian sanctions.89 
Journalists and political and labor organizations in several British colonies in the Caribbean 
subsequently took up the idea of a boycott of South African goods, both at governmental level, and 
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by consumers and organized labor. In August 1948, for instance, the opposition People’s National 
Party (PNP) of Jamaica asked their counterparts in St Kitts to join them in protesting to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies about the newly-elected National Party’s program of apartheid, 
and called for an “embargo on imports” from South Africa. In September 1950, the St Kitts and 
Nevis Trades and Labour Union resolved to advise waterfront workers not to handle cargo from 
South Africa “on account of [the] deliberate and systematic application of its dreadful policy of 
apartheid.” The following month motions protesting apartheid and calling for a ban on imports 
from South Africa goods were tabled in the legislatures of Jamaica and Barbados; in Jamaica, the 
PNP’s motion specifically attacked the Group Areas Act, passed months earlier, as “an insult and 
threat to all persons of African or Asiatic descent.”90  
As the British ambassador to South Africa later put it, the UK government did “everything 
in its power” to kill these legislative proposals.91 But although the PNP’s attempts to legislate 
governmental sanctions were stalled for the time being, the St Kitts and Nevis Trades and Labour 
Union maintained its commitment to refuse to handle South African goods, and there were further 
efforts to organize industrial and consumer boycotts elsewhere in the Caribbean throughout the 
1950s.92 In Cape Town, exporters of wines and canned fruit were alarmed by the efforts in the West 
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Indies to organize boycotts: though South African exports to the Caribbean were worth less than 
£50,000 annually, South African traders feared the boycott might spread elsewhere.93 Indeed, at a 
meeting organized by Christian Action in London in 1951, the secretary of the League of Coloured 
Peoples, an anti-racist organization led by West Indians in Britain, suggested “a campaign of 
isolation and boycott against South Africa.” This early suggestion of a boycott campaign in Britain 
did not have any immediate effect, however: the League of Coloured Peoples collapsed soon after, 
and no one from Christian Action took up the idea.94  
 In the United States, early attempts to exert economic pressure in opposition to apartheid 
focused not on imported goods but on loans and economic assistance to the South African 
government by the World Bank, the U.S. government, and private American banks. In February 
1951, Walter White, the Executive Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured People, responded to news that the Bank was planning to loan $80 million to the South 
African government by writing to the president of the Bank, Eugene Black, to oppose any such 
loans until South Africa ceased defying the UN over South West Africa and abandoned its 
“dangerous and racist policies.”95 At the protests they organized in support of the Defiance 
Campaign in April 1952, Paul Robeson and other leaders of the Council on African Affairs called on 
the U.S. to end loans and other financial assistance to the South African government. In June that 
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year the NAACP annual convention adopted a resolution that brought together and expanded upon 
these demands and White’s earlier initiative, urging “the United States Government, the [World] 
Bank, the [U.S. government’s] Import-Export Bank and all private banks to refuse any loans or [to] 
extend any credit to the Union of South Africa as long as it continues its present policies.”96  
This brief flurry of calls for exerting economic pressure on South Africa did not, however, 
lead to any concerted campaign in the U.S. In July 1952 the CAA announced plans to collect 
100,000 signatures on a petition to President Harry Truman that urged him to “halt United States 
assistance in any form to the government of the Union of South Africa, and to denounce publicly 
that government’s racist program as an international menace.” In the end, however, just 3,800 
signatures were collected.97 These efforts turned out to be one of the CAA’s last campaigns. In 1953 
the attorney general ordered the CAA to register with the Subversive Activities Control Board as a 
communist front. In 1954 the U.S. government launched a further investigation into the Council on 
the pretext that it was acting as a “foreign agent” for the ANC and the SAIC. Unable to meet the 
spiraling costs of defending itself, the CAA disbanded in 1955.98 
In October 1952 the NAACP organized a picket of the South African delegation to the UN 
in order to demonstrate support for the struggle against apartheid, and in 1953 Walter White briefly 
resumed his correspondence with Eugene Black about further World Bank loans to the South 
African government. But the NAACP did not follow up its resolution with any attempt to organize 
a campaign to put pressure on the U.S. government, American banks, or the World Bank to change 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Johnson, “African Americans and South Africans,” 180-81; Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions, 19-20; “Resolutions Adopted by 
the 43rd Annual Convention of the NAACP at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, June 28, 1952,” The Crisis, August-September 
1952, 455. 
97 Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions, 19-20; Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 114. 
98 Von Eschen, Race Against Empire, 141-43, see also 1, 124, 134; Johnson, “African Americans and South Africans,” 246-
55; Lindsey R. Swindall, The Path to the Greater, Freer, Truer World: Southern Civil Rights and Anticolonialism, 1937-1955 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014), 146-56. 
 67 
their lending policies, which continued unchanged. The Association’s attention and resources were 
increasingly focused on domestic racial issues, especially after its landmark victory in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education ruling on segregated schools in May 1954.99 In 1953, 
meanwhile, members of the ad-hoc Americans for South African Resistance established a new 
permanent organization in New York, the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). The 
Committee, with George Houser as its energetic executive director, provided a new focus for liberal 
American support for African liberation, not just in South Africa but across the continent. But 
ACOA did not take up the issue of loans to South Africa that had been raised by both the NAACP 
and the CAA. In its early years, the Committee focused mainly on publicity, fundraising, and 
organizing meetings, speaking tours, and assistance for African leaders visiting the U.S.100 
In South Africa itself, the idea of economic isolation was taken up by Trevor Huddleston, an 
Anglican priest from Britain and member of the monastic Community of the Resurrection, who had 
ministered in Johannesburg since 1943. In his early years in South Africa, Huddleston had focused 
his attention on pastoral care and social work, but he subsequently came to the conclusion that “it 
wasn’t the symptoms but the disease itself that had to be fought.”101 He became close to leading 
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members of the ANC: it was Huddleston who had written to Canon Collins in London to ask him 
to raise funds for the Defiance Campaign in 1952.102 The government’s introduction of  “new Acts 
of tyranny” to suppress the campaign inspired Huddleston to declare publicly for the first time that 
he identified himself “entirely” with the ANC’s struggle. But the harsh new laws also provoked in 
Huddleston a profound pessimism that internal action would be unable to bring about a new, non-
racial order in South Africa. This pessimism was further reinforced in June 1953, when armed police 
broke into a protest meeting at which Huddleston was speaking to arrest Yusuf Cachalia, one of the 
other speakers on the platform. “I had seen and felt in those moments, the terrifying spectre of the 
police state,” Huddleston later wrote. In a letter to the London Observer newspaper soon after this 
incident, he explained his view that “Within South Africa, in spite of every effort that can be made, 
there is, humanly speaking, no hope of influencing the present Government.”103  
From early 1953 onwards, therefore, Huddleston began to argue in a stream of private letters 
to Canon Collins and in public letters to the British press that “intervention in a big way from 
outside will be the only hope for South Africa.” Initially, Huddleston was concerned solely with 
public, verbal criticism, both from the foreign press and from foreign governments.104 Collins did his 
best: he castigated apartheid from the pulpit of St Paul’s Cathedral, to the horror of Archbishop of 
Canterbury Geoffrey Fisher, who shared the view of the Anglican church establishment in South 
Africa that external criticism did more harm than good.105 But Huddleston began to consider how 
external condemnation of apartheid might be reinforced in more material ways. In October 1953, he 
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wrote to Reverend Michael Scott in London, suggesting that during his next visit to New York Scott 
should urge that the United Nations impose economic sanctions on South Africa.106 
 Huddleston’s sanctions proposal was considered by the Africa Bureau, a small non-partisan 
lobby group of influential British figures with connections to Africa that had been established in 
London to support Scott’s campaigns on African issues.107 Those members of the Bureau’s 
committee who expressed opinions on the issue were almost universally opposed to Huddleston’s 
suggestion. One expressed his “shock that such a policy should be advocated by a priest.” Arthur 
Creech Jones (the former Secretary of State for the Colonies in the postwar Labour government) 
and Raymond Raynes (the superior in the Community of the Resurrection, and Huddleston’s 
immediate predecessor in South Africa) both argued that such a call would be unpopular with the 
British public. Raynes believed that “it would be a tactical mistake and set things back,” though he 
did not rule out such a campaign at some point in the future: “There is not sufficient knowledge 
about S[outh] A[frica] and the public conscience not aroused enough yet to support such a proposal, 
and we should be considered fanatics and warmongers by the unenlightened public and the press 
would not help.” The chairman of the committee, the Conservative peer Lord Hemingford, opined 
simply that Huddleston’s proposed course of action “would not achieve anything.”108 
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 Scott himself was more open to Huddleston’s proposal. His discussions of the idea do not 
suggest that he had a clear idea of precisely how he expected economic sanctions to contribute to 
ending racial discrimination in South and South West Africa. But he viewed sanctions as an untried 
third way, an alternative both to ineffective rhetorical exhortations at the United Nations, and to the 
use of force. After attending the debates on South West Africa at the United Nations every year 
since 1947, Scott was increasingly frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the UN’s resolutions, which 
South Africa continued to defy with impunity.  There had “just been words and debates, [but] no 
action to make the white population come to its senses,” he commented, and “there would be a 
disaster unless something could turn the direction of events, and that required more than 
resolutions, diplomatic action by Gov[ernmen]ts., etc.”109 After South Africa had simply ignored the 
ICJ’s 1950 advisory opinion that it must continue to observe the terms of the original South West 
Africa mandate, Hersch Lauterpacht, a prominent international jurist at the University of 
Cambridge, had advised Scott to seek a compulsory judgment (rather than an advisory opinion) 
from the ICJ, since the UN Charter empowered the Security Council to enforce such judgments 
with measures such as economic sanctions. Lauterpacht suggested that contentious proceedings 
should be initiated by the governments of Ethiopia and Liberia, the two independent African states 
that had been members of the League of Nations when it had originally granted South Africa a 
mandate over the territory. Despite the misgivings of his fellow Africa Bureau committee members 
about Huddleston’s suggestion, Scott raised this idea during his 1953 visit to the UN, and then 
traveled to both Ethiopia and Liberia in 1954 to try to persuade the two governments to follow 
Lauterpacht’s advice. The response he received was guarded, however: policymakers in both 
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countries were friendly, but said they would act only if they could be sure of “substantive support” 
from other countries. For the time being, the proposal died.110 
 Perhaps deterred by the lack of enthusiasm from either the Africa Bureau or the UN, 
Huddleston, meanwhile, did not publicize his suggestion further. But in private, like Scott, 
he remained interested in the idea of using economic sanctions against South Africa. Huddleston 
may have discussed the idea of isolating South Africa economically with Canon Collins when Collins 
visited South Africa in June and July 1954. In newspaper articles he wrote about his visit, Collins 
mentioned somewhat tentatively that “the British public may have to consider a personal boycott of 
South African goods,” though he did not take any steps to implement this suggestion.111 
 Between 1950 and 1954, therefore, foreigners in several parts of the world who wanted to 
support the struggle against apartheid considered a variety of forms of external economic action 
against South Africa, including unilateral and multilateral trade sanctions, consumer boycotts, 
industrial boycotts, and cutting off loans to the National Party government. Only in the Caribbean, 
however, were there sustained efforts to implement any of these suggestions. In the United States 
and Britain, as we have seen, there was a variety of reasons why the organizations and individuals 
involved were unwilling or unable to organize sustained campaigns to implement any of these ideas. 
But one crucial reason that the various suggestions did not coalesce into an international movement 
for boycott and sanctions was that these ideas received very little support from the ANC or any 
other anti-apartheid group inside South Africa.  
The ANC’s apparent disinterest in encouraging external boycotts or sanctions might seem 
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especially surprising, given that it was in exactly this period that the Congress leadership took up the 
idea of using domestic consumer boycotts as a weapon in their struggle. There was a long history of 
boycotts by African consumers in South Africa: in 1929-30, for instance, Africans in Durban had 
organized a famous boycott of municipal beerhalls, and there were boycotts of buses and trams to 
protest fare rises in several areas in the 1940s, including, most famously, the Johannesburg township 
of Alexandra.112 In 1952 some local ANC leaders had incorporated calls for consumer boycotts into 
the Defiance Campaign: one grassroots organizer in East London, for instance, told a mobilizing 
meeting in East London in March 1952 that “we want nobody to go and eat the meat of the Dutch 
[i.e. Afrikaners].” After the Defiance Campaign had been called off, the organizers were reported in 
April 1953 to be drawing up a plan for a new “second phase” that would include the “withdrawal of 
native buying power from ‘European merchants.’” The ANC’s focus soon shifted, however, from a 
general boycott of white merchants to pressuring specific businesses to “open up avenues of 
employment” for Africans, and to improve African workers’ pay and conditions.113  
This shift differentiated the ANC’s initiative from the anti-colonial consumer boycotts of 
goods imported from the imperial metropole that had been used in the American colonies in the 
1770s, in India in the 1920s, and in some British colonies in Africa in the 1940s and 1950s. Adopting 
that model was a difficult proposition in a country suffering from what some South African Marxist 
theorists were coming to characterize as “internal colonialism” or “colonialism of a special type,” 
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where colony and metropole were both located in the same geographic space.114 Instead, the ANC’s 
initiative more closely resembled the ways consumer boycotts had frequently been used by organized 
labor in conflicts with employers in the United States in the late nineteenth century, and, in 
particular, the “don’t buy where you can’t work” campaigns waged during the depression by African 
Americans in Chicago, New York, and elsewhere – a model in which some Youth Leaguers had first 
taken an interest in the mid-forties.115 In the wake of the Defiance Campaign, the ANC’s priority 
remained to consolidate and extend its support: campaigning on specific issues that affected the 
immediate well-being of black South Africans, such as employment, was one way Congress leaders 
hoped to do this.116 
When the ANC’s annual conference in December 1953 called for a “campaign of economic 
boycott directed against selected individual firms, business undertakings and government 
enterprises,” this was immediately taken up in Port Elizabeth, where working-class labor leaders 
such as Raymond Mhlaba and Wilton Mkwayi dominated the ANC’s leadership.117 The local ANC 
branch sent out ultimatums to bakers, butchers, and other white shopkeepers whose stores were 
patronized by Africans, demanding that they employ African workers, promote Africans to 
“responsible positions,” and increase their pay. Several firms complied, and those that did not were 
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boycotted, with ANC pickets stationed outside their premises to tell shoppers not to enter. After 
three or four days, several more firms capitulated to the ANC’s demands.118 After a request from 
farmworkers in the rural areas around Port Elizabeth, the Port Elizabeth ANC also organized a 
boycott of oranges. This was so successful that the citrus farmers were forced to make a pilgrimage 
to the Congress office in the city to negotiate a settlement on working conditions on the citrus 
farms.119 Later in 1954, the ANC and its allies responded to an appeal from the African Tobacco 
Workers’ Union by launching a nationwide boycott of cigarettes made by the United Tobacco 
Company (UTC), which had sacked several hundred workers in Durban after a strike. The boycott 
caused significant losses to UTC and achieved partial success: though not all the workers were 
reinstated, UTC’s owners in London, British American Tobacco (BAT), sacked the Durban manager 
and ordered improvements to wages and working conditions.120 
 The domestic consumer boycotts the ANC organized in 1954 had been targeted at selected 
local firms, most of which – with the exception of UTC – had no international presence. Moreover, 
the boycott organizers’ objectives had been to force these businesses to improve pay and working 
conditions and “open up avenues of employment” for Africans. An international boycott of 
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UTC/BAT cigarettes might conceivably have helped (though it does not appear that the ANC and 
its allies called for this). But blanket trade sanctions or industrial or consumer boycotts of all South 
African goods would have risked increasing African unemployment – the exact opposite of what the 
ANC leaders organizing these boycotts were trying to achieve.121 
  Encouraging external economic boycotts would also have risked alienating whites the ANC 
was hoping to woo. In the early 1970s, radical scholars associated with the ANC in exile would put 
forward the argument that apartheid served the needs of South African capital, unleashing a debate 
on the relationship between race and class that would dominate South African studies for the next 
two decades.122 In the 1950s, however, both Marxist and liberal opponents of apartheid believed that 
the National Party was driven by atavistic, irrational racism and that its apartheid policies were 
incompatible with economic growth.123 Congress leaders expected that many white voters would 
defect from the National Party once they realized that apartheid was hurting them economically.124 
In the second half of the 1950s ANC and SACP strategists therefore pursued a “United Front” 
policy, attempting to bring together all South African organizations and individuals who were 
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opposed to the Nationalists’ apartheid policies, even if they agreed on nothing else.125 As the political 
scientist Gail Gerhart has argued, if the ANC’s “objective was to woo as many whites as possible 
away from support of the Nationalist government and thereby eventually to isolate what was 
assumed to [be] the minority of whites who were bedrock racists,” then it “could not afford to 
antagonize any of the swing elements of white opinion.”126 When Walter White of the NAACP 
canvassed Z.K. Matthews’s views on the World Bank’s loans to the South African government in 
1953, Matthews concurred with White’s opposition to the loans, arguing that they bolstered racist 
policies that “violate economic principles.”127 The ANC had no reason to support financial 
assistance to the government that might help the National Party to offset the perceived economic 
irrationality of its policies. But neither did it have an interest in antagonizing potential white 
opponents of those polices by calling for more generalized trade or financial sanctions. 
 ANC leaders and their allies had a further reason for wishing to avoid the kind of serious 
economic dislocation that multilateral sanctions or boycotts might cause. Looking back in the late 
1950s at the ANC’s strategy over the course of the decade, Lutuli commented “It is certainly not 
correct that we visualized achieving a breakdown of the functions of government. It has never been 
our intention to create chaos.”128 In the 1940s, the supporters of the Programme of Action had 
believed that “all we are required to do is show the light and the masses will find the way,” as one 
Youth Leaguer, Robert Sobukwe, put it in 1949. But former Youth League leaders like Mandela, 
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Sisulu, and Tambo became more circumspect after the mass action of the Defiance Campaign 
degenerated in some areas into an “unfortunate, reckless, ill-considered return to jungle law” – as 
ANC leaders in the Eastern Cape described the riots and killings of white bystanders in Port 
Elizabeth in October 1952. Throughout the 1950s, ANC leaders resisted frequent requests from 
supporters to supply weapons for violent resistance, and frequently sought to restrain popular 
militancy.129 Self-identified “Africanists” within the ANC, including Sobukwe, attacked this restraint 
as a retreat from the Programme of Action. But many within the ANC’s national leadership feared 
that if they did attempt to bring about a complete breakdown of authority, they would be unable to 
exert control in the chaos that followed, and this might degenerate into violence along racial lines. 
“We could bring this country to its knees in six months,” one unnamed ANC leader told a foreign 
journalist in 1958. “But if we tried, we in the middle of the road would be the first to go.” The 
speaker was almost certainly overestimating the ANC’s domestic strength, but his comment 
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highlighted another reason ANC leaders were not calling for overseas supporters to take economic 
action to bring the country “to its knees.”130 
 The ANC’s disinterest in encouraging external boycotts or sanctions did not mean that 
Congress leaders were disinterested in the world beyond South Africa’s borders. Indeed, Ben Turok 
– a member of the SACP and of the Congress of Democrats, an organization of white supporters of 
the ANC formed in wake of the Defiance Campaign – later characterized the mid-fifties as the 
period when “suddenly we discovered the world.”131 In 1953, for instance, Walter Sisulu began 
trying to organize a pan-African conference: he sent a conference call to African nationalist 
organizations and governments elsewhere on the continent urging that they should begin 
coordinating their activities.132 Though ultimately nothing came of Sisulu’s pan-Africanist initiative, 
an unofficial South African delegation of Moses Kotane (general secretary of the SACP and a senior 
member of the ANC executive) and Maulvi Cachalia, an SAIC leader (and brother of Yusuf) 
attended the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955, the conference of 
twenty-nine states that is often seen as marking the birth of the “Third World.” Kotane and Cachalia 
circulated a memorandum to the Conference delegates detailing the effects of apartheid. The 
memorandum made no mention of boycotts or sanctions, but appealed to delegates “to use their 
good offices internationally to persuade other civilised and freedom-loving nations of the world to 
prevail on the Government of the Union of South Africa to abandon its unjust and disastrous policy 
of apartheid and racial discrimination.”133 
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There was a flurry of international travel by South African activists in this period. In 1951 
sixty young South Africans from various anti-apartheid organizations flew from South Africa and 
Britain (where many of them were studying) to East Berlin to attend the third biennial World 
Festival of Youth and Students, sponsored by the Soviet-aligned World Federation of Democratic 
Youth (WFDY). For many it was a moving event: “young people met and talked, sang, danced, ate, 
drank, kissed, embraced and pledged everlasting friendship,” recalled Ahmed Kathrada, the secretary 
of the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress and a member of the Communist Party, who led the South 
African delegation. “Thus Vietnamese met the French, Koreans talked to Americans, and Israelis 
consorted with Germans.” Kathrada stayed on in Eastern Europe for two years after the festival. In 
a period when, as he put it, “foreign travel was still something of a novelty,” the connections he built 
up helped secure invitations and travel assistance for other South African activists to visit the 
communist world in the early and mid 1950s.134 These included Walter Sisulu, who was one of thirty 
South Africans to attend the next Festival of Youth in Bucharest, Romania, in August 1953. 
Accompanied by other young ANC leaders including Duma Nokwe and Alfred Hutchinson, the 
ANC Secretary General spent most of the second half of 1953 traveling abroad, visiting Britain, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union, China, and Israel. Other South African activists attended 
events in the mid-1950s organized by other Soviet-aligned international organizations, including the 
World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Women’s International 
Democratic Federation.135 
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 The experience of these trips may have further strengthened the disinclination of Congress 
and SACP leaders to support the idea of external boycotts and sanctions. For their communist 
organizers, the World Festivals of Youth were intended, as the WFDY president told the first 
festival in 1947, to create international friendships that would be “used as weapons to destroy the 
barriers and fictive iron curtains that some people want to build between the nations.”136 Economic 
sanctions were one kind of “barrier” that came in for heavy criticism from communist governments 
and their supporters, at a time when the Soviet bloc was hit hard by the American-organized 
embargo on “strategic exports” from the west. In April 1952, for example, an “International 
Economic Conference” of nearly five hundred businessmen, trade unionists, and economists from 
forty-nine countries was convened in Moscow on the theme of “peaceful coexistence through 
means of world trade.” The conference had been conceived by the World Peace Council, one of the 
Soviet-aligned organizations that was responsible for arranging South African activists’ international 
travel in this period. Convened to discuss “ways and means to restore and develop normal economic 
relations between nations, irrespective of their economic and social systems,” conference delegates 
duly condemned “artificial barriers” to trade such as the U.S. strategic embargo.137  
 The ANC’s strategic focus in the years after the Defiance Campaign remained on 
consolidating, organizing, and further extending its mass support inside the country. Despite the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Nick Rutter, “The Western Wall: The Iron Curtain Recast in Midsummer 1951,” in Cold War Crossings: International 
Travel and Exchange Across the Soviet Bloc, 1940s-1960s eds. Patryk Babiracki and Kenyon Zimmer (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2014), 82. 
137 International Economic Conference in Moscow, April 3-12 1952 (Moscow: Committee for the Promotion of International 
Trade, 1952); Alec Cairncross, “The Moscow Economic Conference,” Soviet Studies 4, no. 2 (October 1952), 113-132; 
Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31-34. Soviet opposition in this period to the idea of economic sanctions did not 
stop the USSR maintaining an economic embargo against the dissident communist regime of Josip Broz Tito in 
Yugoslavia from 1949 to 1954. Robert Owen Freedman, Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc: A Study of Soviet Economic 
Pressure against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China (New York: Praeger, 1970), 18-57. 
 On South African resistance activists’ commitment to “peaceful coexistence” as a potential obstacle to their 
supporting boycotts of South Africa, see A.M. Kathrada, “Towards a Cultural Boycott of South Africa,” Liberation, 
August 1956, 16-19. 
 81 
enthusiasm the organization’s 1953 conference for consumer boycotts as a means of doing this, the 
United Tobacco boycott was the only one that gained traction outside the ANC’s Port Elizabeth 
stronghold. By the end of 1954, the national ANC leadership was backpedalling on the previous 
year’s resolution: the Executive Committee’s report to the annual conference in December 1954 
stressed “the need for great care in the use of the boycott weapon,” advising that “where conditions 
are considered unfavourable at any particular centre, that centre need not embark on the [consumer] 
boycott campaign.”138 Instead, the Congress leadership directed its attention to other issues. In 1954-
55, the ANC launched high-profile though ultimately unsuccessful campaigns against the 
government’s forced removal of residents from Sophiatown (a freehold residential area west of 
Johannesburg that was one of the few areas of apartheid South Africa where Africans had legal 
property rights), and against the government’s introduction of a new program of academically 
limited “Bantu Education” for African schoolchildren.   
Together with the SAIC, the white Congress of Democrats, and the South African Coloured 
People’s Organisation, the ANC also launched a campaign to solicit grassroots suggestions on the 
nature of a post-apartheid South Africa. Once again, the main objective was to mobilize support: the 
purpose, explained one ANC leader, was to give supporters a “vested interest in the freedom 
struggle.”139 The suggestions were collated by a committee into a “Freedom Charter,” which opened 
with the ringing declaration that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white,” called 
for a government “based on the will of all the people,” and cataloged the freedoms that should be 
enjoyed by all without discrimination. Adopted by nearly three thousand delegates at a multiracial 
“Congress of the People” in June 1955, the Freedom Charter also established the basis for what was 
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formalized later that year as the “Congress Alliance.” This consisted of the African, Indian, 
coloured, and white congresses, as well as the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), a 
new confederation of non-racial labor unions founded that year. 
 
III. ‘How can you love your neighbour, if you are never allowed to meet him?’: the first 
cultural and sports boycotts 
While there was little interest among most opponents of apartheid inside and outside South Africa in 
economic boycotts or sanctions, another idea for international action gained much more immediate 
traction. This was a proposal for “a cultural boycott of South Africa,” an idea first publicized by 
Trevor Huddleston in an article in the London Observer in October 1954. The immediate impetus for 
Huddleston’s article was the government’s banning of Oliver Tambo, who had taken over as acting 
Secretary-General of the ANC after the earlier banning of Walter Sisulu. Tambo was a devout 
Anglican and one of Huddleston’s closest friends in the Congress leadership. Huddleston was 
outraged at the complete lack of interest in Tambo’s banning among white South Africans, the vast 
majority of whom, he pointed out, professed to be Christians: “white South Africa remains silent, 
either approving wholeheartedly such totalitarian methods or tacitly accepting them as part of a 
pattern of life which has become familiar.” It was in these circumstances that Huddleston made his 
novel appeal: “In God’s name, cannot the church bestir itself all over the world and act? Cannot 
Christians everywhere show their distress in practical ways by so isolating South Africa from all 
civilized communications that she realises her position and feels some pain from it? I am pleading for a 
cultural boycott of South Africa. I am asking that all those who believe racialism to be sinful or wrong 
should refuse to encourage it by accepting any engagements to act, to perform as a musical artist or 
as a ballet dancer – in short to avoid any contacts which would provide entertainment for only one 
 83 
section of the community.”140 
Huddleston’s initial call for a cultural boycott thus envisaged foreign entertainers refusing to 
play only to all-white audiences in South Africa. In a co-authored letter to the London Times nine 
months later, he expanded the idea to a boycott of all-white South African teams participating in 
sporting events abroad, urging that the organizing committees of the Olympic Games and the 
British Empire Games should “make it a condition of South African participation that the teams be 
chosen without regard to race.”141 
 There were few precedents in international history for Huddleston’s calls for those overseas 
to impose cultural and sports boycotts. Instead, Huddleston’s proposals consolidated and extended a 
number of earlier scattered initiatives by himself and others in South Africa. For several years, 
Huddleston had tried to persuade prominent foreign artists who toured South Africa to play not 
only to all-white audiences, but also to his black parishioners in Sophiatown.142 In the sporting 
world, South African sports had, by the 1940s, become almost totally segregated on ethnic lines, 
with an alphabet soup of separate organizations in each sport not only for whites, but also for 
African, coloured, and Indian athletes. But in the late 1940s and 1950s, the various black governing 
bodies in several sports began to co-operate, establishing new, non-racial national federations in 
sports including soccer, cricket, and rugby. Some of these non-racial federations then appealed to 
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the international governing bodies in their sports, arguing that they, rather than South Africa’s all-
white sports organizations, should receive international recognition.143  
From 1948 onwards, for instance, both the all-white South African Table Tennis Union 
(SATTU) and the newly-formed non-racial South African Table Tennis Board (SATTB) applied 
every year to the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) requesting affiliation. After 
investigating the situation, the ITTF concluded that neither body could claim to be the de facto 
governing body of table tennis in South Africa and called on the two organizations to negotiate with 
each other to form a single representative committee. In the meantime the non-racial SATTB was 
held to be in “good standing” with the ITTF, meaning that its players could compete in international 
table tennis competitions, while the all-white SATTU’s applications were rejected on the grounds 
that it violated the ITTF’s rules prohibiting discrimination. The SATTU was recognized merely as a 
“corresponding body,” with which the ITTF was in contact; its players were permitted to play 
against other ITTF players only if the SATTB consented.144 In soccer, meanwhile, the non-racial 
South African Soccer Federation (SASF) applied to the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) for membership in 1952 and again in 1954, arguing that the all-white South 
African Football Association (SAFA) – which FIFA had officially recognized in 1952 – represented 
only a small minority of the country’s soccer players. In May 1955 an emergency FIFA committee 
meeting concluded that SAFA did “not comprise and control all the clubs and players in South 
Africa… [and] therefore [did] not [have] the standing of a real National Association.” FIFA did not 
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immediately withdraw SAFA’s membership, however, instead suggesting that the two South African 
bodies form a “South African Interfederal Committee” to liaise with FIFA.145 
 There was initially little co-ordination between these efforts to secure international 
recognition by various black sports bodies. But this began to change after the issue was taken up by 
Drum magazine, a publication with which Huddleston was closely associated.146 Founded in 1951 by 
Jim Bailey, the heir to a white South African mining fortune, Drum was edited from December 1951 
to March 1955 by Anthony Sampson, an aspiring journalist from Britain whom Bailey recruited 
straight out of college. Under Sampson, the illustrated monthly became, as one of its writers, Lewis 
Nkosi, later put it “a symbol of the new African cut adrift from the tribal reserve – urbanized, eager, 
fast-talking and brash.” It was not an explicitly political magazine: “to those working on the paper 
day-to-day,” recalled Sylvester Stein, who succeeded Sampson as editor in March 1955, “more 
important than politics seemed matters of football, crime, sex, social, music, magic and mumbo, and 
freakballs.” Few of the journalists and short-story writers associated with the magazine were 
members of the ANC or other political organizations, and Bailey, the white proprietor, was 
concerned that it should neither be too “confrontational” nor too closely aligned with the ANC.147 
Still, in its coverage of black township life, Drum reported sympathetically on the Defiance 
Campaign and other ANC initiatives. The magazine also became famous for its social exposés: in 
1952, for instance, investigative reporter Henry Nxumalo wrote a first-hand account of working 
conditions on the potato farms in the eastern Transvaal.148  
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 When Bailey recruited Stein from the liberal Rand Daily Mail newspaper to succeed Sampson 
as editor of Drum in early 1955, Stein thus felt that he had inherited the challenge of working up “a 
feature with world impact from time to time.” Stein decided that the May 1955 issue – the second 
for which he was responsible – would include a feature demanding that black athletes should be 
included in South Africa’s previously all-white Olympic team. Under Sampson, Drum had devoted 
extensive coverage to black boxing, soccer, and other sports, but Stein now wanted to cover sport in 
an “avowedly subversive” manner. Bailey was initially reluctant, warning that the government 
“would have Stein shot and the paper banned,” but he eventually allowed Stein to press ahead. “I 
had long felt a strong and obstinate urge to handle that sports feature,” Stein later recalled. “Yes, it 
was more truly political than what we usually tackled, but I was a more politically motivated man 
than Bailey, more even than most of the blacks on the paper. And sport, in my opinion, certainly 
related closely to politics.”149  
In the May 1955 feature article, Nxumalo – who had originally been recruited as Drum’s 
sports editor before he moved into investigative journalism – noted that the Olympic charter 
prohibited racial discrimination and reported that various non-racial South African sports bodies 
were therefore attempting to “break the Olympic ring” by applying to participate. Nxumalo argued 
that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was bound by its own rules to boycott any future 
South African team selected on a discriminatory basis: “the South African Olympic Games 
Association should not retain a colour bar clause in its constitution, and if it does it should not be 
entitled to retain recognition from the international Olympic body.”150  
 The combination of Huddleston’s October 1954 appeal in the Observer for a cultural boycott 
and Drum’s May 1955 feature on discrimination in sport had several important effects. In South 
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Africa, Dennis Brutus, a coloured teacher in Port Elizabeth, responded to Drum’s call for “a national 
all-races federation of all the Olympic sports” by forming a Co-ordinating Committee for 
International Recognition in Sport to promote the principle that “all people should have the right to 
represent their country in sport on the basis of ability.”151 In subsequent decades, Brutus would go 
on to become the individual most closely associated with the campaign for a sports boycott of South 
Africa. At college in the 1940s, he had been outraged to discover that black athletes he studied with 
could not represent South Africa in the Olympics even if they performed better than whites. As a 
manager and coach for his school’s sports teams Brutus had subsequently become involved as an 
administrator in several national non-racial bodies in different sports, making him uniquely well-
placed to co-ordinate their efforts.152 
The formation of the Co-ordinating Committee was followed by further appeals for 
international recognition in sports including cricket and weightlifting. And in soccer, after the all-
white SAFA rejected the SASF’s suggestion of a merger on equal terms, the SASF decided to renew 
its appeal for recognition at FIFA’s biennial congress in Lisbon in June 1956.153 Most international 
sports federations were unreceptive to these appeals, however: their initial response was usually to 
refer the non-racial South African bodies back to the all-white bodies that were already recognized. 
Though several international federations, including the IOC, formally prohibited discrimination, 
most were still dominated by European and American administrators who had longstanding ties to 
white South African sport. The exception was table tennis, the field in which the non-racial sports 
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movement achieved its first international victory. Among international sports federations, the ITTF 
was unusual: its aristocratic founder and president, Ivor Montagu, who had codified the rules of 
table tennis in the 1920s, was a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain, a Soviet spy, and 
a committed opponent of racial discrimination. After failing to resolve the years-long deadlock 
between the rival South African table tennis bodies, in April 1956 the ITTF withdrew its recognition 
of the all-white SATTU as a “corresponding body,” and recognized the non-racial SATTB as the 
sole controlling organization for table tennis in South Africa.154 
In Britain, meanwhile, the jazz musician Johnny Dankworth announced in February 1955 
that he was turning down a £10,000 contract to tour South Africa since such tours could only be 
attended by a section of the South African population. In April 1956 the British Musicians’ Union 
ruled that all its members should refuse to perform in South Africa, unless their contracts specified 
that performances must be given to all sections of the population.155 Huddleston’s call for a cultural 
boycott also prompted the Africa Bureau to begin lobbying in support of the idea. In May 1956 the 
Bureau convened a private meeting at the House of Lords that brought together sympathetic British 
performers and athletes with representatives of several of the nodes of the loose network involved 
in campaigning on apartheid in sport and culture, including Huddleston and former Drum editor 
Anthony Sampson (both of whom had now returned to Britain), as well as Harold Bloom, a white 
South African lawyer who was on his way to represent the non-racial SASF at the FIFA congress in 
Lisbon. Another attendee was Reverend David Shepard, an Anglican priest and international 
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cricketer. Huddleston told Shepard that “nothing would jolt people in South Africa more than if the 
MCC [the governing body of English cricket] were to refuse to send a team.”156  
Two months later the Africa Bureau achieved a partial victory, when actors with whom it 
had been collaborating proposed a resolution at the annual meeting of Equity, the British actors’ 
union, which would have instructed all members “not to work in any theatre in which any form of 
colour bar operates.” After a heated debate that lasted several hours, this was eventually qualified 
with an amendment: “unless there is a clause in the contract to ensure that a definite proportion… 
of performances under the contract shall be open to all non-Europeans or, if possible, to persons of 
any colour, race, or creed.” Despite this watering down, the Africa Bureau welcomed the initiative, 
noting in its publicity materials that opponents of apartheid were divided over whether it was better 
to refuse to perform in all-white venues in South Africa in any circumstances, or to make 
performances in all-white venues conditional upon also giving performances to mixed or black 
audiences.157 
For most of the leading figures in the loose network around Huddleston, the Africa Bureau, 
Drum magazine, Dennis Brutus, and South African non-racial sports bodies, the immediate objective 
of promoting boycotts of all-white institutions and audiences was to cause white South Africans to 
reassess their attitudes towards the segregation of sport and culture. This in turn, some hoped, 
would create opportunities for racial reconciliation and for a more wide-ranging reassessment by 
whites of apartheid and white supremacy. Most of those who argued for international boycotts of 
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South African theaters, sports bodies, and so on, did so because their specific targets were all-white 
institutions that denied black South Africans equal participation, not simply because they were South 
African. It was implicit in these initiatives that any South African institutions that adopted non-racial 
policies would not be boycotted.  
Brutus and other representatives of non-racial sports bodies stressed that their objective was 
not to have white South Africans excluded from international sporting competition, but to have 
South Africans of all races included. The purpose of calling for international sports organizations to 
boycott all-white bodies and recognize non-racial ones was to desegregate South African sport, 
starting with the teams that represented the country abroad, even if segregation and apartheid 
continued in all other spheres of life. The SASF, for instance, repeatedly suggested to SAFA that 
their affiliation battle at FIFA could be resolved by a merger of the two bodies.158 Drum’s May 1955 
feature on discrimination in sport had asked whether white South Africa would “stick to its rigid 
colour bar in sport and stand the risk of being barred from international competition and the 
Olympic Games, or will they allow non-whites to strengthen their teams in the same way as does the 
Negro in the United States?” To Drum journalists and others, it did not seem inconceivable that 
white South African sports administrators might choose the latter option if faced with this choice. In 
1956, Drum’s sports editor published his selections for a desegregated national soccer team: the 
starting side, made up of four white, three African, two Indian, and two coloured players, would be 
“a world-beater anytime,” he declared.159  
 To some black South African athletes, basic fairness in the selection of sports teams was an 
end in itself. Indeed, this was how Brutus himself had initially viewed the issue. But for others such 
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as Huddleston, the political ramifications of supporting what he called “the movement for cultural 
and athletic non-racialism in South Africa,” had been central from the beginning. As we have seen, 
the immediate impetus for his original call for a cultural boycott had been the banning of the ANC’s 
Oliver Tambo. Huddleston’s October 1954 article had marked an important shift in his thinking. 
His earlier calls for external intervention, in the immediate wake of the Defiance Campaign, had 
been based on the idea that this would “shake” the government itself, responsible as it was for the 
repressive legislation that had suppressed the campaign.160 But what had outraged him most about 
Tambo’s banning was the indifference of ordinary white South Africans, whether they voted for the 
National Party or the opposition United Party. “It is because the vast majority of the European 
population accept [white supremacy],” Huddleston wrote, “that they are fully prepared to remain 
supine when it is implemented in act” – as in the case of Tambo’s banning. In calling for a cultural 
boycott, Huddleston thus shifted his target from the government to the white South African 
population as a whole. A boycott of performance contracts that provided entertainment only for 
whites, he argued, would “give White South Africans an opportunity of tasting the medicine they so 
freely give to their Black fellow-citizens – the medicine of deprivation and frustration.”161 
 One of the central themes in Naught for Your Comfort, Huddleston’s 1956 bestseller about his 
time in South Africa, was his concern that the overwhelming majority of white South Africans had 
“no conception whatever of human relationships except that based on racial domination.” Whites 
knew Africans only as servants or employees: “This is contact. It is not a relationship. It can never 
be love – the thing which Christianity is all about.” Huddleston explained that what he was trying to 
defend was “this most precious human treasure, the opportunity of love itself.” He put it another 
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way to Canon Collins during Collins’ 1954 visit to South Africa: “How can you love your neighbour, 
if you are never allowed to meet him?”162 For Huddleston, the achievement of “cultural and athletic 
non-racialism” through international boycotts would be one way of creating opportunities for South 
Africans of different races to meet and to establish personal relationships across the color line. And 
this in turn, he believed, would undermine the entire edifice of white supremacy. Huddleston 
himself had “woken up” – a favorite metaphor – to the evil of apartheid, not “through academic 
reading or study” but “through seeing apartheid in its impact on the people who I had responsibility 
for as a priest.”163 Enabling opportunities for inter-racial relationships to develop in sport and the 
arts would create the conditions for more white South Africans to be shaken awake.  
 This understanding of the potential role of sport and culture in undermining apartheid had a 
long genealogy. Since the late nineteenth-century sport had been viewed by British liberal 
imperialists and missionaries – in South Africa and elsewhere – as a means of civilizing non-Britons, 
strengthening their ties to their British rulers, and minimizing anti-British antagonism. In South 
Africa in the inter-war period, liberal whites had, as the sports historian Douglas Booth argues, 
“introduced Africans to institutionalized amateur sports, especially football, as a broad strategy of 
co-option and pacification.” Dorothy Maud – a British missionary who worked at the Community 
of the Resurrection’s mission in Sophiatown in the inter-war years, and who was still there when 
Huddleston first arrived in 1943 – had been involved, for instance, in bringing white students to 
Sophiatown to do community service such as coaching soccer, tennis, cricket, and boxing. It was a 
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“blessed truth,” Maud wrote in 1929, that “games break down colour prejudice quicker than 
anything else.”164  
 Huddleston’s advocacy of a sports and cultural boycott to advance cultural and athletic non-
racialism thus built on a long tradition of efforts by liberal whites to promote inter-racial harmony 
through sport. The fears held by many liberal opponents of apartheid in the postwar period had 
been concisely expressed by one of the characters in Alan Paton’s novel Cry, the Beloved Country: “I 
have one great fear in my heart, that, when they [whites] are turned to loving, they will find we 
[Africans] are turned to hating.”165 This kind of fear – further exacerbated by events such as the 
outbreak of the “Mau Mau” uprising in Kenya in 1952 and by the killing of white bystanders in the 
riots at the end of the Defiance Campaign – was vividly expressed by Canon Collins during his 1954 
visit to South Africa: “a black Hitler could arise, a black nationalist, playing on wrath and 
superstition, and leading a rising aimed at cutting every white throat.” Huddleston shared such fears: 
for him, using boycotts to promote cultural and athletic non-racialism was in part a means of 
stopping Africans from turning to hatred and anti-white bitterness.166 But even more importantly, it 
was a way of encouraging whites to turn to love, by making them see Africans as humans rather than 
as servants or as abstract problems. Huddleston’s liberal and missionary predecessors had seen sport 
as a way to “civilize” indigenous peoples; Huddleston now hoped to use it to civilize racist whites as 
well. 
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 In the 1970s non-racial sports activists began to argue that there could be “no normal sport 
in an abnormal society” and therefore that – even if South African sports were formally 
desegregated and South African teams were no longer all-white – the sports boycott of South Africa 
should be maintained until apartheid itself was ended. In contrast, Huddleston and other early 
advocates of sports boycotts in the 1950s hoped boycotts would help to bring about “normal” or 
non-racial sport within South Africa’s abnormal, white-dominated, segregated society. And if this 
could be achieved, they believed, it would have a transformative effect on that society. Such beliefs 
rested on a liberal understanding of racism, not as something structurally determined, but as a 
problem of individual personal failings. If individual South African whites could be “woken up” 
from racial prejudice through inter-racial contact in sport and the arts, then the racist structures of 
South African society would necessarily be transformed.167 
This understanding of how international boycotts of segregated sports and cultural bodies 
could contribute to undermining apartheid and averting violence was not unique to Huddleston. 
Lewis Nkosi, who joined the staff of Drum magazine in 1957, recalled the mid-1950s as a period 
when “there was a surge of optimism… that art might yet crack the wall of apartheid”: “It was a 
time when it seemed that the sound of police gunfire and jackboot would ultimately become 
ineffective against the resolute opposition and defiance from the new ‘fringe society’ coming 
together in a spirit of tolerance and occupying a ‘no man’s land’ between the two warring camps.” 
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Or as Nkosi’s Drum colleague Bloke Modisane put it, “if South Africa could not be subverted 
politically then perhaps culturally and socially the whites could be seduced into realising that 
integration was a sane policy, particularly since it was an alternative to violence.”168 Some figures 
involved in the campaign for international recognition of non-racial sports bodies held similar views. 
At an assembly of the South African Soccer Federation in 1956 to discuss the SASF’s appeal to 
FIFA, for instance, the keynote address was given by Willy Rip, the president of the Cape Soccer 
Association. The purpose of the assembly, Rip declared, was to initiate a movement to break down 
racial barriers in sport, and this would have not only sporting but political significance: “If you can 
only get two people making football together not war, you have a good start.” (“Twenty-two still 
better” quipped a heckler in the audience).169 By the end of the 1950s Dennis Brutus too had come 
to see sport as a “political instrument,” arguing that the achievement of non-racial sport could 
threaten “the entire indivisible structure of racial rule.” “Once white South Africans can be 
influenced in their judgements by merit they will certainly come to think seriously of white and black 
sportsmen alike,” Brutus contended. “And in a country which eats, drinks, lives, and sleeps sport, 
the entire mental climate of the country could be changed.”170 
 Among the explicitly political organizations in South Africa, some of the most notable 
support for international boycotts in support of the movement for cultural and sporting non-
racialism came from members of the Liberal Party. This had been formed in 1953 by whites who 
had until then placed their hopes in the idea that the opposition United Party might adopt a more 
liberal position on racial issues. The Liberal Party was committed to the extension of constitutional 
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rights and the franchise, though Liberals disagreed on how far the right to vote should be extended: 
until 1959 the party’s official position was in favor of a qualified franchise. To achieve the 
implementation of its principles, the Liberal Party’s founders agreed, they would use “only 
democratic and constitutional means.” As the historian Janet Robertson has put it, “To the Liberals, 
it was not the parliamentary system that appeared to have failed, but the United Party. What was most 
needed, so it seemed, was a new party to work within the parliamentary process.”171 
The Liberal Party thus focused initially on trying to persuade white voters through rational 
argument. But from early on prominent Liberals also backed the use of external boycotts to 
promote non-racialism in sport and the arts. In 1957, for instance, Alan Paton, the prominent 
novelist and party president, began writing to foreign patrons of the “International Arts League of 
Youth,” a South African cultural organization that organized an annual all-white “Festival of 
Youth,” asking them to resign if the League refused to lift its color bar. The letters were, Paton 
declared, the “first shots” in a campaign to draw the attention of individuals and organizations 
overseas to the segregated nature of South African bodies that they were associated with.172 Later, In 
January 1959, Paton was invited by Dennis Brutus to give the opening address at the founding 
meeting of the South African Sports Association (SASA), a new coordinating body for the non-
racial sports federations. Paton, who became an honorary Vice President of the new Association, 
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gave his full support to SASA’s efforts to end racial discrimination in sport, declaring that 
“sportsmanship and the colour bar are incompatible.”173 
 Within the Congress movement, the sports and cultural boycotts were actively promoted by 
the youth wings of the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses. The Transvaal Indian Youth 
Congress (TIYC) took up the issue of discrimination in sport immediately after the publication of 
Drum’s May 1955 feature article: later that month the TIYC’s annual meeting passed a resolution 
calling on all world sports bodies – and especially the organizing committees of the Olympic and 
British Empire Games – to “debar white South Africa and to demand a non-colour bar 
representation.” In the run-up to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, representatives of the Congress 
subsequently began to press this demand in correspondence with the International Olympic 
Committee in Lausanne, and in the media.174 The Natal Indian Youth Congress, meanwhile, wrote 
to foreign artists asking them not to perform to all-white audiences in Durban, and picketed those 
who still came.175 In May 1956, the TIYC Executive passed a resolution calling for “a cultural 
boycott of South Africa as part of a universal move to isolate this country and bring about pressure 
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to bear in the fight against racial discrimination.” A cultural boycott, the TIYC declared, would give 
encouragement to black South Africans in their political struggle, it would  “impress upon racialist 
South Africans that in their Herrenvolk policies they stand isolated from the rest of the civilized 
world” and it would “give rise to greater political consciousness among European South Africans 
and… contribute to bringing about more sympathy and support for the national liberation 
movement.”176 
 Despite the enthusiasm of the Indian youth congresses, this view of the potential 
significance of cultural boycotts received little support in the wider Congress movement in the 
1950s. Ahmed Kathrada of the TIYC pointed out in August 1956 that the Congress movement had 
“no defined policies” on the issue of cultural relations between South Africa and the outside world. 
On the “spontaneous” boycott initiatives abroad, the “national organisations” that made up the 
Congress Alliance had, Kathrada noted with frustration, “remained silent.”177 In their private lives, 
leaders of the Congress Alliance reveled in transgressing the norms that segregated South African 
social life: Ben Turok recalled that white activists viewed small gestures, such as conspicuously 
entertaining black comrades in the all-white suburbs, as “our own small contribution to the erosion 
of apartheid.”178 And while some members of the Congress movement or the SACP may have 
dismissed sport as “non-revolutionary or even counter-revolutionary” (as the youthful Kathrada had 
done himself in the 1940s), many others were enthusiastic players or spectators. ANC President 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Executive Committee, Transvaal Indian Youth Congress, “Resolution Calling For A Cultural Boycott,” 26 May 1956, 
File Em6.3.3, Records Relating To The ‘Treason Trial,’ Wits Historical Papers. 
177 A.M. Kathrada, “Towards a Cultural Boycott of South Africa,” Liberation, August 1956, 16-19. In June 1956, the 
conference of the Natal Indian Congress passed a resolution calling on international sporting and cultural organizations 
to disaffiliate discriminatory South African bodies. But – unlike its youth wing – the NIC did not subsequently campaign 
on the issue. Meer, “I Remember,” 459-60. 
178 Turok, Nothing But the Truth, 84-85. See also, for instance, Clingman, Bram Fischer, 176, 202. 
 99 
Albert Lutuli was a “compulsive football fan” who had served in a variety of executive positions in 
local, provincial, and national African soccer bodies in the 1930s.179 
But the Congress leadership did not treat the active promotion of cultural and athletic non-
racialism as a significant tactic in the struggle to achieve the South Africa envisaged in the Freedom 
Charter. Inter-racial co-operation in sport and the arts was to be welcomed, but it was not viewed as 
strategically significant. Ezekiel Mphahlele, literary editor of Drum from 1955 to 1957 and one of the 
few Drum writers to join the ANC, commented in 1959 that the ANC leadership had never viewed 
“cultural matters as an important flank to its activities. All its time had been taken up in 
organizational work around purely political ideology.”180 When Alfred Hutchinson, an ANC leader 
who had been a college classmate of Dennis Brutus, first tried to persuade Ruth First and the other 
editors of Fighting Talk magazine – “the thinking Congressite’s guide to the political scene” – to 
publish an article by Brutus on sport he was told “Sports really has nothing to do with politics. We 
don’t have to waste our time with it.”181  
 The Congress leadership were confident the end of apartheid would be achieved much more 
quickly than would be possible through the gradual evolution in white attitudes envisaged by liberal 
advocates of cultural and sports boycotts. And in the short term there seemed to be little evidence 
that the movement for cultural and athletic non-racialism was causing any evolution in white 
attitudes. “We didn’t realise how small and powerless we were,” Lewis Nkosi later wrote.182 The 
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white South African entertainment industry responded to the initiatives by Equity and the British 
Musicians Union not by integrating theaters and concert venues, but by arranging for touring British 
actors and musicians to give additional “token performances” for black audiences in inferior venues, 
thus complying with the minimum requirements of the resolutions.183 And in sport, though the 
Africa Bureau claimed that “the ping-pong crisis reverberated through South Africa” in 1956, the 
ITTF’s recognition of the non-racial SATTB as the sole controlling organization for table tennis in 
South Africa did not lead even to the integration of table tennis. The all-white SATTU continued to 
refuse to merge with the SATTB, preferring instead for its players to be barred from international 
competition. 
 Other all-white sports bodies that retained international recognition responded to pressure 
from the non-racial federations by offering them forms of “affiliation” that still maintained the 
complete segregation of sport. The all-white SAFA, for instance, responded to FIFA’s calls for 
compromise by removing the “color bar clause” from its constitution in 1956, renaming itself the 
Football Association of South Africa (FASA), and offering the non-racial SASF the option of 
becoming a non-voting affiliate organization, an offer that the SASF unsurprisingly rejected.184 
Backed by the government – which began denying passports to black sports representatives and 
preventing them from traveling abroad to lobby international organizations – the white sports 
bodies maintained a united front against any moves towards integrated sport. The council of the all-
white South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association (SAOCGA) ruled in 
November 1957 that there would be no competition between white and black athletes under its 
auspices, and that therefore no black athletes would be selected to represent South Africa 
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internationally. SAOCGA president Reg Honey called on all of the white sports bodies affiliated to 
the Association “to stand together and, if it came to that, get thrown out together from international 
bodies.”185 
Events in Johannesburg in 1957 meanwhile put domestic boycotts back on the agenda of the 
Congress Alliance, even as the South African government stepped up its efforts to cripple domestic 
resistance to its policies. In December 1956, one hundred and fifty six leading members of the 
Congress Alliance were arrested and charged with treason, initiating the mammoth “Treason Trial,” 
which for some of the accused would last until 1961. But, in January 1957, just as the trial’s 
“preliminary examination” was beginning, a massive bus boycott broke out in the township of 
Alexandra, nine miles north of the center of Johannesburg. For many African workers, transport 
costs consumed a significant proportion of their income, and when the bus company attempted to 
increase fares from Alexandra by a penny, thousands of African commuters began boycotting the 
buses, choosing instead to walk up to twenty miles a day. This campaign, with its slogan of 
“Azikhwelwa!” (“We will not ride!”) was, in Lutuli’s words, “a spontaneous movement of the people” 
that “the ANC had no part in organising.” The boycott was coordinated by a People’s Transport 
Committee, which included members of the local ANC branch, but also many others.186 (One of the 
few organizations in Alexandra to refuse to join the Committee was the youth wing of the NEUM: 
according to one member of the Committee, others in the township joked that the NEUM, “which 
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always preached the boycott weapon and evinced attachment to it, boycotted everything including 
the bus boycott.”187)  
This spontaneous initiative became, Nelson Mandela later wrote, “a live bomb and a national 
issue.” Sympathy bus boycotts quickly spread to other African townships surrounding 
Johannesburg, and to cities further afield including Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and Durban.188 In early 
February, the ANC provincial leadership in the Cape called for a bus and local train boycott in 
solidarity with the boycotters in Johannesburg. In Port Elizabeth, where ANC organization 
remained strong, this solidarity bus boycott was eighty or ninety per cent effective at the outset, 
despite the fact that there was no fare dispute in the city. The initial enthusiasm for boycotting Port 
Elizabeth’s buses began to wane, however. After two weeks, the ANC leadership in the city 
announced that it was suspending the transport boycott and moving on to “the second phases of the 
present struggle.” These second phases included a revival of the consumer boycott tactic that had 
been used so successfully in Port Elizabeth three years earlier. Now, however, the boycott was 
directed against  “all products produced in Nationalist owned and Nationalist controlled factories, as 
well as… Nationalist controlled finance houses, such as Building Societies, Banks, Investment 
Corporations and Insurance Companies.” Shopkeepers were given a month to dispose of their 
stocks of the blacklisted products. Defiant traders who continued to stock “Nationalist goods” after 
this deadline were picketed by ANC patrols. Faced with plummeting sales, several stores quickly 
conceded.189 In Alexandra itself, the bus boycott lasted for more than three months, during which 
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the public bus company lost nearly £90,000. The boycott finally came to an end in April, after a 
compromise agreement that led to the government passing legislation to subsidize bus fares. It was a 
rare victory for opponents of apartheid in this period: Anthony Sampson noted that the new 
legislation was “the first act of parliament in the forty-seven years of the Union to be passed directly 
as a result of African pressure.”190 
 While the Treason Trial dragged on, as the prosecutors monotonously read thousands of 
pieces of evidence into the record, the Alexandra bus boycott and its repercussions in Port Elizabeth 
and elsewhere created a renewed interest in domestic boycotts on the part of the national leadership 
of the Congress Alliance. In February 1957, Walter Sisulu published a lengthy article on the subject 
of “boycott as a political weapon.” Sisulu was particularly concerned with the question of boycotting 
segregated political institutions, which continued to cause controversy amongst opponents of 
apartheid. As a leading Youth Leaguer in the 1940s Sisulu had supported the boycott of such bodies, 
but he now argued that in the prevailing conditions of the late 1950s, the ANC should revise its 
1949 resolution on the issue. Boycotts, he argued, could be an effective weapon, in both the political 
and the economic spheres. The bus boycotts in Alexandra and elsewhere were just one illustration of 
this. But the central point Sisulu wanted to make was that “elevating a tactic of struggle into a 
fundamental principle” was a serious error. “Boycott is a tactic,” Sisulu stressed, “and only one of 
the methods to be used for the struggle for national independence and against white domination and 
discriminatory laws.” Like all tactics, the use of boycott should be “dictated… by the prevailing 
conditions” and “judged from their effect on the movement.”191 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Sampson, Treason Cage, 214. 
191 Walter Sisulu, “Boycott as a Political Weapon,” Liberation, February 1957, 12-15. Nelson Mandela published an article 
making the same argument exactly a year later. Nelson Mandela, “Boycott is not an Inflexible Principle: Our Struggle 
Needs Many Tactics,” Liberation, February 1958, 14-17. 
 104 
 In his argument that the boycott of discriminatory institutions was not a “fundamental 
principle” but a tactic whose use should depend on circumstances, Sisulu might also have been 
describing the approach of the Congress Alliance, the Communist Party, and other anti-apartheid 
bodies to international boycotts of South Africa in the period since the Second World War. In 
subsequent decades, the boycott of South Africa in almost every sphere would indeed become not 
just an important tactical weapon, but a central principle for the ANC and for many other groups 
opposed to apartheid, both inside South Africa and around the world. But this had not been the case 
in the 1940s and 1950s. After calling for multilateral trade sanctions in 1947, Yusuf Dadoo had 
subsequently dropped the idea.192 He and other South African resistance leaders instead 
concentrated their attention on the developing opposition to apartheid inside the country. The next 
two chapters show how – after consumer boycotts of South African goods spread out around the 
world in the course of 1959, and after options for domestic opposition were drastically restricted in 
1960 – the ANC and its allies did subsequently come to view the international economic isolation of 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Spread of Anti-Apartheid Boycotts, 1957–1960. 
 
Saturday December 13, 1958, the final day of the All-African People’s Conference, was chaotic. 
Meeting in Accra, the capital of newly-independent Ghana, the three hundred official delegates – 
representing more than sixty political, labor, youth, and women’s organizations from twenty-eight 
African territories – had spent the previous week discussing African liberation and pan-African 
unity. Each morning they had gathered in plenary to hear addresses from the heads of national 
delegations, before dividing in the afternoons into five committees tasked with hammering out 
specific resolutions. The conference had in fact originally been supposed to close on Friday 
December 12. But the final meeting of the heads of delegations, who met at 10am that Friday to 
consider the resolutions passed by the five committees, had continued until the early hours of 
Saturday morning – until at 5am a “strike” by the secretariat typists, unable to stay awake any longer, 
forced the discussions to an end.1 
When the delegates gathered in the Accra Community Center for the final time on Saturday 
December 13, therefore, the finalized texts of the conference resolutions were not yet available.2 
Tom Mboya, the twenty-nine year old Kenya labor leader and chairman of the conference, rose to 
give his closing remarks. Speaking in front of the conference logo – the silhouette of the African 
continent, with a huge torch superimposed upon it – and beneath a gigantic banner reading 
“HANDS OFF AFRICA! AFRICA MUST BE FREE!,” Mboya began by declaring that the 
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conference had been “a historic moment for all the peoples of the world.” Turning to the specific 
decisions reached, he first briefly discussed the conference’s resolution on the conflict in French-
ruled Algeria, before turning to South Africa. South Africa, he declared, was “the situation which no 
longer requires mere resolutions but action”: “We have agreed and we are going to urge that in fact 
the time has come when the Independent African States and any sympathetic governments and 
organisations anywhere in the world… should decide on positive action against South Africa.” 
Specifically, that positive action would take the form of “economic sanctions by refraining… against 
buying South African goods.” After discussing more briefly the conference’s other decisions, and 
affirming the conference’s determination that they be implemented, Mboya closed his oration by 
reading the conference slogan from the giant map of Africa on the wall opposite him: “Peoples of 
Africa, unite. We have nothing to lose but our chains. We have a continent to regain. We have 
freedom and human dignity to attain.”3 
 This was the first time an international gathering had resolved to use an economic boycott to 
assist the struggle against apartheid. And unlike the sporadic earlier appeals for economic boycotts 
and sanctions by individuals such as Yusuf Dadoo, Trevor Huddleston, and Michael Scott, the 
AAPC’s action generated a significant response. It was the AAPC’s resolution, ANC president 
Albert Lutuli later wrote, that “set the ball rolling” for the international boycott campaigns that 
became such a central feature of external action against apartheid in subsequent years.4 Studies of 
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the struggle against apartheid have almost always presented the launch of economic boycott 
campaigns against South Africa in 1959 as responses to an appeal by the ANC.5 But the call for 
sanctions at Accra in December 1958 was not instigated by the ad hoc ANC delegation that attended 
the AAPC. The internationalization of boycotts of South Africa at the end of the 1950s was not 
initiated by the nationalist leadership in South Africa as part of any grand strategy for South African 
liberation. The ANC’s attitude described in Chapter 1 – of welcoming foreign expressions of 
support, but not investing any significant time, resources, or personnel in international campaigns – 
continued to characterize ANC policy through the end of the decade.  
Rather than being a straightforward “boomerang” response to an appeal from South Africa, 
the boycotts launched in 1959 reversed the process: it was the boycott initiatives by individuals and 
organizations outside South Africa that first interested the resistance movements inside the country 
in the potential usefulness of this kind of external action. Ronald Segal, the Congress-aligned editor 
of Africa South magazine and an early supporter of sanctions, commented decades later that 
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“Certainly there was no developed economic [sanctions] strategy at that point and I think that [in] a 
very very important period of the international movement it was outside the country that new ideas 
were generated and new policies formed. I don’t think the ANC believed in the efficacy of economic 
sanctions.”6 
Inside South Africa, the ANC and the newly-formed Pan Africanist Congress both launched 
new domestic consumer boycott campaigns in 1959. But the organizers of these boycotts adopted 
them above all because of their expected impact not on those boycotted, but on the South African 
boycotters themselves. They did not attach any great strategic importance to a counterpart 
international boycott, and did not devote significant time or resources to encouraging one. 
Nevertheless, subsequent efforts elsewhere in the world to implement the AAPC resolution by 
launching boycotts of South African goods gained inspiration and legitimacy from the fact that the 
adoption of the AAPC resolution happened to coincide with the launch of domestic boycott 
campaigns inside the country. 
 Indeed, there was a high degree of contingency in the spread of boycotts of South African 
goods between 1958 and 1960. The AAPC’s adoption of a resolution on sanctions can be traced 
back to Michael Scott’s ongoing interest in the idea, which went back to the early 1950s, as we have 
seen. But Scott only decided to attend the AAPC at the last minute, and had not planned to use the 
conference as a forum in which to proselytize for sanctions. In Britain, the consumer boycott 
campaign was launched after the maverick Ronald Segal gave a speech in Cape Town in which – 
without consulting ANC leaders – he prematurely launched the ANC’s consumer boycott. Attempts 
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to organize boycotts of South African goods elsewhere in the world were primarily the result of the 
persistence of a single individual, Kenyan labor leader and AAPC chairman Tom Mboya.7 
 The leading supporters of economic boycotts of South Africa in this period suggested a 
diverse array of mechanisms by which they hoped boycotts might contribute to the struggle against 
apartheid. Some suggested that the purpose was to put pressure directly on the National Party 
government. Others dismissed this as hopelessly naïve and argued that boycotts would put pressure 
either on the white business community or on the white electorate in South Africa. In Britain in 
early 1960, the publicity materials of the newly-formed Boycott Movement stressed that the purpose 
of the British consumer boycott was not to damage the South African economy but to make a 
“moral gesture” of self-denial that would trouble the consciences of white South Africans. For 
members of the South African Liberal Party who endorsed and promoted external boycotts, 
meanwhile, the most important effect of boycotts would not be on whites at all, but on black South 
Africans who the Liberals feared might turn to violence. And for the leaders of the two overseas 
organizations that played the greatest role in entrenching and popularizing the idea of a boycott of 
South African goods, the British Labour Party and the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, their primary purpose was not to impact the situation inside South Africa at all, but to 
appeal to constituencies elsewhere in the world that they were anxious to woo. 
 
I. Setting the Ball Rolling: The All-African People’s Conference  
The All-African People’s Conference was one of a number of international convocations in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. The international order was in flux, as former colonial territories were rapidly 
gaining their independence, and leaders of the new states were engaged in what the political scientist 
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Robert Vitalis has called “a multifront war of position” to establish which particular global 
solidarities would define the postcolonial era. This competition was characterized by a series of 
“sometimes rival, sometimes simply orthogonal convocations,” at both state and non-state levels. 
These included the Bandung Conference in 1955; the conference of Afro-Asian Peoples in Cairo in 
1957; the first Conference of Independent African States and the AAPC, both held in Accra in 1958; 
the Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State or Government in Belgrade in 1961; and the 
founding conference of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa in 1963.8 
Kwame Nkrumah, the Ghanaian Prime Minister, and George Padmore, the Trinidadian 
activist who now served as Nkrumah’s ‘Adviser on African Affairs,’ both had long associations with 
the pan-African movement: together they had been the joint organizing secretaries of the fifth Pan-
African Congress in Manchester in 1945. Nkrumah and Padmore perceived the first of the post-
colonial international convocations, the “Asian-African Conference” at Bandung in 1955, as a 
potential threat to their own Afro-centric ambitions: a few months after the Conference, Padmore 
suggested to Nkrumah the idea of a ‘‘conference to match Bandung on an African scale with Asians 
as observers.’’9 Subsequently, the ambitions of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt to project his influence 
into both Asia and Africa – marked most notably by Egypt’s hosting of the conference of Afro-
Asian Peoples in December 1957 and the subsequent establishment of the Afro-Asian People’s 
Solidarity Organisation as a permanent body headquartered in Cairo – worried Nkrumah and 
Padmore even further. When Ghana hosted the first Conference of Independent African States in 
April 1958, this was, according to one contemporary account (possibly written by Padmore’s 
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widow), “in order to keep for Black Africa priority over the Afro-Asian movement in Cairo.”10 Billed 
as the sixth in the series of pan-African congresses that had begun with that organized by the great 
African American activist W.E.B. du Bois in 1919, the December 1958 All-African People’s 
Conference offered much greater opportunities to pursue this agenda, involving as it did non-
governmental groups from almost every territory in Africa, rather than only those states that were 
already independent.11 (In April 1958, these had been – apart from South Africa – Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Nasser’s United Arab Republic). The AAPC thus 
brought together leading anti-colonial nationalists from across the continent, many of whom were 
meeting for the first time. The most prominent, in addition to Nkrumah himself, included Hastings 
Banda of Nyasaland, Franz Fanon of Algeria, Abeid Karume of Zanzibar, Kenneth Kaunda of 
Zambia, Patrice Lumumba of the Belgian Congo, Mboya of Kenya, Joshua Nkomo of Southern 
Rhodesia, and Holden Roberto of Angola. 
For Nkrumah, the primary purpose of hosting this gathering was to strengthen ties of pan-
African solidarity among leaders from across the continent and to enhance Ghana’s leading role 
within the pan-African movement – and, ultimately, within the “pan-African commonwealth of free 
and independent United States of Africa” that he saw as the ideal end-point of the process of 
decolonization.12 Nkrumah did not intend the AAPC to be the site of the launch of a boycott 
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– although most of us were more concerned with the freedom of our own territories than with his vision of the future.” 
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campaign or any other kind of specific new initiative against the white regime in South Africa. The 
AAPC’s subsequent adoption of a resolution calling for the independent African states to impose 
trade sanctions against South Africa was, indeed, an unexpected and unwelcome development for 
the Ghanaian hosts.  
In South Africa, leaders of the Congress Alliance welcomed Nkrumah’s initiative in calling 
the conference as the belated fruition of Walter Sisulu’s attempts to organize a pan-African congress 
several years earlier. But Congress leaders likewise did not expect or intend for the AAPC to initiate 
a new boycott campaign against South Africa. The South African government had refused to grant 
passports to any delegates from the ANC wishing to leave South Africa to attend the conference, 
with the consequence that, as Lutuli put it, the ANC had “to rely on a ‘delegation’ of people who 
were by chance already out of the country.”13 The ANC delegation was led by Ezekhiel Mphahlele, 
the former literary editor of Drum magazine, who had left South Africa in 1957 to take up a teaching 
post in Nigeria. After hearing about the planned AAPC, Mphahlele had written to Nelson Mandela 
in South Africa offering to represent the ANC.14  
The rest of the ANC delegation consisted of Roy Mdudu and Mohan Govan, two largely 
unknown South African expatriates then living in Ghana and Nigeria respectively, plus Mary Louise 
Hooper, a white American who had worked an aide to Lutuli before being deported from South 
Africa in 1957. Like Mphahlele, Hooper had written to the ANC leadership in South Africa to 
request that they nominate her to be an ANC delegate. On the third day of the conference the 
delegation was joined by Alfred Hutchinson, an ANC defendant in the ongoing Treason Trial who 
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had escaped from South Africa the previous month by train, disguised as a migrant worker, and had 
subsequently made his way north to Ghana. Mphahlele recalled how Hutchinson had arrived in the 
middle of the morning plenary session: “Alfred Hutchinson stalks up the aisle, six feet of him, just 
like one of those outlaws on the screen who come to tame and civilise a noisy, lawless town of the 
Wild West. I rush from the platform to embrace him, beside myself with excitement. Mboya 
introduces him to the conference amidst loud applause.”15 
 Perhaps on account of the ad hoc nature of the ANC’s representation at the conference, the 
ANC National Executive in South Africa also sent a document to Accra entitled “Notes for 
Delegates to the All-African People’s Conference.” This submission made no mention of boycott or 
sanctions: it focused, first, on outlining the Congress’s reservations about the implication of the pre-
conference material that AAPC would determine a common ideology and strategy for all 
participants, and, second, on explaining the current situation in South Africa and the ANC’s past 
efforts to alter it.16 Similarly, Mphahlele made no reference to boycott or sanctions in his in his 
speech to the AAPC plenary on the conference’s second day.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ezekhiel Mphahlele, “Accra Conference Diary,” Fighting Talk, February 1959, 6-7; [Mary Louise Hooper] to [M.B. 
Yengwa?], 4 October 1958, Folder: ‘Letters,’ Box 1, Mary Louise Hooper papers (MSS 283), Special Collections, 
Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI; Alfred Hutchinson, Road to Ghana (Johannesburg: Penguin, 2006); UK 
High Commission, Accra, to Commonwealth Relations Office, telegram, 10 December 1958, CO936/580, UKNA. See 
also Jeffrey S. Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, Southern Africa and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing Africa,” Kronos 
37 (November 2011): 23-31; Nicholas Grant and Vincent Hiribarren, “Anti-Apartheid in Exile: Alfred Hutchinson’s 
Road to Ghana” [interactive online mapping project], https://perma.cc/AVQ4-NPZR. 
16 “The Annual Report of the National Executive Committee,” 13-14 December 1958, Item Ba6.3; “Notes for delegates 
to the All-African People’s Conference to be held in Accra, Ghana  in December 1958,” Item Ba6.4, ANC Records, 
Wits Historical Papers. Gurney speculates that the ANC “Notes for delegates” did not mention boycott “perhaps 
because of the legal implications.” Gurney, “In the Heart of the Beast,” 261n32. This is unlikely: boycott advocacy was 
not made an offense in South Africa until March 1960, and – as we shall see – ANC, PAC, and South African Liberal 
Party leaders in South Africa were not inhibited from publicly advocating international boycotts in late 1959 and early 
1960. 
17 E. Mphahlele, “Address to the All-African People’s Conference… Presented by the Delegation of the African 
National Congress of South Africa,” Folder 1, Box 314, Africa Bureau Records; “The Atrocities of Colonialism – Down 
with Apartheid Policy,” Accra Evening News, 11 December 1958, 4. Subsequently, resolutions by the ANC annual 
national conference of December 13-14 1958, and by the joint executives of the Congress Alliance on February 21, 
1959, announced that they “endorsed,” “approved,” and were “particularly inspired by the solidarity expressed by” the 
AAPC’s sanctions resolution, but made no suggestion that the resolution had originally been proposed by the ANC. 
 114 
Rather than having been initiated by the ANC, the AAPC’s sanctions resolution was adopted 
as a consequence of Michael Scott’s ongoing interest in the idea of using sanctions against South 
Africa. In December 1956, Scott had used his testimony to the UN Trusteeship Committee to 
suggest again – as he had first done three years earlier – that the status of South West Africa should 
be referred to the ICJ for a compulsory judgment, which could then be enforced with economic 
sanctions.18 And in March 1957, while attending Ghana’s independence celebrations, Scott raised the 
idea of sanctions in two private meetings with Nkrumah. Noting South Africa’s decade-long 
defiance of the General Assembly’s resolutions on the questions of apartheid, the treatment of 
Indians, and the status of South West Africa, Scott urged Nkrumah that “the question of what can 
be done must be thought out and a new plan of strategy devised.” Specifically he suggested that the 
independent African states take action “both individually and jointly which will adversely affect 
South African trade and other relations”; such action, he proposed, could be discussed and 
coordinated at the Conference of Independent African States that Nkrumah was planning to 
convene.19 Though Nkrumah promised to study Scott’s proposals, in public he confirmed in March 
1957 that Ghana would continue to trade with South Africa. He wanted to “smash apartheid,” he 
explained, but Ghana could not “interfere in the internal affairs of another country.” Nkrumah and 
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other Ghanaian officials instead expressed the hope that South Africa could be influenced through 
the pressure of world public opinion.20 When the Conference of Independent African States met in 
Accra in April 1958, Scott’s sanctions proposal was not on the agenda. 
In convening the AAPC, however, Nkrumah created a forum in which Scott was effectively 
able to circumvent the Ghanaian government’s opposition to trade sanctions. Nkrumah’s desire to 
promote his own ideas and influence in decolonizing Africa had led him to convene the AAPC as a 
conference of non-governmental organizations, in which the governing parties of independent states 
– such as his own Convention People’s Party, the formal hosts of the conference – interacted on a 
basis of formal equality with a variety of other non-state actors representing groups from around the 
continent. The ability of Nkrumah’s government – and that of the other already-independent 
African states – to control the agenda and resolutions was thus much weaker than at the 
intergovernmental Conference of Independent African States. Shortly before the AAPC began, 
Nkrumah declared to a senior Ghanaian security official that he “intended to ensure that no 
resolution prepared by one of the sub-committees… would be put before the plenary without his 
personal approval.”21 In the event he proved unable to carry this out.  
The end run that Scott performed at the AAPC around Nkrumah’s continued opposition to 
sanctions was not, however, a pre-meditated action. Scott had received an invitation to attend the 
AAPC in November, but he appears not to have intended to accept until he received an emergency 
telegram from his longtime ally in South West Africa, Chief Hosea Kutako, urging that Scott should 
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represent the Herero people at the conference.22 Scott then traveled to Accra, arriving on the second 
day of the Conference. The arrival of “the world-famous white defender of Africans,” as the Accra 
Evening News characterized him, was announced during the conference plenary the following day 
amid what the official minutes described as “scenes of pleasure and hope.”23 Scott was then invited 
to address the plenary, the only white attendee to be so honored. In his plenary speech, Scott made 
no explicit reference to boycotting South Africa. The main theme of his address was the 
“bankruptcy of military force” – at the time Scott’s primary concern – and the consequent need for 
“the peoples of the world to find new methods of resisting injustice in human relations and insanity 
in foreign policies.”24 
In addition to his own speech, however, Scott also circulated copies of a “Statement to the 
All African People’s Conference” by Mburumba Kerina, a young South West African student then 
studying in the United States who had worked closely with Scott the previous year to lobby the 
United Nations on the issue of the South West Africa mandate. Kerina’s statement did not, perhaps, 
accord fully with Scott’s own ideas. Its opening lines, “paying reverence to the thousands of dear 
ones who have shed their blood for the liberation of Africa in the MAU-MAU and the ALGERIAN 
WARS” contrasted starkly with Scott’s stress in his own speech on the bankruptcy of force.25 But 
Kerina’s specific proposals were ideas that Scott himself had been promoting in 1957–58, and for 
which Scott was probably the ultimate source. (Indeed, when Chief Kutako wrote to Kerina in 
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August 1958 appointing him his representative at the UN, he had instructed him to check everything 
he said there with Scott). Building on the Africa Bureau’s activism on the sports boycott, Kerina 
suggested that the AAPC should request “the Olympic Games Executive Committee to oust South 
Africa from the Olympic Games as long as she refuses to accept Africans in her Olympic Team.” 
And he proposed that Conference should “Request all independent African States to close down all 
communications and commercial exchanges with the South Africa Government as well as the 
servicing of aircraft proceeding to and from South Africa” until Pretoria placed South West Africa 
under the United Nations Trusteeship System.26 
Eleven years after Dadoo had first suggested the idea in 1947, the proposal for multilateral 
trade sanctions – made by Kerina and publicized by Scott – now found a large and receptive 
audience for the first time. British diplomats in Accra reported during the conference that the “main 
targets” of the AAPC were “the Union of South Africa and ‘white settlers’ generally,” explaining 
that delegates “no doubt regarded the Union as par excellence the embodiment of all they disliked.”27 
Addressing the plenary after Mphahlele’s speech on Tuesday December 9, Mboya had commented 
that in the case of South Africa, “Something more than ‘pious resolutions’ was required.”28 In this 
context, the Kerina/Scott sanctions proposal, made the next day, must have appeared to be precisely 
the “something” that was needed. The idea of boycotting “commercial exchanges” with South 
Africa represented the internationalization at governmental level of a form of action with which 
many of the anti-colonial activists at the AAPC were familiar from their own domestic struggles. In 
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Kenya, for instance, “Mau Mau” rebels in the early 1950s had organized a series of widely-observed 
boycotts of European goods and services, including government-run buses and European beer and 
cigarettes. Mboya himself had recently taken up this tactic, organizing a two-day boycott of buses, 
beer, and cigarettes, earlier in 1958.29 
The sanctions proposal was considered by the conference committee on “Racialism and 
Discriminatory Laws and Practices,” of which Mphahlele was appointed the convener. The AAPC’s 
five committees met in camera each afternoon during the week of the conference, and we 
consequently know little about the committee’s discussions.30 But, crucially, the committee greatly 
expanded the objective of the embargo Kerina had proposed. Rather than focusing only on South 
West Africa, the committee redirected the sanctions against the entire edifice of South African 
apartheid, proposing that the planned AAPC permanent secretariat “should urge any African 
independent states which conduct trade with South Africa to impose economic sanctions against the 
latter country as a protest against racial discrimination which the European minority are practising to 
the humiliation of the non-European majority. Such economic sanctions should include the boycott 
of South African goods.” In addition, the committee further proposed that African countries should 
withhold migrant labor from South Africa, and that no African state should have diplomatic 
relations “with any country on our continent that practises race discrimination.” (Kerina’s suggestion 
of a sports boycott was, however, ignored). The committee’s proposals were subsequently adopted 
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as the Conference’s “Resolution on Racialism and Discriminatory Laws and Practices” by the heads 
of delegations, during their marathon all-day and all-night meeting that began on Friday December 
12.31 
South African diplomats worried that “if ever anybody were foolish enough to implement” 
the AAPC’s sanctions resolution, it “could indeed strike a serious blow to South Africa’s economy.” 
But in the short term nobody did implement the resolution.32 Unable to agree on who should be 
appointed Secretary-General of the new permanent organization the conference decided to establish, 
the members of the AAPC Steering Committee decided to put off establishing a full secretariat until 
their next meeting, scheduled for June 1959 in Cairo. In the meantime, a “skeleton staff” was 
appointed as a temporary secretariat in Accra, including a little-known Ghanaian bureaucrat as 
“Administrative Secretary without political responsibility.” The Steering Committee left the details 
of the proposed boycott of South Africa to be worked out at their next meeting six months later.33 
 The independent states whom the AAPC resolution had called upon to impose sanctions 
meanwhile showed no inclination to do so. Indeed, at a press conference in January 1959, Nkrumah 
declared that – far from observing the conference resolution proscribing diplomatic relations with 
any country that practiced racial discrimination – he planned to exchange ambassadors with Pretoria. 
Asked when the boycott of South African goods resolved upon by the AAPC would begin, 
Nkrumah reiterated his opposition to the idea, commenting only that he had  “nothing to say at the 
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moment. A boycott is the same as total war.”34 In Ethiopia – which Mboya visited shortly after the 
conclusion of the AAPC and where, at a public meeting at the Ethiopian National Library, he 
described the AAPC’s discussions of economic sanctions – the government of Emperor Haile 
Selassie briefly considered banning South African imports, but decided against it.35 
Thus neither Ghana, nor Ethiopia, nor any of the other seven independent African states 
took any action to impose sanctions in 1959. There was little pressure on them to do so, even from 
Mboya, who had enthusiastically embraced the idea at the AAPC, but who was presumably waiting 
for the next AAPC Steering Committee meeting before doing anything further. In April and May 
1959, Mboya made a whirlwind tour of the United States, giving more than one hundred speeches in 
six weeks. Contemporary reports of Mboya’s tour suggest he rarely mentioned the proposed 
boycott. In his most reported address, his keynote speech to the American Committee on Africa’s 
“Africa Day” celebration on April 15, he did not mention it all.36 
In mid-May, however, Mboya abandoned this hands-off approach to the boycott of South 
Africa. Immediately after he returned to Kenya from the U.S., Mboya chaired the East, Central and 
Southern Africa Area Committee of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the 
worldwide non-communist labor federation. Mboya had originally risen to prominence as the 
General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL). Under the draconian “Emergency” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 “Ghana Wants to Appoint Envoy to Union,” Cape Argus [newspaper clipping], 15 January 1959; “Nkrumah envoy 
plan not official,” [newspaper clipping], File 1/9/2/3, Verwoerd Collection; I.M.R. MacLellan to the Earl of Home, 
despatch, 24 February 1959, CO 936/580, UKNA. Compare the claim that Nkrumah “strongly supported” the AAPC 
sanctions resolution made in Ama Biney, “Ghana’s contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle: 1958-1994,” in SADET, 
Road to Democracy, vol. 5, African Solidarity, 82. 
35 British Embassy, Addis Ababa, to The Secretariat, Nairobi, 12 January 59, FO 371/137937; British Embassy, Addis 
Ababa, to African Department, Foreign Office, 19 February 1959, File FO 371/137988, UKNA. 
36 For the most detailed overview of Mboya’s visit, see George M. Houser, “Mboya Visits the U.S.,” Africa Today, May-
June 1959, 9-16. See also Mary Dudziak, Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall’s African Journey (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 19-24; Goldsworthy, Tom Mboya, 116-20; Tom Schactman, Airlift to America: How Barack 
Obama, Sr., John F. Kennedy, Tom Mboya, and 800 East African Students Changed their World and Ours (New York: St Martin’s 
Press, 2009), 69-78. South African Foreign Minister Eric Louw wrote in July that sanctions against South Africa had 
been “advocated by Tom Mboya in a nation-wide television interview in New York.” Eric Louw, “Aide Memoire: The 
Jamaican Question,” 2 July 1959, 4, File 105, Louw Collection. 
 121 
regulations imposed by the British authorities in response to the Mau Mau uprising, all African 
political activity and organizations in the colony were prohibited. Labor unions were one of the few 
forms of African organization outside colonial control that remained legal. The relative freedom of 
action enjoyed by Mboya and the KFL in this period were in part a consequence of the support and 
protection afforded by the KFL’s membership of the ICFTU, which provided the KFL with 
resources, encouragement, and international publicity. It was the ICFTU’s support, Mboya believed, 
that ensured that KFL itself was never proscribed by the British authorities.37  
From the mid-1950s, the ICFTU had begun an intensive campaign to win the labor unions 
of decolonizing Africa to its side in its cold war competition with the rival communist-dominated 
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In 1957 it established three Area Committees for its 
African affiliates. Mboya, who had developed a “deep attachment to the ICFTU” as a consequence 
of its support of the KFL, became chair of the four-man East, Central and Southern Africa Area 
Committee.38 At the committee’s meeting in Nairobi from May 16 to 18, 1959, it adopted a long 
resolution condemning apartheid, which concluded with “AN IMPASSIONED APPEAL to all 
governments, organisations and people concerned” to take actions including a boycott of South 
African goods, and a ban on migrant workers going to South Africa. The Regional Secretary of the 
ICFTU, Serge Claverie of the Mauritius Trade Union Congress, was assigned to organize and 
coordinate the boycott in East Africa.39 
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The ICFTU Area Committee resolution represented a significant broadening of the AAPC’s 
original proposal. In the text of the AAPC resolution, the only actors charged with implementing a 
boycott of South African goods had been the nine “African independent states.” But as Mboya 
came to conceive of it in the course of 1959, “possible action” action against South Africa fell into 
three categories: “economic sanctions by various governments,” consumer boycotts by “the ordinary 
man in the street,” and “industrial boycotts” by labor unions refusing to handle goods being 
imported from (or, in some cases, exported to) South Africa. Moreover, action at these three levels 
was no longer restricted to the African continent. Later in the year Mboya told the U.S. ambassador 
to South Africa that he had “doubts as to the efficacy of a purely African boycott movement.”40 
Mboya’s decision in May 1959 to begin promoting the boycott through the structures of the 
ICFTU may have been connected not only to his concern about racial discrimination in South 
Africa, but also to the politics of international labor in decolonizing Africa. In particular, Mboya was 
concerned about the strength of the emerging African movement to disaffiliate from the Brussels-
based ICFTU. At a fringe meeting of labor leaders attending the AAPC in December 1958, several 
delegates had proposed that African national labor federations should form an All-African Trade 
Union Federation and disaffiliate from all other international labor organizations, including both the 
WFTU and the ICFTU. Despite his frustrations with the “patronizing condescension” of some 
European ICFTU officials, Mboya, was staunchly opposed to disaffiliation; at the AAPC he and 
others managed temporarily to put off any decision on the issue. Writing to the African-American 
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labor leader A. Philip Randolph the following month, Mboya described the debate over 
disaffiliation, and continued: “the ICFTU is not particularly effective in Africa and consequently we 
cannot very well convince others to come to our side… If the ICFTU does not tighten up in her 
policy then she will only have herself to blame for the loss of Africa. We are doing our best, but we 
need stronger and positive policies from Brussels.”41 
Mboya made the same point forcefully in his meetings with Walter Reuther, the powerful 
president of the United Automobile Workers (UAW), and other American labor leaders during his 
visit to the U.S. in April-May 1959. Above all, Mboya wanted greater financial, political, and 
educational support from the ICFTU, a larger African role in ICFTU decision-making, and greater 
autonomy for the nascent ICFTU structures in Africa. But Mboya may have come to see 
committing the ICFTU to implementing the AAPC’s boycott decision as another example of a 
“stronger and positive” policy from Brussels that would help “convince others to come to our side” 
in the struggle against pan-African disaffiliation. 
 
II. ‘A devastating weapon’? Boycotts Foreign and Domestic 
The coincidence of an independent but almost simultaneous development played a crucial role in 
ensuring that the boycott proposed by the AAPC would ultimately gain traction among opponents 
of apartheid both outside and inside South Africa. On the same day – Saturday December 13, 1958 
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– that Mboya and Nkrumah brought the AAPC to a close in Accra, three thousand miles away at the 
other end of the continent the ANC annual national conference was opening in Durban. Among the 
resolutions adopted by the two-day ANC conference was one declaring that domestic “economic 
boycott is one of the major political weapons which must be effectively applied by our 
organisation,” and instructing the ANC executive to “to prepare and embark on a nationwide 
economic boycott immediately of such commodities or institutions as may be decided from time to 
time.”42 
The previous year, the ANC national leadership had been impressed by the bus boycott in 
Alexandra, and by the success of the switch from a solidarity transport boycott to a consumer 
boycott in Port Elizabeth. In May 1957 the ANC and its allies had announced that a “national 
boycott of Nationalist-controlled firms and products” would commence across the country on June 
10. In Port Elizabeth, the boycott continued to be effective: a British journalist who visited reported 
a sense of “hidden organization in place” ensuring “ruthless” enforcement.43 But in the rest of the 
country things were more haphazard. In most places the ANC lacked the high degree of 
organization it had achieved in the Eastern Cape, and was unable to implement the boycott 
systematically.44 This first attempt to launch a nationwide boycott campaign was also hamstrung by a 
legal challenge. For its first blacklist of products to be boycotted, the ANC had selected fourteen 
brands of cigarettes and tobacco produced by the Rembrandt group, on the grounds that 
Rembrandt’s first chairman had been Nico Diedrichs, a prominent National Party politician, and 
that the company had “a number of Nationalist members of Parliament, including Cabinet 
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Ministers, among its directors and shareholders.” Rembrandt responded vigorously, arguing that it 
was not “controlled” by any political party. Two days before the boycott was due to begin on June 
10, 1957, the company obtained a temporary interdict from the Supreme Court prohibiting the 
distribution of materials calling for the boycott of its products. Police raids were launched to seize 
boycott pamphlets already printed.45 
Despite the legal difficulties and haphazard implementation, the boycott campaign generated 
considerable enthusiasm. “Congress offices received reports of spontaneous boycotts often from 
remote and unlikely areas,” Nelson Mandela later recalled. “The boycott, that’s the thing,” Drum 
journalist Todd Matshikiza told Anthony Sampson in December 1957, when the magazine’s former 
editor returned to South Africa to cover the Treason Trial. “It’s just rolling on – buses, oranges, 
cigarettes. Azikhwelwa! Don’t ride! Azidliwa! Don’t eat! Azibenywa! Don’t smoke! I tell you, man, 
the darkies love it: they don’t say a word, they just don’t buy. You just hear ‘azi’ at the street corner 
and you think ‘what shouldn’t I be doing?’” One man had snatched a packet of cigarettes from a 
blacklisted brand out of Matshikiza’s pocket, then returned later to give him a packet made by a 
different firm.46 In early 1958 Sylvester Stein, Sampson’s successor at Drum, published a satirical 
novel – the central character was “a Non-European from Non-Europe” – in which the “African 
Congress of Equality” launched “a general boycott, from food to drink, from Cape Lusikisiki to 
Mount Sukunikuni, from now until victory.”47 
At the ANC national conference in December 1958, the Congress leadership sought to 
capitalize on this widespread enthusiasm by proposing that the consumer boycott campaign of 
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products of National Party-aligned firms be relaunched, now that the legal wrangling with 
Rembrandt had at last been resolved. In its report to the conference, the Congress executive argued 
that “[t]he economic boycott is going to be one of the major political weapons in the country,” a 
sentiment echoed almost word-for-word in the conference’s subsequent resolution. Crucially, this 
was a period when the ANC leadership was concerned to find “new methods of struggle” in 
response to growing pressure from its membership for a more militant approach to the struggle 
against apartheid.48 In particular, protests against the government’s extension of the pass laws to 
include African women, which had begun in 1955, had broken out again spectacularly in October 
1958, when grassroots women’s leaders had surprised the ANC executive by organizing a massive 
women’s anti-pass protest. In the last two weeks of October, two thousand women deliberately 
courted arrest. The protest organizers had initially intended that those arrested should pay neither 
bail nor court-imposed fines, but they were overruled by the ANC leadership, which ordered that no 
more women should court arrest and that those already arrested should pay bail.49  
The Congress movement had not encouraged direct civil disobedience since the collapse of 
the Defiance Campaign and the government’s subsequent introduction of harsh new penalties for 
defiance. As the leading white communist Rusty Bernstein later recalled, many in the South African 
Communist Party leadership viewed protest against the pass laws by destroying passes as “a high-
risk strategy”: “It [could] lead directly to eviction from municipal housing, loss of employment, and 
‘endorsement out’ or banishment from the cities for all who [took] part. The state reaction [would] 
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be fierce and unrestrained.”50 The ANC executive’s report to the 1958 annual conference thus 
emphasized that the struggle against passes was “a prolonged struggle now taking one form and now 
another” and cautioned that “to hope that by striking one blow we would defeat the system would 
result in disillusionment.” Accepting this, the conference appointed an Anti-Pass Planning Council 
to study how the struggle against the passes could best be advanced.  When it reported back in 
February 1959, the Council argued that “the economic boycott weapon can be used effectively in 
our struggle against the pass laws.”51 A domestic consumer boycott campaign would not risk the 
kind of disillusionment that might follow an unsuccessful attempt to organize civil disobedience. 
Boycott was – as Govan Mbeki, a leader of the ANC and the underground SACP in Port Elizabeth, 
had argued the year before – “one of those weapons which may silently used by all without fear of 
victimisation.” Whereas acts of civil disobedience like pass burning were punishable with heavy 
penalties, “Not all the police nor all the military are sufficiently powerful to compel one individual to 
spend one penny on a commodity he does not want.”52 The ANC leadership’s desire to respond to 
grassroots pressure for anti-pass campaign but to do so by less risky means than civil disobedience, 
and the possibility of reviving the internal economic boycott campaign after the resolution of the 
legal battle with Rembrandt, thus became intertwined. 
ANC leaders had no illusions that a consumer boycott campaign would lead straight to 
“victory,” whatever enthusiasts like Sylvester Stein may have suggested. When he had first tried to 
launch the boycott of Nationalist products in June 1957, ANC Secretary-General Oliver Tambo 
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acknowledged that he was not expecting that the government would “fall overnight” as a result.53 
Rather, the boycott was to serve two intermediate purposes. First, the consumer boycott was 
intended to peel white voters and white capital away from the National Party. Despite the vocal 
opposition of “Africanist” dissidents, the national leadership of the Congress movement continued 
their efforts to establish a “United Front” of those opposed to the Nationalists’ apartheid policies. 
Their immediate priority was ousting the National Party from government.54 The opposition United 
Party might be “a pale shadow of the Nats” that had frequently failed to forcefully oppose apartheid 
policies. But, declared a statement from the Congress Alliance in December 1957, “the defeat of the 
Nats and [the election of] a Government more yielding to pressures from within the country from 
the majority of the people would create opportunities for the people to press forward for their rights 
and grant opportunities for the rapid development and maturing of the Congress struggle.”55 
The most notable expression of this tactical perspective was the ANC’s attempt to influence 
white voters by calling for a stay-at-home to coincide with the April 1958 general election. But the 
consumer boycott had the same objective. When the idea of consumer boycotts had first been 
discussed in ANC circles back in 1953, a generalized boycott of “European merchants” had been 
mooted. But in 1957-59, the boycott was exclusively targeted at “Nationalist-controlled firms and 
products.” Hardly anyone in the Congress movement seriously expected the boycott to transform 
the attitudes and policies of the National Party politicians in government: “the best we can hope of 
them,” wrote SACP theoretician Michael Harmel, “is that they will, in due course, retire to that 
graceful obscurity earned by unsuccessful and unpopular politicians.” But many Congress leaders did 
hope that by reducing the profits of firms with close ties to the National Party, they might cause 
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some Nationalist supporters to abandon the party. “The big business supporters of the Party, 
appalled by the chasm that has opened out under their feet through the Congress declaration of an 
economic boycott, and the far-reaching consequences that can follow, are beginning to have long 
and deep second thoughts about apartheid and Verwoerd,” Harmel wrote in September 1957.56  
Harmel’s optimism that the Nationalists had “come to the end of the road” proved misplaced: in 
April 1958, the National Party won its third consecutive general election, and further increased its 
parliamentary majority. But despite this setback, the leaders of the Congress Alliance continued to 
hope that a consumer boycott of “Nationalist” products could peel support away from the National 
Party. 
Even more importantly as far as the ANC leadership were concerned, the boycott of 
Nationalist products was intended to generate and sustain mass support for the Congress movement 
inside the country. This had, as we have seen, been a primary objective of almost all of the ANC’s 
major campaigns in the 1950s from the Defiance Campaign onwards. Walter Sisulu had observed in 
February 1957 that the Alexandra Bus Boycott and the subsequent solidarity boycotts elsewhere had 
“raised the political consciousness of the people, [and] brought about a greater solidarity and unity 
among the masses.” The ANC’s consumer boycott campaign was intended to have the same result: 
persuading people of the reasons not to buy blacklisted products was, Tambo explained, “valuable 
educational and political work.”57  
The way in which persuading people not to buy particular products could contribute to 
mobilization and organization of support for the ANC was the primary connection that ANC 
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strategists saw between the otherwise seemingly unrelated boycott campaign and the struggle against 
passes.58 “This was to be an organizational, rather than a revolutionary effort,” wrote Ronald Segal, 
the Congress-aligned magazine editor who was closely involved in the 1959 boycott campaign.59 The 
ANC executive was thus less concerned to reduce the total sale of boycotted products by any means 
than to ensure maximum participation by South African consumers. Whereas the boycott campaigns 
in Port Elizabeth in 1954 and 1957 had been prosecuted primarily by demanding that retailers cease 
stocking boycotted in products or face a boycott themselves, in 1959 the ANC executive rejected 
such “wrong methods,” stressing that it was essential to “persuade the consumers not to buy the 
goods by conducting house to house campaigns.”60 
A “Mass National Conference” in Johannesburg over the weekend of May 30-31, 1959 gave 
a mass endorsement to the Anti-Pass Planning Council’s proposal that the boycott “products of 
Nationalist-controlled institutions” be re-launched on June 26, the date celebrated annually by the 
Congress movement as South African Freedom Day. In addition the mass conference decided upon 
the immediate launch of a nationwide boycott of potatoes. Throughout the 1950s, anti-apartheid 
journalists from Drum and other publications had reported on the horrific conditions on the potato 
farms in the Bethal area of the eastern Transvaal. In May 1959 conditions on the potato farms again 
made headlines when SACP and Congress activist and journalist Ruth First revealed in the 
Congress-aligned New Age newspaper that Africans convicted of minor offences, such as pass law 
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violations, were being sentenced to forced labor on the Bethal farms.61 The potato boycott, launched 
to protest this system of “farm gaols,” gained widespread support. Potatoes piled up unsold 
throughout the country. As one Congress-aligned labor activist later recalled, the campaign “was 
directed against a single product, the potato, and was easy to carry out, unlike a boycott aimed at 
selected products of Nationalist firms which workers did not know.”62 The argument for boycotting 
potatoes that were being produced in conditions of, effectively, slave labor, could be made in 
emotionally powerful terms: referring to reports of laborers being worked to death and buried in the 
fields where they died, ANC leaders who played prominent roles in promoting the boycott, such as 
Robert Resha, frequently compared eating potatoes to consuming the flesh of the dead workers. Joe 
Slovo later recalled that “Resha, whose oratorical campaign was sprinkled with figurative allegations 
that Transvaal potatoes contained the blood of black farm workers, became such a victim of his own 
passionate propaganda that for the rest of his life he was unable ever to eat a potato.”63 
The ANC leadership did not envisage a counterpart international trade boycott of South 
Africa as playing a significant role in its strategy in this period. The December 1958 ANC annual 
conference had resolved that the AAPC “was an historical event of great importance to South 
Africa,” and specifically “approved” the AAPC’s decision to launch a boycott of South African 
goods. Subsequently, the ANC Anti-Pass Council’s proposal for a domestic boycott campaign had 
included an oblique reference to international initiatives, declaring that “The economic boycott in 
South Africa has unlimited potentialities. When our local purchasing power is combined with that of 
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sympathetic organizations overseas we wield a devastating weapon.”64 But the ANC made no further 
attempt to encourage the activities of those sympathetic organizations overseas.65 The Congress 
movement’s emphasis in 1959 on the two interlinked domestic boycott campaigns – against potatoes 
and against products of Nationalist-controlled institutions – was the consequence of the complex 
interaction of a number of factors, including the end of the legal battle with Rembrandt, growing 
grassroots pressure for an anti-pass campaign, the leadership’s desire to respond to that pressure 
with a campaign that was less risky than civil disobedience, outrage at the “farm gaol” revelations, 
and, above all, the ongoing desire to mobilize and organize support for the Congress Alliance. An 
international boycott was largely irrelevant to these primary concerns. 
Nor did an international boycott feature prominently in the strategic thinking of the Pan 
Africanist Congress, the new organization formed by the ANC’s “Africanist” dissidents, who had 
finally broken away from the Congress movement at the end of 1958. The Africanists were strongly 
inspired and influenced by the AAPC. The PAC’s inaugural conference was held in April 1959 in a 
hall festooned with pan-Africanist slogans such as “Africa for Africans, Cape to Cairo, Morocco to 
Madagascar.” The new party committed itself to the ultimate objective of a United States of Africa, 
endorsed Nkrumah’s concepts of the “African personality” and of “positive neutrality” in foreign 
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relations, declared that the AAPC had “laid a promising organizational foundation for African 
nationalism on a Pan-African basis,” and adopted a flag that showed a black silhouette of the 
African continent with a gold star over Ghana.66  
Like the ANC, the PAC adopted a form of domestic boycott as its primary campaign in 
1959. In August Pan Africanist president Robert Sobukwe announced that the PAC was launching a 
“status campaign” that would start with boycotts of stores or businesses that were discourteous to 
African customers. For Sobukwe, white domination could only be maintained by the “active 
cooperation and goodwill of the oppressed”: the status campaign boycotts were intended as a form 
of consciousness-raising of the African masses, from which, Sobukwe believed, mass action to 
achieve liberation would necessarily follow. “We are reminding our people that acceptance of any 
indignity, any insult, any humiliation, is acceptance of inferiority,” Sobukwe explained in his 
announcement of the status campaign. “They must first think of themselves as men and women 
before they can demand to be treated as such. The campaign will free the mind of the African – and 
once the mind is free the body will soon be free.” As in the case of the ANC’s consumer boycotts, 
therefore, and despite the PAC’s enthusiasm for the AAPC, the kind of international boycott of 
South African trade called for by the conference was largely irrelevant to the concerns that drove the 
PAC’s domestic boycott campaign.67 
 Although neither the ANC nor the PAC took much interest in the idea of an international 
boycott of South African exports, the conjuncture of the AAPC’s appeal and the domestic boycott 
campaigns inside South Africa inspired boycott initiatives elsewhere, including in Britain. In later 
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years, leading members of this first British boycott campaign would almost unanimously remember 
their efforts as having been in response to a call by Lutuli for an international boycott.68 This 
founding myth was always used in Anti-Apartheid Movement publicity materials in Britain over the 
next three decades, and has subsequently been repeated in most academic studies. But there is no 
evidence that any such call was made until December 1959 – six months after the first campaign to 
boycott South African goods was launched in Britain – when Lutuli, M.P. Naicker of the South 
African Indian Congress, and Peter Brown of the South African Liberal Party, issued a joint appeal 
endorsing external economic boycotts as “one way in which the world at large can bring home to 
South African authorities that they must either mend their ways or suffer for them.”69 That joint 
appeal, moreover, had been issued after Patrick van Rensburg, the director of the newly-formed 
“Boycott Movement” in Britain, explicitly asked Lutuli for “a statement calling freshly and clearly for 
the boycott.” Van Rensburg’s request reflected the considerable confusion on this issue within the 
Boycott Movement itself: when van Rensburg commented at one meeting of the Boycott 
Committee that “this campaign arose out of a request from South Africa,” other committee 
members countered that “this was a British campaign, and the ANC had not yet made any direct call 
for an international boycott.”70 
The joint appeal from Lutuli, Naicker and Brown – which subsequently came to be regarded 
as the “founding statement” of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain – became central to the 
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Boycott Movement’s publicity campaign as soon as it was received.71 Emphasizing this origin story 
for the boycott was a deliberate decision by the campaign’s organizers. David Ennals, who became 
the vice chairman of the Boycott Movement at the end of 1959, wrote in December that “The 
‘image’ to be presented to the British public should be that of response to a request by the African 
Congress and the Liberal Party and other bodies in South Africa allied to the Congresses, for a 
boycott – rather than that of bodies initiating a boycott as a strategy or tactic of their own work in 
this country.”72 Creating this “image” was important for tactical reasons. The claim that the British 
boycott was a response to “a direct appeal from South Africa” was the most effective counter to the 
two most common critiques directed at the campaign: that far from the boycott assisting black 
South Africans resisting apartheid, they would be the first to suffer from its economic impact, and 
that the logical conclusion of the campaign was that British consumers should boycott the products 
of every country with a government of which they disapproved.  
Rather than being a straightforward “boomerang” response to an appeal from the ANC, 
then, the boycott campaign in Britain indicated how two initially independent initiatives – the 
AAPC’s call for a boycott of South African goods and the announcement of the ANC’s plans for an 
internal boycott – became intertwined in the course of 1959. Vella Pillay, a South African Indian 
living in London who became one of the central figures in the Boycott Movement, recalled decades 
later that “The boycott strategy… was given great impetus by the exposure [by] Ruth First of the 
slave labour conditions of the potato farms and the announcement by Ronald Segal in a speech in 
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Cape Town calling for a boycott of South African goods.”73  
On April 23, 1959, Segal had given a speech to students at the University of Cape Town that 
ANC deputy president Oliver Tambo later jokingly characterized as a “Unilateral Declaration of a 
Boycott of Nationalist Products.” The ANC’s intention to launch its internal boycott in June had 
been widely publicized during “Africa Day” celebrations the previous week, but the speech by the 
self-described “freelance rebel” had the effect of prematurely launching the boycott two months 
early. Segal’s focus was on the actions that should be taken by his South African audience, and he 
did not explicitly call for an international boycott. But he did quote at length from a leaked 
memorandum from the Transvaal Chamber of Industries on the domestic boycott campaigns, one 
section of which discussed somewhat fearfully the possibility of international action: “There is a 
distinct danger that any legislation to outlaw such boycotts would be viewed in a poor light in 
overseas countries… and might even lead to overseas boycotts against South African exports with 
consequences more harmful to South Africa’s economy than might be achieved by local boycotts.”74 
Segal’s speech and the leaked Chamber of Industries memo were reported the next day on the front-
page of the British left-wing weekly Tribune under the banner headline “BOYCOTT SOUTH 
AFRICAN GOODS!” The Tribune article, which included a list of “Nationalist products” that were 
exported abroad, sparked the first interest in Britain in launching such a boycott.75 
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One of the first people in Britain to take an interest in the idea was Rosalynde Ainslie. A 
white South African who had come to Britain to study in 1954, Ainslie had remained in London 
because the apartheid prohibition of “mixed marriages” would have prevented her from living with 
her Sri Lankan husband if she returned home. She had met Segal when they were both students in 
Cape Town in the early 1950s, and was now the London representative of Segal’s magazine, Africa 
South. Ainslie’s efforts to excite the interest of the small community of Congress-aligned South 
Africans living in London (most of them students, or – like both Ainslie and Pillay – forced to live 
abroad by the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act) initially met with little response, however. When 
she suggested it, she recalled more than three decades later, “They all looked terribly solemn… 
[They were] not at all convinced by this. The only person who was was Vella [Pillay]. He became my 
friend for life because he showed some bloody enthusiasm and he… really put himself behind it.”76 
Given the general lack of enthusiasm on the part of her fellow South Africans, Ainslie 
turned instead to the Committee of African Organisations (CAO), on which she was the 
representative of the South African Freedom Association, the loose grouping of Congress-aligned 
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South Africans in London. The CAO had been formed in London in 1958 by several organizations 
of Africans (mainly students) in Britain, in order to co-ordinate their campaigning activities on 
African and international affairs. In early 1959 the CAO was, the British Security Service reported at 
the time, “transformed into an organisation of some importance… as the major representative 
African body in the UK” as a consequence of the declaration of States of Emergency in parts of the 
British-ruled Central African Federation.77 Kanyama Chiume of the Nyasaland African Congress and 
Joshua Nkomo of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress both subsequently fled to 
London in order to avoid arrest. Chiume and Nkomo lived initially at the CAO’s offices in the 
basement of a Bloomsbury medical practice. The Bloomsbury office became for a few months, 
Chiume recalled, “the centre of the struggle against the Central African Federation.” It was in the 
midst of this “feverish activity,” with hundreds of people coming to the office to help issue 
statements, produce publicity materials, and organize demonstrations, press conferences, and 
meetings, that Ainslie suggested that the CAO organize a boycott of South African goods.78 
In contrast to the skepticism of Ainslie’s fellow South Africans, the CAO enthusiastically 
took up the suggestion. This enthusiasm presumably derived in part from the fact that the CAO’s 
first objective was – according to the constitution it adopted that year – “To work with and promote 
the aims of the All-African People’s Conference.”79 The composition of “Boycott Sub-Committee” 
the CAO established reflected the extent to which the boycott of South African goods was a pan-
African project rather than solely a South African one. It was chaired by Femi Okunnu, a Nigerian 
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law student, and of the other seven original members only two were South Africans: Ainslie and 
Steve Naidoo, a South African Indian student whom Ainslie had initially persuaded to join her at 
CAO meetings because she was unsure how a white South African would be received.80  
The lineup of speakers at the CAO’s official launch of its consumer boycott campaign, at a 
public meeting of some two hundred people at Holborn Hall on June 26, 1959, symbolized how the 
external and internal boycott efforts were becoming intertwined. Two South Africans gave speeches: 
Vella Pillay and Tennyson Makiwane, a twenty-six year-old ANC Youth League leader, Treason 
Triallist, and New Age journalist, who had recently arrived in London. The others on the platform 
were Michael Scott, whose interest since 1953 in international economic action against South Africa 
had finally culminated in the AAPC resolution the previous December; Kanyama Chiume, the 
Nyasaland African Congress leader, who had become an enthusiastic supporter of the boycott after 
attending the AAPC; and Julius Nyerere, the president of the Tanganyika African National Union, 
who was then visiting London. The date of the Holborn Hall meeting was chosen to coincide with 
the launch of the anti-Nationalist boycott in South Africa. The leaflet distributed by the CAO, which 
called on consumers in Britain to “help defeat the South African racialists by boycotting all South 
African goods,” explicitly echoed the language of the ANC Anti-Pass Council’s report: “The internal 
boycott in South Africa coupled with external support from people overseas are devastating 
weapons against South Africa’s racialism.” More than 100,000 copies of this leaflet were distributed 
in the two months after the boycott launch meeting, as the CAO’s Boycott Committee organized 
pickets, demonstrations, and poster parades at shopping centers around London.81 
 Though scholarly attention has tended to focus on the launch of the consumer boycott in 
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Britain in 1959, the CAO’s campaign was far from the only attempt outside South Africa to organize 
a boycott in this period. In the course of July 1959, a British diplomat in South Africa noted, “every 
day has brought reports, based variously on rumour or fact, of boycotts or calls for boycotts of 
South African goods in overseas markets.”82 The first of these boycott announcements was in fact 
another entirely independent development: on July 2 the government of the British colony of 
Jamaica announced that it was banning trade with South Africa, as a protest against the 
government’s racial policies, which were “revolting to the conscience of all decent peoples 
throughout the world.”83  
This was the first time any country had imposed governmental economic sanctions against 
South Africa since India’s initiative in 1946. Though contemporary observers assumed that the 
Jamaican decision was a response to the AAPC resolution, the Jamaican People’s National Party had 
– as we saw in Chapter 1 – taken an interest in breaking off trade with South Africa as early as 1948. 
After the PNP won power in the 1955 elections in the self-governing colony, the party had come 
under pressure from its supporters to revive the idea. In September 1957 the PNP national executive 
had resolved in favor of an embargo, and in November 1958 – just before the AAPC – the Jamaican 
cabinet did the same. The British government had strenuously opposed the decision: Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies Julian Amery traveled to Jamaica in May 1959 to attempt to 
persuade the Jamaican ministers to reconsider. But despite the “extreme pressure” exerted by 
Amery, the Jamaican government was constitutionally responsible for its own “regulation of trade,” 
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and the British objections were ultimately overridden.84 Like India, Jamaica did not seek to convince 
other governments to follow its example, but the coincidence of its action with the ongoing 
repercussions of the AAPC resolution, and with the launch of the ANC’s internal boycott, further 
added to the momentum of the incipient international boycott movement. 
In Africa, meanwhile, little action had initially followed the resolution of the ICFTU Area 
Committee in Nairobi in May. Serge Claverie, the Mauritian ICFTU Regional Secretary whom the 
committee had assigned to organize the boycott had delayed doing so, instead writing to ICFTU 
headquarters in Brussels to ask whether he should follow the Committee’s instructions.85 The 
members of the Executive Board of the ICFTU, meanwhile, meeting in West Berlin in early July, 
were divided over whether to endorse the Area Committee’s resolution. The opposition was led by 
the representative of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), who argued that any boycott would 
“lead to further misery amongst the under-privileged classes” in South Africa. Ultimately, the Board 
agreed to adopt a resolution that condemned apartheid but deliberately omitted any reference to the 
boycott proposal.86 The ICFTU’s official organ, Free Labour News, had, however, already published 
the Area Committee’s resolution in full in its July 1959 issue. A supportive editorial opined that, 
whatever the legal and other difficulties of implementing a boycott, “the average worker and his 
wife” would be prepared to avoid purchasing South African fruit.87 On July 5, soon after that 
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month’s issue of Free Labour News must have reached Ghana and three days after the Jamaican 
government announced its embargo, a conference of the Ghana TUC resolved “to refuse to do 
anything with the white minority of South Africa, and in solidarity with comrades of the maritime 
union to refuse to unload any South African goods meant for discharge at ports of Ghana.”88 
The actions of the Jamaican government and the Ghanaian unoins prompted Mboya to give 
up on waiting for Claverie and to take the boycott campaign into his own hands. Noting that “the 
original idea of a boycott” had been agreed at the AAPC under his chairmanship, he announced to 
the press on July 18 that union leaders throughout East Africa would meet in Kampala in August to 
arrange the details of the boycott in the region. The following day, at a public meeting of two 
thousand KFL members outside Nairobi, Mboya secured support for a resolution authorizing the 
KFL “to associate itself with the Ghana TUC decision,” and implement a boycott “of all goods or 
foods from or to the Union of South Africa” both through individuals refusing to purchase them, 
and through dock and railway workers refusing to handle them.89 
As the Kenya Police Special Branch noted, there was “no doubt that MBOYA is determined 
to implement the boycott on as large a scale as possible and with the least possible delay.”90 In late 
July he contacted International Transport Workers Federation, the ICFTU, and the AFL-CIO (the 
American national labor federation), urging them to the support the boycott.91 Mboya also recruited 
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the support of Walter Reuther, the president of the United Autoworkers and one of his most 
powerful patrons in the American labor movement. Reuther agreed with Mboya that it was 
necessary to “build a worldwide boycott, for it is this kind of practical economic pressure that will 
get results that no amount of moralizing will produce.”92 At the August meeting of the Executive 
Board of the AFL-CIO, Reuther secured passage of a resolution declaring that “the AFL-CIO looks 
with sympathy upon the consumer boycott of products made in the Union of South Africa which 
has been proposed by certain African Free Trade Union Centers, and we hope that this matter will 
be given consideration at the December 1959 world congress of the ICFTU.”93 
In order to ensure broader East African participation in the boycott beyond organized labor, 
Mboya also raised the boycott issue at the conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, from September 8 to 
10, of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), a loose 
grouping of anti-colonial and labor leaders in the region that had been formed the previous year.  
The conference was chaired by Julius Nyerere, now back from the visit to Britain in June during 
which he had spoken at the launch meeting for the CAO’s consumer boycott. The thirty 
PAFMECA delegates resolved – “in accordance with the resolution passed by the first All-African 
People’s Conference… and being aware of the steps already taken by the ANC in boycotting certain 
products and goods produced in South Africa” – to undertake a series of measures. PAFMECA 
would launch a “trial” consumer boycott in east and central Africa from November 1 of South 
African wines, sherries, and hoes; instruct region’s upon labor movements in “to prepare and submit 
a detailed plan for a boycott by all the transport unions of all goods to and from South Africa”; send 
a letter to heads of state around the world calling on them “to help institute a world-wide campaign 
of economic sanctions against South Africa”; and call on the independent African states to “appeal 
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through the United Nations to all nations to join in the campaign against South Africa.”94 
 Though the ANC’s domestic boycott campaign was an important source of inspiration and 
legitimacy for many of these initiatives outside the country, advocates of boycotting South African 
goods in mid-1959 did not explain the relationship they envisaged between the ANC’s boycott of 
the products of selected “Nationalist-controlled institutions,” and their own “blanket boycott” of 
South African exports.95 To the extent that the mechanisms by which an external boycott was 
intended to work were discussed at all in this period, most of the prominent Africa-based boycott 
advocates framed their purpose as being to reduce South African trade sufficiently – in the words of 
John Tettegah, general secretary of the Ghana TUC – to bring “economic pressure on the South 
African government to liberalize its apartheid policies.”96 To labor leaders and anti-colonial 
politicians used to using economic pressure – often with some degree of success – to wring reforms 
from British colonial regimes, this might have seemed a plausible mechanism of change. To many 
others, however, it seemed unrealistic: while acknowledging that a widespread boycott could have a 
“calamitous effect on the South African economy,” the Irish Times – one of the first newspapers to 
take a position on the boycott – editorialized that given the racial fanaticism of South African Prime 
Minister Verwoerd, “only the most naïve optimist [could] believe that an economic boycott [would] 
force the Nationalists to recant on apartheid.” The Irish Times editors did suggest, however, that a 
“prolonged and successful boycott of South African exports” might bring about a shift in attitudes, 
not of “racial extremists,” but of South African businessmen for whom avoiding financial ruin was 
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ultimately of greater concern than maintaining racial exclusion and domination.97 
In general, boycott advocates more familiar with South African politics envisaged the 
boycott bringing about change in this way. In Britain the CAO Boycott Committee, in which 
Tennyson Makiwane was now playing a leading role, urged a boycott on the grounds that it was the 
only remaining means for opponents of apartheid to persuade “South African industrialists and 
producers” to put pressure on the government. One of the most trenchant exponents of this 
position was Trevor Huddleston, who, as we have seen, had supported the idea of isolating South 
Africa economically since 1953. In a letter to the London Times endorsing the boycott, Huddleston 
argued that “if in fact those who hold economic power in South Africa to-day were prepared to use 
it to destroy apartheid, they could do so any time they liked. It is worth remembering that it is not 
the Nationalist Afrikaner who wields this power: and it never has been.”98 
The primary advocates of the various boycotts and boycott announcements that proliferated 
during the austral winter of 1959 were acting with little if any contact with the leaders of resistance 
to apartheid inside South Africa. In Britain, South African expatriates such as Rosalynde Ainslie, 
Vella Pillay and, above all, Tennyson Makiwane, played crucial roles in initiating and then 
legitimizing the boycott campaign, but at the time none of them were senior figures in the Congress 
movement, and there is no evidence that they were acting on instructions from South Africa.99 At 
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the PAFMECA conference in September Julius Nyerere opened the debate on the boycott by 
explaining that he had received a letter from South Africa (he did not identify the author further) 
asking for certain South Africa goods to be boycotted by all African countries, and explained that he 
had replied with a telegram asking for further details. In the course of the subsequent discussion 
Mboya emphasized that “liason with Africans in South Africa” should be one of PAFMECA’s 
priorities in planning its boycott.100 
In the United States, the lack of such liaison up to that point – and the consequent 
disconnect between the emerging international campaigns to boycott South Africa and the leaders of 
the internal resistance to apartheid – led the American Committee on Africa to view the boycott 
campaign with caution. At the end of September 1959, George Houser, the ACOA’s executive 
director, asked advice from Mary Louise Hooper, the American former aide to Lutuli who, like 
Houser himself, had attended the AAPC. The boycott campaign had been “picking up a little bit 
both in England and in various parts of Africa,” Houser noted, but he wanted to know “just what is 
happening in South Africa itself” in terms of “suggestions for some kind of boycott of South 
African goods to be taken up on a world-wide basis.” Hooper replied that ANC leaders had not 
offered “anything definite in the way of suggestions for our use” regarding an international boycott, 
though she knew that the ANC leadership were “anxious to have the boycott spread.” Houser 
feared that it would be “foolish” to launch an American boycott “unless one can follow through on 
it and have some real effect” – something he doubted, given that the paucity of “ordinary 
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consumers’ goods” imported from South Africa to the U.S.”101 While Houser continued to canvass 
ideas from various South African contacts and from AFL-CIO officials, the ACOA thus did not 
immediately throw itself behind the incipient boycott campaign. 
 Indeed, rather than continuing to gain additional support, the movement to boycott South 
African goods began to lose momentum from September 1959. The spate of boycott 
announcements came to an end. After the Jamaican decision, the trade ministers of the British West 
Indian colonies of Barbados, British Guiana, Dominica, and Grenada had each declared their 
intentions to advise their own governments to follow suit. But in no case was any action 
forthcoming, possibly as a result of lobbying by the British government.102 Meanwhile, those boycott 
campaigns that had already been announced struggled. In Britain, the chair of the CAO’s Boycott 
Committee noted at the end of July that “after the initial impact [of the boycott launch], CAO had 
not been able to mobilise enough forces to broaden and intensify the campaign sufficiently.” Patrick 
van Rensburg, a member of the South African Liberal Party who had just arrived in Britain, 
observed that by September the original boycott campaign “had virtually petered out.”103 
In East Africa the implementation of the boycott resolutions of the ICFTU’s Area 
Subcommittee, the KFL, PAFMECA, and other bodies quickly encountered difficulties. The fact 
that the initial decisions had been taken by Mboya and a handful of other labor and political leaders 
with little consultation began provoke resistance. At a meeting of the KFL executive in early 
September, Mboya was greeted by protests that the executive had not yet taken a formal decision on 
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the boycott, and that an industrial boycott by organized labor “would be doomed to failure unless 
supported by the [British] TUC and the ICFTU, and would almost certainly result in hardship for 
coloured workers in South Africa.” Implementation of an industrial boycott would depend primarily 
on the transport unions. But when the general secretary of the Railway African Union in Kenya 
unilaterally committed his members to refusing to handle South African goods, this provoked 
“uproar” at the next meeting of the union’s General Council, which condemned his action and 
instead adopted a majority resolution that endorsed a consumer boycott but carefully avoided any 
mention of industrial action.104 In light of such opposition, Mboya seems to have feared the damage 
that announcing a boycott that failed to attract support might do to his credibility. He allowed 
PAFMECA’s scheduled launch date of November 1 to pass without any public announcement in 
Kenya, and indicated privately that he did not expect the boycott to “get into full swing” until 
December or January. In the meantime, he focused his attention on securing support for the boycott 
from the ICFTU. Only in Tanganyika was PAFMECA’s “trial” consumer boycott of South African 
alcoholic drinks and hoes actually launched, by Julius Nyerere in a speech in Dar es Salaam. By mid-
November, it was reported that South African hoes had already disappeared from markets in the 
territory.105 
 In Ghana, the TUC’s decision to refuse to unload cargoes from South Africa was quickly 
overruled by Nkrumah’s government. As we saw in Chapter 1, George Padmore, who served as 
Nkrumah’s Adviser on African Affairs until his death in September 1959, had been one of the very 
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first people to advocate consumer and industrial boycotts of South African goods back in 1946. But 
Nkrumah himself remained resolutely opposed to the idea. Immediately after the AAPC, Nkrumah 
had dismissed the conference’s call for governmental economic sanctions against South Africa, and 
he now moved to quash the unions’ independent initiative to impose a boycott at non-governmental 
level. Nkrumah’s cabinet agreed to reprimand the TUC – on the grounds that “formulation of policy 
in regard to trade and other economic matters was the sole responsibility of the Government” – and 
assured importers that the government would ensure an uninterrupted supply of commodities from 
southern Africa.106  
In part, Nkrumah’s policy on South Africa was driven by Ghana’s economic interests. Rapid 
industrialization lay at the heart of Nkrumah’s vision for Ghana’s postcolonial future, and the TUC’s 
action appeared to threaten this. The white-ruled states of southern Africa were “the principle or 
sole supplier” of some products imported to Ghana, the Minister of Commerce and Industry noted, 
including machinery for mining, and it would be “economic suicide” to allow the TUC’s boycott to 
proceed. An industrial boycott would, moreover, undermine the assurances the Ghanaian 
government had given that it would ensure a favorable climate for the foreign investment it believed 
essential for Ghana’s industrial development.107 
 Nkrumah’s approach to South Africa was not purely a passive one, however, based solely on 
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the negative rejection of economic sanctions.108 More than any other African leader of the time, 
Nkrumah passionately believed in both the desirability and the feasibility of achieving a continental 
“United States of Africa.” South Africa, freed from apartheid, was always envisaged as ultimately 
being part of this future pan-African federation.109 But as Nkrumah explained in January 1959, the 
“method” Ghana would adopt to help end apartheid would depend on circumstances. For the first 
three years after Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah pursued a policy towards South Africa 
underpinned by the assumption that, as he later put it, “if only one was patient and negotiated and 
tried to understand the problems of South Africa, then the situation would gradually begin to 
improve and little by little, racial oppression would disappear.”110 Nkrumah therefore rejected not 
only economic sanctions, but any form of isolation, ostracism, or confrontation, believing instead 
that sustained contact with “the multi-racial example of Ghana” might moderate the South African 
government’s approach.111  
Nkrumah’s government recognized that such a strategy was not likely to be welcomed by 
“African nationalists in the Union of South Africa and in other parts” of the continent.112 But it 
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actively pursued this policy of constructive engagement from 1957 onwards. Nkrumah had 
personally invited the South African prime minister to Ghana’s independence celebrations in 1957 
and to the first Conference of Independent African States in Accra in 1958. (The South African 
government sent a non-cabinet representative to independence ceremony, and declined the 
invitation to the 1958 conference unless the European imperial powers were also invited).113 In 
January 1959, as we have seen, Nkrumah announced that Ghana hoped to establish diplomatic 
relations with South Africa “very soon.”114 South African foreign minister Eric Louw scathingly 
dismissed this suggestion, drawing on longstanding racist tropes about the sexual peril to white 
women posed by black men: if diplomatic relations were established, African ambassadors would 
have to be invited to diplomatic receptions in South Africa, Louw pointed out, and white South 
African politicians in favor of such relations should “consult their womenfolk, who are generally 
interested in attending diplomatic and other social functions.”115 
Undeterred, Ghanaian Foreign Minister Ako Adjei informed the cabinet that “while the 
Union Government welcome the idea, they do not consider the time opportune for such an 
exchange [of ambassadors], having regard to their racial policy.” Adjei suggested instead that an 
exchange of high-level diplomatic visits might create a “good atmosphere” for the future 
establishment of formal diplomatic relations. In September 1959, the Ghanaian government thus 
formally invited Louw to visit Ghana, a visit that Nkrumah argued to his cabinet might “contribute 
to a change of policy in the Union on African matters.” Louw accepted the invitation, and suggested 
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that he visit in 1960.116 In the meantime, after an approach from a white South African businessman 
in late 1959, the Ghanaian trade ministry actively pursued the possibility of sending an unofficial 
Ghanaian trade mission to South Africa. Assurances were secured through the South African High 
Commission in London that such a mission would be received “on the basis of complete non-
discrimination,” and its members accommodated in hotels usually reserved for whites only. These 
assurances foreshadowed the approach to high-profile black visitors that the South African 
government adopted in the 1970s and 1980s in order to minimize international criticism of 
apartheid. But to the Ghanaian Minister of Trade the South African assurances were “revolutionary” 
and could well, he informed his colleagues, “cause the beginning of a break in the rigid internal 
policies of apartheid which we all detest so much.” Though the proposed trade mission thus seemed 
to justify the Ghanaian government’s faith that constructive engagement could change racial policy 
in South Africa “little by little,” domestic “political considerations” led the Minister to recommend 
against sending the mission in the immediate future: any such mission would be sure to revive the 
question of the Ghanaian TUC’s proposed boycott that had only just been “resolved.”117 
 
III. ‘A Gesture of Sympathy’: South African Liberals, the British Labour Party, and the 
ICFTU 
Actively opposed by Ghanaian government, failing to spread beyond Jamaica to other governments 
in the West Indies, lacking the support of transport workers in East Africa, stalling in Britain, and of 
limited interest to the liberation movements in South Africa, the incipient boycott of South African 
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goods might have petered out in the second half of 1959. That it did not was largely due to the 
actions of the South African Liberal Party, the British Labour Party, and the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. These three organizations are not traditionally associated with 
the campaign to isolate of South Africa: in later years the leaderships of all three would be associated 
with arguments for constructive engagement with South Africa rather than economic boycott. 
The crucial role the three organizations played in reviving and entrenching the boycott of 
South Africa in late 1959 is all the more striking given their initial ambivalence about the idea. The 
ICFTU Executive, as we have seen, had decided against endorsing the boycott in July 1959. In 
Britain, the Commonwealth Sub-Committee of the Labour Party executive had considered the 
boycott within a fortnight of its June 26 launch by the CAO, and had decided that official support 
by Labour would raise “widespread consequential issues” that required further study. In the 
meantime, the Party’s position was that participation in the boycott was a “matter of individual 
choice.”118 And in South Africa, members of the Liberal Party were clearly divided. When he had 
been questioned about the idea of an external economic boycott during a visit abroad in 1956, party 
president Alan Paton had opposed the idea: “one of the greatest factors in the improvement of the 
African people was the industrial revolution in South Africa,” he argued, and boycotts might inhibit 
this. In July 1959, Walter Stanford, one of the Liberal Party’s white “Native Representatives” in 
parliament, wrote to the London Times to condemn the proliferation of boycotts for the same 
reason.119  
On the other hand, Patrick Duncan, a prominent Liberal activist and editor who had led the 
Liberal Party’s delegation to the AAPC, welcomed this development. Duncan declared that he 
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looked forward to the day that “not one ounce of goods or gold, and not one passenger, will be able 
to move in or out of South Africa by sea, land, or air.” The Party’s National Chairman, Peter Brown, 
was more circumspect, commenting that boycott was “a dangerous weapon, not one which any 
Liberal would use by choice.” But Brown concluded that it was “a legitimate means of bringing 
pressure to bear on a government which has shown itself quite impervious to argument or 
appeal.”120 
Subsequently, the hand of the South African Liberals was effectively forced by the actions of 
one of their leading members. Patrick van Rensburg was a twenty-seven year old former South 
African foreign service officer who, after resigning in 1957 in protest at the government’s racial 
policies, had been appointed the Liberals’ Transvaal Party Organizer. In the first half of 1959 van 
Rensburg had been an enthusiastic supporter of the ANC’s domestic boycott of Nationalist 
products, despite the lack of enthusiasm for the project on the part of many of his Liberal 
colleagues.121 After arriving in Britain in August 1959 intending to spend a few months in Europe, 
van Rensburg was asked by Tennyson Makiwane, to help with the boycott campaign in Britain; 
having pondered the issue for six weeks, he decided to throw himself into reviving the flagging 
campaign. At van Rensburg’s initiative, the campaign was refocused on a one-month “short and 
sharply intensified boycott” in March 1960. As he later explained, “if [the campaign] was to 
continue, it would do so only if it had an initial impetus; it would not get that if responsible backing 
were absent; and it was clear that this would not be given to an indefinite campaign. The campaign 
already launched had shown this.” For the remainder of 1959, van Rensburg tirelessly went about 
securing “responsible backing,” soliciting prominent public figures and organizations to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 [Patrick Duncan], “The Boycott Must Grow,” Contact, 11 July 1959, 6; Peter Brown, “Not to Boycott is Surrender,” 
Contact, 8 August 1959, 7. See also “Boycott is Legitimate, Say Liberals,” New Age, 23 July 1959, 5.  
121 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, 104-6. On Liberals’ ambivalence regarding the ANC’s domestic boycott, see also 
Cardo, Opening Men’s Eyes; Debra Anne Fyvie Moffatt, “From ‘Conscience Politics’ to the Battlefields of Political 
Activism: The Liberal Party in Natal, 1953 to 1968” (M.A. thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1999), 110-11. 
 155 
“sponsors” of the campaign, and dispatching reams of letters and articles to the British press.122  
 Among those whose support van Rensburg solicited were the leaders of his own party in 
South Africa. Van Rensburg’s central role in organizing the boycott in Britain had already stirred 
controversy among South African Liberals: Peter Brown, the Party chairman, wrote to him in 
October that he had “come to the conclusion that the real reason for your trip overseas was to cause 
me as much trouble as you could. If it pleases you at all, you are succeeding admirably!” Many 
prominent Liberals remained committed to the Party’s founding principle of opposing apartheid 
only by “constitutional means” and to persuading white voters through reasoned argument, not 
coercion or punishment. It was in this sense that even Liberals like van Rensburg and Brown who 
supported an overseas boycott conceded that it was “hardly a traditional liberal instrument of 
opposition.” Nevertheless, though some white Liberals resigned from the Party over the issue, Alan 
Paton now abandoned his earlier opposition, and Brown secured a resolution from the Party’s 
National Committee on November 3 that endorsed his own view that despite “the many possible 
short-comings of, and hardships caused by, boycotts” they were a “legitimate political weapon.” 
Following van Rensburg’s request to Lutuli for an explicit statement of support, Brown also drafted 
the boycott appeal that he, Monty Naicker, and the ANC president co-signed in December.123 
In advocating the boycott, Liberals including van Rensburg, Brown, and Paton frequently 
framed its objective as being to “bring pressure to bear on [the] government,” or, more broadly, to 
achieve the longstanding objective of South African liberalism of bringing about “a change of heart 
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among whites.”124 But their primary motivations for supporting the boycott were twofold. In the 
first place, in light of its failure to make any headway with the white electorate, and of the manifest 
inability of its handful of members of parliament – all “native representatives” – to have any impact 
on the spate of apartheid legislation passed in the mid-1950s, the Liberal Party’s focus was 
increasingly shifting to extra-parliamentary methods of opposition. Though the Party leadership 
remained white-dominated, it had some success in recruiting black members, and it was hoped that 
supporting the external boycott would facilitate this. Thus whereas more conservative members of 
the Party feared that van Rensburg’s boycott activities were “political suicide for the Liberal Party 
among potential [white] voting support,” the dominant and increasingly radical faction within the 
Party was now less concerned with trying to win over white voters than, as Brown put it, to “win 
Africans to support Liberalism before they are persuaded that their only hope lies in extreme 
nationalism.” Support for the overseas boycott was one way of enhancing the Liberal Party’s ability 
to win African support. To Liberal skeptics of the boycott, Brown emphasized that every African 
member of the Party with whom he had discussed the issue supported it.125 
 Fear of violent revolution was the second reason for South African Liberals’ support of the 
overseas boycott. As one of van Rensburg’s Liberal correspondents in South Africa wrote to him, 
the Party had decided to back the boycott “because it is one of the few non-violent methods left of 
influencing policy in this country – the alternative is a violent method, which we do NOT 
support.”126 Well-aware of the grassroots pressure for violent resistance throughout the 1950s, many 
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Liberals feared that if government repression continued to close down options for peaceful 
opposition, and the ANC’s campaigns did not appear to be having any success, African leaders 
committed to non-violence would be deserted by their own supporters. These fears were heightened 
by events such as the spontaneous riots in the Cato Manor township outside Durban in June 1959, 
when a municipal crackdown on illegal alcohol production provoked African women to invade and 
destroy government-run beer halls and other municipal buildings. The formation of the PAC also 
appeared ominous: PAC leaders’ fiery rhetoric and celebration of spontaneous mass action often 
seemed to indicate their belief in the inevitability or even the desirability of violence. In these 
circumstances, Paton and Brown wrote in their widely-circulated “Statement on the Overseas 
Boycott” in November 1959, “it is only through evidence of convincing support for such campaigns 
as the present boycott that opponents of violence in South Africa can maintain their positions of 
leadership in their various communities.” The alternative was a choice “between the status quo and 
revolution,” both of which were “unacceptable.”127 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, Alan Paton would emerge as one of the few prominent individuals 
closely identified with the struggle against apartheid who actively campaigned against boycotts, 
disinvestment, and sanctions. In 1964 he explained that he had advocated the economic boycott of 
South Africa “only for some weeks” before changing his mind.128 But during those few weeks in 
1959-60 that Paton and the Liberal Party actively campaigned for an overseas boycott, in order to 
reinforce a reformist alternative to violent revolution, they made a crucial contribution to the 
boycott idea’s spread and entrenchment. The ongoing international popularity of Paton’s novel, Cry, 
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the Beloved Country, meant that in the west he remained by far the most well-known South African 
opponent of apartheid. In late 1959, Paton endorsed the boycott in an address at St Paul’s Cathedral 
in London, in the letters pages of the London Times, in interviews with foreign journalists, and in the 
“Statement on the Overseas Boycott” he co-signed with Brown.129 He fit well into the long-standing 
western trope of the “white savior,” and his legitimation of the boycott as a new form of action for 
people opposed to apartheid outside South Africa carried significant weight.130 
In Britain van Rensburg’s most decisive contribution was the re-focusing of the faltering 
boycott campaign on a single month of action. Van Rensburg always stressed that the one-month 
campaign “by no means [sought] to restrict those” who wished to maintain an ongoing boycott; 
rather, he argued, the publicity and attention generated by the intensified campaign would mean that 
the number of people who “might remember not to buy South African long after the intensified 
period is over” would be much higher. Van Rensburg’s emphasis on a month-long boycott was 
resented by some existing members of the Boycott Committee, but it proved tactically astute.131 
Whereas the CAO’s boycott launch in June had gone unreported in the British press, the revamped 
campaign now generated significant interest and debate. British goods had often been targets of anti-
colonial boycotts, but in Britain itself there was, as the anti-apartheid activist and researcher 
Christabel Gurney has noted, “no continuous tradition of boycott.” The organizers of the anti-
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apartheid boycott were, for instance, initially unaware of the anti-slavery sugar boycotts in Britain in 
the late eighteenth century. (Though after van Rensburg were alerted to this history by a supporter, 
this “precedent” was included in the Boycott Committee’s publicity materials.)132 The relative 
novelty and uniqueness of the idea of a politically-motivated consumer boycott of goods from 
another country helped attract attention to the British campaign: at the start of the boycott month in 
March, the Manchester Guardian commented that “‘The boycott’ begins today, and it is an indication 
of the organisers’ success so far that no-one needs to ask ‘boycott of what?’”133 
In Britain, by far the most important organization to join the boycott campaign was the 
opposition Labour Party, which on December 16 called upon all Labour members to support it. The 
mobilization of Labour’s nationwide machinery behind the boycott dramatically increased the size, 
reach, and prominence of the boycott campaign, and turned it into a major national issue in both 
Britain and South Africa. In South Africa the initial launch of the CAO’s boycott campaign in June 
1959 had passed largely unremarked: white South African policymakers, businessmen, and 
journalists were at the time much more concerned about the actions of the Jamaican government 
and of organized labor in Ghana and East Africa. But the subsequent involvement of Britain’s 
official opposition, a party that might well form the next government in the imperial metropole, 
generated considerable interest and concern.134  
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Labour’s decision to endorse the consumer boycott month, and to devote significant 
resources to promoting it, was not primarily driven by ideas about the impact it would have in South 
Africa, but by domestic politics. In the wake of the Party’s heavy and unexpected loss to the Harold 
Macmillan’s Conservative Party in the October 1959 general election, Labour’s General Secretary, 
Morgan Phillips, had argued that the Party needed “something that will make a moral appeal to the 
country,” and proposed making 1960 an “African Year.” A number of Africa-related events in 1960, 
Phillips suggested – including the forthcoming government-commissioned report  on the future of 
the Central African Federation, the independence of Nigeria, the ongoing South African Treason 
Trial, and the boycott of South Africa goods – would provide “an opportunity for a sustained 
education and propaganda campaign” throughout the year. Supporting the boycott month in March 
1960 would be one way of initiating the Party’s year-long Africa-themed campaign.135 Labour 
became closely involved in the running of the boycott campaign through the Secretary of the Party’s 
International Department, David Ennals, who was also a member of Christian Action, the 
campaigning organization founded by Canon Collins. In November Collins had offered to take over 
the boycott campaign from the CAO’s Sub-Committee, which was struggling for funds; 
subsequently an agreement was reached by which Christian Action would fund the newly renamed 
and increasingly autonomous “Boycott Movement” on the condition that it could nominate two 
new members of the Committee – one of whom was Ennals – with a right of veto.136 
 The third organization whose support was crucial to reviving, entrenching, and spreading the 
boycott idea in late 1959 and early 1960 was the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
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Though the ICFTU executive had initially decided against supporting the boycott campaign, Mboya 
maintained pressure on the ICFTU to endorse the boycott, especially after it became clear that it 
would not be possible to implement an industrial boycott in East Africa without strong ICFTU 
support. The KFL consequently proposed a resolution to biennial ICFTU’s World Congress in 
December 1959 calling on all affiliated organizations to organize boycotts of South African goods.137  
Meeting in Brussels from December 3 to 11, the ICFTU World Congress did indeed adopt a 
resolution that instructed its affiliates “to take effective steps to organize the workers and consumers 
of their respective countries in a massive boycott of South African goods.”138 More than any other 
single event, it was this resolution that internationalized economic boycott of South Africa as a 
primary form of overseas activism against apartheid. The resolution called on the ICFTU executive 
to establish a “target date by which time the boycott shall become effective,” but many national 
affiliates did not wait. The British TUC announced that it would join the Labour Party in supporting 
the March 1960 consumer boycott campaign. On January 9, the Cyprus Workers’ Confederation 
announced that its members would refuse to handle South African products for the month starting 
on February 20. On February 11 the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO instructed its Department 
of International Affairs “to assist in the organization of a boycott by the American labor 
movement.” And in the course of January and February, the national trade union federations of 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and West Germany all announced that they would begin one- 
or two-month consumer boycott campaigns on April 1.139 
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 None of this would have occurred were it not for Tom Mboya. When the ICFTU Secretariat 
– responsible for preparing a report on the KFL’s proposed boycott resolution before the Congress 
– had canvassed several affiliates for detailed information, the only response received had again 
come from the KFL.140 And it was primarily out of a desire to support Mboya that the ICFTU 
Secretariat and Executive decided to throw their weight behind the proposal. Like the British 
Labour Party, the ICFTU endorsed the boycott campaign for instrumental reasons that had little to 
do, in the first instance, with its impact in South Africa. At a meeting of a subcommittee of the 
ICFTU Executive in October 1959, at which the British TUC representative again forcefully 
opposed the proposal, the ICFTU General Secretary Jacobus Oldenbroek declared that “after 
having some experience of boycott actions, he could think of a hundred reasons why a boycott 
should not take place; but he was looking for one reason why it should. The one reason was that the 
friends of the ICFTU in Africa wanted it and were applying it. A boycott would not have much 
effect, but it would be a gesture of sympathy. He would think twice before refusing to make such a 
gesture.”141 
 For boycott advocates within the ICFTU, the campaign was primarily “a gesture of 
sympathy” for the “friends of the ICFTU in Africa.” Those African “friends” were certainly not the 
ANC-aligned South African Confederation of Trade Unions, which was secretly affiliated to the 
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rival WFTU, and with which the ICFTU had an antagonistic relationship. When two officials from 
the ICFTU secretariat had visited South Africa in 1959, they had refused to attend SACTU’s 
congress on the grounds that WFTU representatives had also been invited. The SACTU General 
Secretary had subsequently published an open letter furiously denouncing the ICFTU officials.142 
Rather, the “friends” the ICFTU’s boycott was intended to support were Mboya’s KFL and other 
African ICFTU affiliates. Despite his poor relationship with many European trade unionists, Mboya 
had been a favorite of American organized labor since his first visit to the U.S. in 1956. Though 
divided among themselves on many issues, U.S. labor leaders were united in their support for 
Mboya: the AFL-CIO and individual American unions including Reuther’s UAW provided 
significant financial and material support to the KFL in the late fifties. Whereas in this period 
European national labor federations tended not to stray far from the colonial policies of their own 
governments, American labor leaders embraced anti-colonialism, believing that rapid independence 
– and active support for that independence by bodies in the West – was the only way of 
counteracting the attractiveness of communism to colonial subjects.143 
American labor leaders believed that the development of “free” (i.e. non-communist) labor 
organizations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa – and the incorporation of those organizations into 
ICFTU structures – was of primary importance, not just for the labor movement, but for the “free 
world.” As Reuther wrote privately to Arne Geijer, the Swedish president of the ICFTU: “In the 
absence of such a positive trade union force, the communists will get the people in these three great 
areas by default… The direction that these hundreds of millions of people in these three critical 
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areas will take will in large measure depend on the kind of practical aid we can give them in building 
effective, democratic trade union forces which form the essential foundation for building a free 
society.” By the late 1950s, despite the ongoing opposition of the British TUC, the ICFTU 
secretariat was moving towards this position and beginning to take a more active role in Africa in 
particular.144 The sudden appearance of a pan-Africanist disaffiliation movement at the AAPC in 
December 1958 posed an obvious threat to these initiatives. Mboya’s emergence as the leading 
African opponent of disaffiliation further enhanced his significance to the AFL-CIO and the 
ICFTU.145 Supporting Mboya’s demand for a boycott of South Africa was one “gesture of 
sympathy” with which the ICFTU could demonstrate the practical usefulness of affiliation to the 
Confederation, and further enhance the position of Mboya and other ICFTU allies in Africa as they 
battled the pan-Africanist disaffiliation movement. 
The two non-South African organizations that did most to spread and entrench the boycott 
in 1959-60 had thus both done so primarily in order to increase their own standing with 
constituencies outside South Africa: the British electorate in the case of the Labour Party, and 
African trade unionists in the case of the ICFTU. In its official pronouncements the ICFTU framed 
the purpose of its boycott as being “to exert maximum economic pressure on the South African 
government with a view to bringing about a change in its inhuman racial policies.”146 But in private 
many ICFTU leaders doubted the boycott would achieve this: General Secretary Oldenbroek 
believed that “a boycott would not have much effect,” while ICFTU President Geijer told South 
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African diplomats in Sweden in January 1960 that the boycott was “designed to bring pressure on 
South Africa to mend her ways,” but also commented, the diplomats reported to Pretoria, that he 
“feared we were so stubborn [that] a boycott would not succeed in causing us to alter our policy.”147 
In Britain, the Labour Party explicitly downplayed the economic impact of the boycott. 
Labour publicity materials stressed that the boycott was “a symbolic act” or “moral gesture.” “We 
have no illusions,” Labour explained in its first circular on the issue, “We shall not bring the Union 
Government to its knees.” David Ennals, the Party’s International Secretary and now the Vice-
Chairman of the Boycott Movement, repeatedly stressed that, “In supporting the boycott in this 
country we are determined to ensure that it will not strike heavily at the South African economy.” 
Even in the entirely unlikely event of a totally effective boycott of South African consumer goods in 
Britain during March 1960, Ennals emphasized, the boycott would reduce sales of South African 
goods by just £2 million, and this would be a drop in sales in Britain, not in imports from South 
Africa.148 For Ennals, the boycott was “a token action with far more significant political and moral 
than economic implications.” His conception of the boycott was that it would have an influence in 
South Africa not by depriving the country of revenue from exports, but by demonstrating that 
people in Britain cared so strongly about apartheid that they were prepared to deprive themselves of 
South African goods. The envisaged impacts in South Africa of Britons undertaking this “moral 
gesture” were that it would “trouble consciences in South Africa,” and that – even if this did not 
happen – such a “gesture of solidarity” would “demonstrate to opponents [of apartheid] that they 
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are not alone.”149 In particular, Boycott Movement publicity – all of which now was now vetted by 
Ennals before being printed – emphasized the theme that was so central for the South African 
Liberals: news of the overseas boycott would focus black South Africans’ hopes “on an effective 
non-violent weapon, and distract peoples’ [sic] thoughts from violence.”150 
 The paradox of Labour Party and ICFTU support for the boycott was that in entrenching 
and spreading the idea of a boycott of South Africa, they also gutted the campaign of the aspect that 
Mboya – its primary sponsor – and the British and South African governments all judged would be 
“by far the most effective action” in terms of damage to the South African economy: industrial 
action by organized labor.151 Perhaps the most successful previous instance of this kind of “black 
ban” had been in Australia, in support of the Indonesian struggle for independence from the 
Netherlands. From 1945 until Indonesia became independent in 1949, the Australian Waterside 
Workers’ Federation had refused to load, unload, or crew Dutch shipping. More than 550 Dutch 
ships were held up during this period, and Dutch naval forces – nicknamed the “Black Armada” by 
one sympathetic author – had effectively been frozen in Australian waters.152 Mboya now envisaged 
similar action on a world-wide scale against shipping travelling to or from South Africa, a prospect 
that caused serious apprehension in the South African government. 
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In July 1959 South African Foreign Minister Louw had twice summoned the British 
ambassador to protest, first at the Jamaican government’s trade embargo (for which Louw insisted 
that Britain, as the imperial power, bore responsibility), and then at Mboya’s announcement of plans 
for an industrial boycott in East Africa (if industrial action occurred, Louw tried to insist, the British 
colonial authorities in Kenya would have a responsibility to ensure that cargo from South Africa was 
landed).153 Louw’s concern was that, as he explained regarding the Jamaican government’s embargo, 
“The consequences which may follow may be serious for the Union, not because of the small 
amount of trade [with Jamaica] that may be lost, but because of the political implications, in that it 
may act as a spur to other hostile countries to take similar action against South Africa.”154  
Mboya’s initiative in East Africa then provoked fears that the South African economy might 
be seriously damaged even if no further governmental action was forthcoming: the British embassy 
in South Africa reported that there was “no doubting the concern on all sides [of South Africa’s 
white political establishment] lest the fashion should spread and particularly at the prospect of an 
international trade union ban (encouraged by the ICFTU) as a result of the activities of Tom 
Mboya.”155 In Britain, Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government was sufficiently concerned by 
the support of the Labour Party and the TUC for the consumer boycott campaign that it convened a 
special Cabinet committee on the issue. At its first meeting on January 1, 1960, the high-powered 
Committee, which included Macmillan, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Alec 
Douglas Home, and Secretary of State for the Colonies Ian Macleod, concluded that “a consumers’ 
boycott could in practice do no harm.” But Edward Heath, the Minister of Labour, was instructed 
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to “keep contact with the TUC with a view to discouraging any possibility of an industrial 
boycott.”156 
 Macmillan and his colleagues need not have worried. The CAO and then van Rensburg after 
he joined the British campaign had planned to ask dockers, shop workers, and market porters to 
refuse to handle South African goods.157 In October, van Rensburg had also canvassed the 
possibility of securing “a month of official boycott of South African goods” by some of the states 
represented at the UN.158 But the Labour Party’s view, as Ennals repeatedly emphasized, was that 
“This is only a consumers’ boycott. We have not asked the Government to endorse it; we have not 
asked the trade unions to refrain from handling South African goods; we have not asked the general 
public to cease buying South African goods for ever; we have sought to persuade individuals, as a 
token of their opposition to apartheid, to refrain from buying South African goods for a period of 
one month only.”159 In his correspondence with Labour Party headquarters, Ennals characterized 
himself as a “restraining influence” on the Boycott Movement committee, and reported that he had 
been able to “to discourage [the other members] from doing all sorts of things that would have been 
irresponsible and to keep them in line with the activities which the Party supports.” Above all, this 
meant ensuring that the Committee made no attempt to persuade British workers to support the 
boycott with industrial action.160 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 “Cabinet: Boycott of South African Goods: Minutes of a Meeting…,” 1 January 1960, CAB 130/170, UKNA. 
157 “Committee of African Organisations South African Boycott Sub Committee Meeting,” minutes, 29 July 1959, File 1; 
“South Africa Goods Boycott,” minutes, 4 November 1959, File 2, AAM; Patrick van Rensburg to John Hatch, 28 
September 1959; Patrick van Rensburg, “The Boycott Movement,” n.d. [1959], Box 130, Labour International 
Department Collection. 
158 Patrick van Rensburg to Michael Scott, 26 October 1959, File 5, AAM.  
159 David Ennals to W.F. Vickers, 19 January 1960, Folder: ‘Boycott Movement Correspondence,’ Box 130, Labour 
International Department Collection; emphasis added. 
160 David Ennals to M. Phillips, 19 January 1960; see also [D. Ennals] to Morgan Phillips, 26 January 1960, Folder: 
‘Boycott Movement Correspondence,’ Box 130, Labour International Department Collection. 
 169 
 The British TUC likewise remained unalterably opposed to an industrial boycott. In the wake 
of the ICFTU’s resolution in December the TUC announced its support of the boycott as an “act of 
individual goodwill” and an expression of its members’ “personal revulsion” against apartheid, but 
the TUC leadership were terrified of the impact that any attempt to take collective action as workers 
would have on labor on Britain. An industrial boycott, they feared, would damage the British 
economy, expose British transport workers to disciplinary action, and jeopardize trade union 
funds.161 The TUC leadership therefore maintained a somewhat hands-off stance even towards the 
consumer boycott. A leaflet calling on trade unionists to “make the consumers’ boycott your own 
personal protest against apartheid” was circulated to all members in February. But none of the 
“leading personalities” on the TUC General Council were prepared to speak at the rally launching 
the boycott month in Trafalgar Square on February 28.162 
Though not explicitly endorsing an industrial boycott, the boycott resolution at the ICFTU’s 
World Congress in December 1959 had not completely ruled it out either: General Secretary 
Oldenbroek was instructed to “explore with the International Trade Secretariats [i.e. international 
groupings of unions in the same industries] and affiliated organisations immediately concerned the 
practicability of reinforcing the consumers’ boycott by industrial boycotts.”163 Though national labor 
federations in Cyprus and in several colonies in the Caribbean announced their willingness to 
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undertake an industrial boycott, the Secretariat quickly concluded that there was a “lack of any 
widespread support”: in addition to the ongoing opposition from the British TUC, the International 
Union of Food, Drink and Tobacco Workers’ Associations responded to Oldenbroek’s enquiry that 
it did not believe a boycott by its members on handling South African goods would be possible. 
Having established May 1 as the “target date” for its affiliates to begin a two-month boycott, the 
ICFTU consequently restricted its efforts to appealing to its members to boycott as consumers, not 
as workers.164 
 In part precisely because the Labour Party and powerful elements in the ICFTU were 
determined to minimize the economic disruption wrought by the boycott, the campaign’s impact 
had, by March 21, 1960, been in one sense very limited. No other governments had followed 
Jamaica’s example, and large-scale industrial action in any of South Africa’s major trading partners 
was a dead letter. Though fixed-term one- or two-month consumer boycotts were scheduled to start 
in many parts of the world in the near future, the primary damage inflicted on the South African 
economy so far had been the loss of the £237,000 export market in Jamaica and South Africa’s 
exclusion from the hoe market in Tanganyika. In Britain, the rally on February 28 in Trafalgar 
Square to launch the “intensified month of boycott” had been attended by as many as 15,000 
people, one of the largest open-air gatherings in central London since the VE Day celebrations in 
1945. But despite the media and public attention the British campaign had generated, the TUC 
subsequently reported that “nothing suggested the boycott had had an important impact on the 
consumption of South African goods.”165 
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The South African government and business community were clearly concerned about 
potential future economic damage if the boycott were to spread, particularly at a governmental or 
industrial level. But as critics of the boycott were quick to point out, there was no evidence in the 
immediate term to suggest that this concern was producing any “change of heart” among South 
African politicians or businessmen. The immediate response of many South African exporters’ was 
to seek to confound potential consumer boycotts by removing from their products any indication of 
their place of origin. In December 1959 leading English-speaking and Afrikaner businessmen, 
including Harry Oppenheimer of the giant Anglo American conglomeration and Anton Rupert of 
Rembrandt, established a new organization, the South African Foundation, to try to head off 
boycotts by improving South Africa’s image overseas. “We attacked the double standards which 
were employed against us,” recalled one of the founders, and “explained the history and 
achievements of the white man in South Africa.” The businessmen “call themselves the South 
African Foundation but only present a South African Façade,” joked one South African satirist.166  
South African Foreign Minister Eric Louw meanwhile responded with bluster and threats. 
Well aware of the importance the British government attached to the Commonwealth as a vehicle 
for Britain’s continuing global power, Louw responded to the mid-1959 boycott announcements by 
trying to use this as leverage to compel Britain to take action against the Jamaican government and 
Mboya’s KFL. In private meetings with the British ambassador, he threatened to block the future 
admission of the West Indies Federation to the Commonwealth if the Jamaican action were not 
overturned, and warned that if the West Indies were admitted over South Africa’s objections, South 
Africa itself might withdraw from the organization.167 The British government insisted that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Special Branch Headquarters, Kampala, “The Proposed Boycott of South African Goods,” 9 October 1959, CO 
822/1844, UKNA; Francis de Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979), 106-7; 
Anthony Delius, The Day Natal Took Off (Cape Town: Insight Publications, 1963), 14. 
167 Eric Louw, “Aide Memoire: The Jamaican Question,” 2 July 1959, File 105, Louw Collection; UK Mission, Pretoria, 
to Commonwealth Relations Office, telegram, 28 July 1959, CO 822/1844, UKNA. 
 172 
constitutionally it could not interfere in the Jamaican government’s decisions on trade issues, but 
otherwise sought to hold the Commonwealth together by not antagonizing the South African 
government. When Harold Macmillan famously declared in a speech to the South African 
parliament in February 1960 that the “wind of change” was blowing through Africa, he was careful 
to avoid aligning himself with those opposed to white rule in South Africa itself. In his speech 
Macmillan also explicitly condemned the consumer boycott in Britain, warning that boycotts “will 
never get you anywhere.”168 
If by March 1960 the impact of the boycott campaign had been very limited, both in 
economic terms and in terms of its political effects, the rapid international spread of the idea of 
isolating South Africa economically nevertheless had crucial consequences. The first was – just as 
the South African government had feared – to entrench the idea of international economic isolation 
as the primary means by which non-South Africans outside South Africa should oppose apartheid. 
When the Sharpeville massacre occurred on March 21, 1960, it was to these kinds of actions that 
those who wished to contribute to the struggle against apartheid immediately turned, including many 
who had been cautious or even opposed to the idea in the fifteen months after the Accra AAPC had 
set the ball rolling. 
Crucially, this was true not only outside South Africa, but also for opponents of apartheid 
inside the country. As this chapter has shown, the ANC leadership had not initiated the first call for 
a boycott at the AAPC, and had subsequently played only a limited role in encouraging the 
international spread of the boycott campaign during the subsequent year. Encouraged by 
decolonization elsewhere in Africa and believing that South Africa’s “colonialism of a special type” 
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must similarly soon succumb to the same trend, Congress movement strategists were optimistic in 
1959 that apartheid would soon be defeated. “We cannot tell what exact form the changes will take, 
how exactly or when they will come,” leading SACP theoretician Michael Harmel had written at the 
start of the year. But the defeat of apartheid was a “certainty,” and it need not involve violence: 
“There have been plenty of examples in history where a combination of factors have been 
compelling enough to make a ruling class give way for urgent and overdue changes, without 
dragging the people through the agony of civil war.”169 
This optimism was further reinforced by the widespread support for the Congress 
movement’s campaigns in 1959, and especially for the potato boycott, which had been an impressive 
demonstration of organizational strength and had forced minor concessions from the government 
on farm jails. Gillian Slovo, the daughter of Congress movement and SACP stalwarts Joe Slovo and 
Ruth First and aged 7 in 1959, recalled watching her mother arrive home “beaming” on the day in 
August that the boycott of potatoes and all potato products was called off. First pulled out a packet 
of potato chips for each of her three young daughters, and declared “Let’s celebrate!” As Slovo put 
it, “No wonder… Ruth was smiling… The ANC protest campaign which had dominated the fifties 
was building to a peak. Next year, the beginning of a new decade, it would be more successful, might 
even, perhaps, bring the government to its knees. Those people like my parents who had been part 
of a movement which every year gained in strength… were at a peak of optimism.”170 
Amidst the prevailing optimism about imminent change in South Africa, neither the ANC 
nor the PAC had initially assigned the international boycott any great strategic significance, especially 
given the unlikelihood that any of South Africa’s main western trading partners would participate. 
Nevertheless the unexpected spread of the international boycott campaign clearly caused the leaders 
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of both Congresses to begin to take greater interest in the idea of international economic action. The 
ANC National Executive reported to the Congress’s annual conference in December 1959 that the 
“international response” to the June launch of their anti-Nationalist boycott had been “beyond all 
expectations.” The same report declared that “the time has now come for the world to consider 
sanctions” against South Africa. That month ANC President Lutuli signed the statement Peter 
Brown had drafted endorsing the consumer boycott in Britain. Questioned in early 1960 about his 
views on overseas boycotts, Lutuli replied that he “strongly” believed that they might help to turn 
white voters against the National Party: “I feel that with the boycotts, when South African markets 
are affected, the people in South Africa who are affected might be angry and might feel that they 
would be better off with another form of Government if the present one did not see things in a 
reasonable way.”171 The PAC also announced its support for the boycott of South African goods: 
“the crippling of the monopolistic South African White economy shall have the effect of bringing 
back some sense to Verwoerd’s government of minority rule,” declared the PAC executive in their 
report to their own national conference that December.172 
But although the proliferation of boycotts outside the country thus generated interest and 
support for the idea among anti-apartheid leaders inside South Africa, neither the ANC nor the PAC 
invested significant time, energy, resources, or personnel in encouraging an external economic 
boycott. In the immediate term, the focus of both the ANC and the PAC remained on internal 
action. Still under pressure from grassroots members, the ANC resolved at its December 1959 
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conference to launch a campaign against the pass laws, starting on March 31. The Congress 
leadership remained wary of civil disobedience: the main feature of the planned campaign would be 
nationwide mass demonstrations on the launch day and then on selected days thereafter at 
approximately monthly intervals. The PAC leadership was likewise under pressure from its 
supporters to undertake more militant action than the status campaign boycotts, for which there had 
been little enthusiasm. A week after the ANC’s conference, the PAC’s first annual conference 
resolved that it too would launch an anti-pass campaign. This would be far more dramatic than the 
ANC’s: on the appointed day – later set as March 21 – the PAC would call on all African men to 
leave their passes at home, and present themselves at their local police station for arrest. Once 
arrested they should adhere to the campaign slogan: “No bail! No defence! No fine!” With their faith 
in grassroots spontaneity, the Africanists had always believed that they needed only to provide 
inspirational leadership to spark off unstoppable mass action. Defiance of the pass laws would 
escalate, PAC leaders believed, and quickly send the country’s economy and administration into 
chaos.173  
The leaders of the ANC and PAC remained focused on these internal campaigns in the first 
three months of 1960. But the rapid spread of boycott campaigns overseas had nevertheless raised 
the possibility of international economic sanctions on the very eve of the crisis that followed the 
Sharpeville massacre on March 21, after which South African opponents of the regime immediately 
began to explore new strategies by which they might achieve their objectives. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The Turn to Sanctions, 1960 – 1964 
 
On March 30, 1960, the South African government declared a nationwide State of Emergency. In 
dawn raids, police began rounding up and imprisoning more than two thousand PAC and Congress 
Alliance activists under the emergency regulations. “That night the raids were huge,” recalled 
Congress of Democrats activist Ben Turok. “Thousands [were arrested]... all sorts of people. And so 
I sat, and…listened to the news. The whole world is collapsed.”1 Troops were sent into African 
townships to force strikers back to work. Two days earlier the government had introduced 
legislation to ban both the ANC and the PAC; the law making both organizations illegal came into 
force on April 8.  
The following day a white farmer narrowly failed in his attempt to assassinate Prime Minister 
Hendrik Verwoerd, who was seriously injured. By then, however, the government had finally 
crushed the upsurge of resistance that had broken out across the country nineteen days earlier. On 
March 21 there had been little response in much of the country to the PAC’s call for Africans to 
defy the pass laws. But in the township of Sharpeville, outside Johannesburg, a large crowd had 
gathered outside the police station. The police had opened fire, killing more than sixty-nine people 
and wounding more than one hundred and eighty. Demonstrations, strikes, pass burning, and riots 
broke out across the country in the days following the massacre. The government briefly struggled 
to maintain control, and suspended implementation of the pass laws. On March 30, thirty thousand 
Africans participated in a largely unplanned march into the center of Cape Town. 
On April 1, in the midst of the crisis, an “Emergency Committee” of the ANC made the 
Congress’s first public and explicit appeal for the immediate imposition of international economic 
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sanctions against South Africa. The Committee – which included Moses Kotane, Yusuf Dadoo, 
Michael Harmel, and Ben Turok – consisted of the few senior members of the Alliance leadership 
who had managed to escape the police net when the Emergency was imposed the day before. Their 
first public statement declared that the ANC would continue “to give leadership and organisation to 
our people until freedom has been won,” and called on “all the peoples and Governments of the 
whole world” to give their support. Specifically, the Emergency Committee urged “the United 
Nations to quarantine the racialist Verwoerd Government by imposing full economic sanctions 
against the Union of South Africa.”2 
 This chapter analyzes the turn to sanctions made by the Congress Alliance and its allies in 
the external anti-apartheid movement in the years immediately following the Sharpeville Massacre. It 
shows that sanctions now became a central element in ANC strategy in the specific context of the 
domestic and international situation that prevailed in 1960. Public pressure after Sharpeville also 
caused Ghana and the other independent African states to reverse their earlier opposition to 
sanctions: the African Group at the United Nations now became the force that sanctions advocates 
hoped would be able to bring about a multilateral regime of trade sanctions that would cripple the 
South African economy. The focus on economic boycotts at governmental level was also adopted by 
the Congress movement’s supporters in the west: the earlier consumer and sports boycott 
campaigns that had been started before the massacre were now repurposed as forms of “political 
education” or consciousness-raising that were intended to create a constituency for sanctions among 
western publics. 
 In the immediate wake of Sharpeville, all sanctions advocates envisaged that they would 
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contribute to peaceful political change in South Africa by increasing the costs of apartheid to whites 
and bringing about a realignment of white politics that would isolate Verwoerd and other hardline 
racists. Many opponents of apartheid in the west clung to the hope of this model of change 
throughout the first half of the 1960s. But, crucially, those members of the Congress movement and 
the South African Communist Party who concluded that it was necessary to turn to violent 
resistance after Sharpeville continued to believe that the imposition of sanctions was of crucial 
strategic importance. The leaders of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the newly-formed armed wing of the 
ANC and the SACP, were divided over whether the ultimate objective of their armed struggle was to 
seize power by armed force or to compel the government to the negotiating table. But all agreed that 
achieving their ultimate aim would be facilitated by effective economic sanctions. Moreover, the 
imposition of a multilateral regime of trade sanctions appeared for a brief period to be a serious 
possibility: as decolonization transformed the membership of the United Nations, sanctions 
advocates were initially optimistic that the African states would be able to exert sufficient leverage at 
the UN to force British and American acquiescence.  
 
I. ‘A solution could only come from outside’: Sanctions after Sharpeville 
Once it became known abroad, the ANC Emergency Committee’s call on April 1 for “full economic 
sanctions” gave a focus to the inchoate and varied responses to Sharpeville around the world over 
the previous eleven days. Some outside South Africa had already called for governmental sanctions 
immediately after the massacre. Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, wrote to U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter the day after the 
killings asking him to recall the American ambassador to South Africa, and “cut off all economic aid 
and commerce with that country.” United Auto Workers president Walter Reuther, the leading 
American supporter over the previous months of Tom Mboya’s campaign for a boycott, followed 
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up with his own letter to Herter and President Dwight Eisenhower on March 24, urging a “complete 
economic quarantine.”3 In a debate in the Australian parliament two days after the massacre, the 
opposition Labor Party called for Australia to impose trade sanctions.4 On March 30, the 
government of the self-governing British colony of Antigua in the West Indies became the third 
government after those of India and Jamaica to declare an end to all trade with South Africa.5 On 
April 1, the government of Ghana took the more limited step of announcing an embargo on the 
importation of one specific South African product: Drum magazine.6 
 The belief that external opposition to the South African government’s behavior should be 
expressed through boycotts and sanctions was still far from universally shared, however, even 
among committed opponents of apartheid. The American Committee on Africa’s first flyer in 
response to Sharpeville, released on April 4, made no reference to boycotting South Africa, for 
instance. Under the heading “How individual Americans can respond” the flyer instead emphasized 
donations for assistance to the dependents of those killed and legal aid for those subsequently 
arrested.7 In Britain, in contrast, at a meeting of leading opponents of apartheid at the House of 
Commons on April 5 Tennyson Makiwane and Vella Pillay urged that those outside South Africa 
should now take a much more proactive role: the ANC and the South African Indian Congress, they 
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1960, Folder 1, Box 37, Scheinman Papers. 
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declared, “felt that fund-raising was not enough and did not meet the urgency of the situation. We 
must try to stop the violence rather than alleviate its results.”8  
Those at the meeting were uncertain exactly how they could do this, however. When Pillay 
suggested an embargo on labor from the British territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and 
Swaziland, others argued that this would be too difficult given the lack of alternative employment 
opportunities for migrant workers in southern Africa. The minutes of the meeting record that “the 
possibility of stopping exports of oil to South Africa and of imports of gold from there was briefly 
touched upon.” But the attendees were not yet aware of the ANC Emergency Committee’s appeal 
four days earlier, and in Britain there was little explicit discussion of the possibility of campaigning 
for economic sanctions in the weeks immediately after Sharpeville. In the meantime, the Boycott 
Movement had already decided just before the massacre that it would continue in existence after the 
March 1960 boycott month was over. After the massacre the Committee immediately decided that 
the consumer boycott campaign would now be continued indefinitely. It released a statement calling 
on the British people “to take every opportunity to express outrage and revulsion at the barbarous 
behaviour [of the South African government] and to further intensify the boycott of South Africa 
goods, as a practical expression of their attitude.” The statement also expressed the hope that the 
UN Security Council would “take the strongest possible action,” but did not offer any more specific 
suggestion of what form such action might take.9 The Security Council did in fact meet to discuss 
South Africa for the first time in the wake of the massacre. On April 1, the Council adopted a 
resolution deploring the South African government’s policies and recent actions, and calling on it 
“to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality.” UN Secretary-
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General Dag Hammarskjold was instructed to hold consultations with the South African 
government.10 
 The strategic focus of the nascent anti-apartheid movement in Britain – and beyond – was 
transformed by the arrival in Britain of Yusuf Dadoo in mid-April.11 Thirteen years after he had first 
called for worldwide sanctions against South Africa during the SAIC’s passive resistance campaign, 
Dadoo had been one of the handful of Congress Alliance leaders who had escaped the police and 
issued the new appeal for sanctions on behalf of the ANC on April 1. He had then been assigned by 
the other members of the ANC Emergency Committee to leave the country. ANC Deputy President 
Oliver Tambo had already left South Africa, charged with establishing an “External Mission”: as 
soon as the government announced its intention to ban the liberation movements on March 28, 
Congress-supporting magazine editor Ronald Segal had driven Tambo across the border into 
British-ruled Bechuanaland (now Botswana). Dadoo joined up with Tambo and Segal there, and he 
and Segal then traveled on to London. The day after their arrival on April 19, Dadoo attended a 
meeting of the Anti-Apartheid Committee, as the Boycott Movement had now renamed itself. (By 
the end of the month it had settled on “the Anti-Apartheid Movement” or “AAM”). Emphasizing 
that “outside pressure on South Africa was most important,” Dadoo conveyed the ANC Emergency 
Committee’s request for UN sanctions, and suggested asking the labor movement and the 
independent African states to refuse to handle oil destined for South Africa. The Committee 
assigned Vella Pillay to draft a “Programme of Action” focused on the demand for economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 134, “Question relating to the situation in the Union of South 
Africa,” 1 April 1960, https://perma.cc/2JNR-CXPS. 
11 On the importance of the arrival in Britain of Dadoo and – shortly afterwards – Oliver Tambo, see “First Recording: 
Kader Asmal,” vol. 1; “First Recording: Vella Pillay,” vol. 13, Hilda Bernstein Interviews. 
 182 
sanctions. It was, as another member of the Committee later observed, “a move that was to have 
profound implications for the future of the anti-apartheid struggle.”12  
 The ANC and its supporters abroad thus first came to focus on governmental economic 
sanctions in the specific context of the ongoing State of Emergency after Sharpeville. The mass 
arrests and the banning of the ANC left the Congress movement inside the country almost totally 
incapacitated. The kinds domestic campaigns on which the Congress movement had focused its 
attention throughout the 1950s now became impossible. The Emergency Committee of Kotane, 
Harmel, and Turok spent the duration of the State of Emergency on the run, moving from safe 
house to safe house every few weeks to avoid detection. SACP activist Wolfie Kodesh, who spent 
the Emergency sleeping on a Johannesburg golf course to avoid arrest, acted as a liaison between the 
Emergency Committee and other Congress and Communist Party members who were still at large. 
Their primary objective was simply, he recalled, “to keep things moving and to keep things alive. 
And to show, as much as possible, that the Congress Alliance was still alive and kicking.” The main 
way of doing this was “giving people activities to perform, like… putting out leaflets, going door to 
door.”13 While such action was necessary to maintain any semblance of political organization at all, it 
was hardly sufficient to pose a serious challenge to the state. Congress leaders both in South Africa 
and abroad had no idea how long this paralyzed state of affairs would last: it was possible, they 
believed, that the Emergency would continue indefinitely. It was in this context, with the pursuit of 
almost any form of internal action against apartheid effectively impossible, that in May 1960 Tambo 
went so far as to claim that “a solution could only come from outside the country.”14 
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 Moreover, the State of Emergency shut down most internal anti-apartheid activity at the 
exact moment when Congress leaders’ attention had been drawn to the idea of external boycotts. 
The Sharpeville massacre occurred in the midst of the boycott month in Britain, and nine days 
before the ICFTU-inspired consumer boycott campaigns by the national trade union federations of 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and West Germany were due to start on April 1. Congress 
leaders were further impressed by the welter of international interest and condemnation that 
followed Sharpeville. In his cell in the ‘Rooi Hell’ prison in Port Elizabeth, ANC and SACP leader 
Govan Mbeki recorded in his diary during the Emergency that he and his fellow prisoners were 
“Greatly encouraged with [the] news of anti-apartheid feeling growing” internationally, and that 
“Probably one of the most striking things in this period of our history is the growing volume of 
opposition throughout the world to the apartheid racial policies.” Those on the liberal nationalist 
wing of the ANC were just as struck by this phenomenon. M.B. Yengwa, a senior Congress official 
in Natal and close aide of ANC President Lutuli, wrote to Mary Louise Hooper in September that 
whereas in 1957 he had believed it would take ten or twenty years to free South Africa, the way in 
which “world opinion has swung almost solidly to our side and against the S.A. Government” had 
now convinced him that victory would be achieved in five years at the most. “The international 
front,” Yengwa observed, “seems to be becoming the most important wing of the liberatory 
movement in this Country.”15 
 Anti-apartheid activists’ new focus on the “international front” was also influenced by the 
perception that decolonization was transforming the United Nations. In the 1940s, after his calls for 
multilateral sanctions had been ignored, Dadoo had castigated the “weakness” of the UN, which he 
believed had been rendered impotent by Britain, the U.S., and their allies. But as former colonies 
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gained independence and joined the world body, Congress leaders believed that this could now be 
reversed. In 1960 sixteen new African states became members of the UN. This meant, an 
underground ANC newssheet explained that November, that there was now an “anti-colonial 
majority” in the General Assembly, and that “the United Nations Organisation, which was up to the 
middle of 1960 a stronghold of the big imperialists and colonial powers, has now become a 
stronghold of the anti-colonial forces, and that properly used, it could help in furthering the struggle 
for national independence and for equality and freedom.” Specifically, Congress leaders were 
confident that – as an underground bulletin produced by the Congress of Democrats in July 1960 
predicted – the worldwide “horror” at apartheid following Sharpeville was “soon to find expression 
in crippling sanctions by the United Nations.”16 
 Congress leaders and their allies abroad were thus optimistic that UN was now a forum in 
which they could secure a multilateral sanctions regime. For sanctions to be “crippling,” they 
believed, they would have to be observed universally. A “Memorandum on Sanctions on South 
Africa” that the AAM circulated to all British political parties and labor unions in July 1960 pointed 
out that the impact of India’s unilateral sanctions against South Africa in 1946 had been undermined 
by South Africa’s ability subsequently to buy jute and tea from Ceylon and Pakistan instead, while a 
memorandum on “The Concept of Sanctions” circulated by the ACOA to UN delegations in 
October 1960 recalled the failure of the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italy in 
1935 because of the non-compliance of several of Italy’s trading partners.17 In the case of South 
Africa, sanctions advocates agreed that Anglo-American participation in a sanctions regime was 
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essential if it was to be effective. “No combination of countries agreeing to cut off supplies to South 
Africa which did not include Great Britain and the United States would have any effect at all,” 
Patrick van Rensburg wrote bluntly in March 1962, in one of the earliest studies of anti-apartheid 
sanctions.18  
 Anti-apartheid activists believed that the transformation of the UN had turned it into a 
promising forum for exerting pressure on Britain and the U.S. to agree to a multilateral sanctions 
regime, because of the cold war struggle for the allegiance of the emerging Third World. The AAM’s 
June 1960 “Memorandum on Sanctions” argued that the desire to maintain the goodwill of African 
and Asian states might embarrass the United States and Britain into abstention on a sanctions 
resolution in the UN General Assembly, and that – once such a resolution had been passed – 
“failure to conform with sanctions would be a greater defiance than either country would be likely to 
wish to contemplate.”19 
ANC leaders and their allies thus turned to sanctions in 1960 because options for opposing 
apartheid inside the country had been suddenly limited at the exact historical moment that the 
transformation of international politics by decolonization seemed to offer new opportunities in the 
international sphere. This new focus on sanctions was further reinforced by the perception that after 
Sharpeville South Africa was particularly vulnerable to international economic action, in a way that it 
had never been before. The massacre and its aftermath caused a precipitous drop in the confidence 
of international investors and was followed by a rapid flight of foreign capital and the depletion of 
South Africa’s foreign currency reserves. These developments were followed closely by opponents 
of apartheid: Govan Mbeki wrote in his prison diary that he and his fellow prisoners had “note[d] 
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every economic factor – rise of the bank rate in S.A. etc.” Newly-exiled in Britain, Ronald Segal 
argued in the left-wing weekly Tribune that South Africa was now “vulnerable as never before to the 
slightest assaults on her overseas trade.”20 It appeared, moreover, that pressure on the economy 
could produce political change: in the immediate wake of Sharpeville prominent members of the 
business community publicly demanded changes in government policy in order to stabilize the 
situation. Some members of the government appeared to endorse such proposals, including Paul 
Sauer, the acting prime minister while Verwoerd recovered from the assassination attempt against 
him. Sauer announced that Sharpeville had “closed the old book of South African history” and that 
the government needed to “create a new spirit which will restore overseas faith, both white and non-
white, in South Africa.”21 
Sharpeville and its aftermath were thus not only a period of crisis for the ANC and its allies, 
but also one of hope. “For a few days,” SACP stalwart Hilda Bernstein later recalled, “the future of 
white supremacy hung in the balance.”22 Congress leaders believed that an effective international 
boycott would further exacerbate South Africa’s economic problems and tip the balance against 
apartheid. A memorandum on “Boycott and Economic Sanctions” circulated to delegates at the UN 
by Oliver Tambo in 1961 argued that the “setback of 1960” had created a situation that was 
“gloomy for South African capitalists, but hopeful for those who are convinced that the only 
weapon left against apartheid is economic. With a buoyant economy such as in the immediate post-
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war years, the economic battle would have been formidable. With a weakened economy such as 
South Africa has at present, victory becomes a possibility.”23 
 What kind of “victory” did sanctions advocates envisage that a sanctions regime would help 
to bring about? In their publicity materials the South African liberation movements and their allies in 
Britain, the U.S., and elsewhere sometimes implied that the objective of sanctions was to “break the 
intransigence of the Verwoerd government,” or to “compel the South African Government to 
abandon its policy of apartheid and white domination.”24 In practice, however, most sanctions 
advocates in this period did not believe that Verwoerd’s National Party government could ever be 
compelled to negotiate away apartheid. As Lutuli put it in December 1961, the National Party 
government was “far too committed to the apartheid policy ever to change.” Rather than trying to 
achieve such a change on the part of the government, then, “what we hope, is that outside pressure 
might make the electorate take stock of the situation and act accordingly.”25 
 Most of the leading opponents of apartheid in this period understood their immediate 
objective to be – as the ANC Emergency Committee put it in its statement on April 1, 1960 – the 
replacement of the Verwoerd government with “one less completely unacceptable to the people, of 
all races, … a government which sets out to take the path, rejected by Verwoerd, of conciliation, 
concessions, and negotiation.”26 This position was elaborated further by one of the members of the 
Emergency Committee, SACP theoretician Michael Harmel. During the Emergency, Harmel wrote 
an SACP discussion paper entitled “South Africa: What Next?” Among the issues Harmel addressed 
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was what government would follow that of Prime Minister Verwoerd. Harmel argued that though 
the Communist Party’s long-term objective was “a revolutionary provisional government, headed by 
workers and peasants,” the immediate task was to replace the National Party government with one 
which “may well fall short of what we want” but which would be “prepared, at the very least, to 
negotiate with all sections of the people for a peaceful settlement of such immediate grievances [as] 
passes, wages, representation in parliament. This would be a government of transition, between 
Verwoerd and national liberation.” Harmel’s position was not universally accepted. After the 
Emergency was lifted and activists were released at the end of August, the paper was circulated to all 
units of the underground SACP. It received “substantial criticism” from those Party members who 
believed that Verwoerd government could and should be immediately replaced by a “revolutionary 
provisional government.” But the idea that the immediate objective of anti-apartheid activity was the 
replacement of the National Party regime with a more conciliatory and reformist one was accepted 
as official SACP policy.27 
This was also the model of change envisaged by Lutuli and others on the liberal-nationalist 
wing of the ANC, and by prominent advocates of sanctions who were now overseas. Among these 
was Patrick van Rensburg, the South African Liberal and former director of the Boycott Movement, 
who in 1961 was commissioned by the Institute of Race Relations in London to produce the first 
detailed study of sanctions and the specifics of South Africa’s foreign trade.28 While working on the 
sanctions study, van Rensburg also wrote an autobiography, in which he laid out a detailed scenario 
for how sanctions could contribute to ending apartheid. It was possible, van Rensburg argued, that 
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“the collapse of White supremacy would come about through a succession of White governments, 
each shorter and more troubled than the last.” In an economic crisis brought on by sanctions, there 
might be a parliamentary realignment in which the National Party would split, and some of its more 
moderate elements would form a government with the opposition United Party. Or, alternatively, in 
a crisis election, voters might elect a United Party government. Such a government would still, of 
course, be committed to white supremacy, but it “might be less drastic than the present one and 
more amenable to pressure.” Under sustained pressure from ongoing sanctions, a successor 
government might be compelled to work with the Progressive Party (formed by eleven MPs on the 
liberal wing of the United Party, who had broken away in 1959) or the Liberal Party. “Once the 
crisis had forced the successors of Dr Verwoerd to seek the aid of either of these groups,” van 
Rensburg believed, “the end of White supremacy would have begun.”29 
 Advocates of sanctions rarely spelled out the scenarios they envisaged in such detail. But 
similar ideas about the role of sanctions could play were held not only by liberals like van Rensburg 
but by South African and overseas opponents of apartheid across the political spectrum. The SACP 
Central Committee, for instance, argued in October 1960 that trade sanctions could assist the 
struggle against apartheid in several vital ways. Not only would sanctions give inspiration and 
encouragement to the internal resistance, but they would also, first, contribute to “dividing the ruling 
class itself, driving in a wedge between those who are prepared to persist with the worst excesses of 
apartheid irrespective of the economic cost, and those who are prepared to relax some of the most 
reactionary aspects of the policy, in order to maintain prosperity.” Second, sanctions would “weaken 
popular appeal of the South African government to the white population generally” by associating 
apartheid with economic hardship. As SACP Central Committee member and ANC Secretary 
General Duma Nokwe explained in a 1961 article on UN sanctions, “the only way of teaching 
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Whites that racialist policy must be abandoned is by removing the economic benefits they think they 
get from the system. Faced with unemployment and possibilities of starvation, the Whites will reject 
racialism and choose the path of sanity.”30  
Tambo and his embryonic “External Mission” thus threw themselves into campaigning for 
sanctions immediately after Sharpeville. So too did Nana Mahomo and Peter Molotsi, two members 
of the PAC Executive who had been sent out of South Africa the day before Sharpeville. According 
to Molotsi, the PAC leadership was concerned that Tennyson Makiwane of the ANC, who had risen 
to prominence through his role in the Boycott Movement in Britain, was “gaining all the sympathy 
abroad.” Mahomo and Molotsi do not appear to have received specific instructions before they left 
on what they should do, however, and they did not receive any after their departure. The Pan 
Africanists, who had always celebrated action over organization, were even more badly crippled after 
Sharpeville than the ANC. The senior PAC leaders had all been arrested for defying the pass laws on 
March 21, and though in some areas plans had been made for contingency tiers of leadership, all of 
these were subsequently swept up by the police. The PAC headquarters was left in charge of William 
Jolobe, a student who had previously served as a part-time typist and secretary for the Party. In these 
circumstances, Mahomo and Molotsi acted for the next two years on their own initiative, without 
any direction from inside South Africa.31 In May 1960, they agreed to form an exiled South African 
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United Front (SAUF) with Tambo of the ANC, Dadoo of the SAIC, and Jariretundu Kozonguizi of 
the South West African National Union, and joined with Tambo and Dadoo in calling for economic 
sanctions to be imposed against South Africa.32 
Despite the enthusiasm for sanctions on the part of the SAUF leaders and their supporters 
in Britain and the U.S., their demands initially met with a limited response from the governments 
whose support would be necessary to impose them. In May 1960 the only governments that 
prohibited trade with South Africa were India, Jamaica, and Antigua. In Africa, as we have seen, no 
independent state had implemented the original December 1958 resolution of the All African 
People’s Conference calling for sanctions. Indeed, Kwame Nkrumah had again publicly denounced 
the idea of governmental economic sanctions in January 1960.33 The unpopularity of this position 
amongst non-governmental pan-Africanist activists had, however, been vividly demonstrated at the 
second AAPC, held that month in Tunis. “Speakers after speakers [sic] directly and indirectly 
attacked Ghana on its luke-warm attitude towards the boycotting of South African goods,” reported 
A.K. Barden, secretary of Ghana’s Bureau of African Affairs.  “I feel,” Barden concluded, “that in 
order to uphold the envious prestige of Ghana in its relentless fight for independence for dependent 
countries, this matter [the boycott of South African goods] should be given further serious 
consideration.”34  
Eleven days after Sharpeville the Ghanaian cabinet decided to ban the South African-owned 
Drum magazine “as a token of the government’s abhorrence of the South African Government’s 
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policy of apartheid and the recent atrocities committed against Africans in South Africa.” This was 
presumably intended to reduce the damage being done to Ghana’s reputation among pan-Africanists 
by Nkrumah’s earlier outspoken opposition to sanctions – while still avoiding the economic 
dislocation in Ghana that a broader trade embargo could cause.35 Selecting Drum as the sole South 
African item to be boycotted was ironic, as prominent friends of the magazine including Trevor 
Huddleston and Alan Paton quickly pointed out in telegrams to Nkrumah. As we have seen, the 
magazine had played an important role in popularizing the boycott of all-white sports teams. And it 
was a Drum photographer, Ian Berry, who had captured the only images of the police firing into the 
crowd at Sharpeville, and whose pictures of the massacre were flashed around the world. The 
magazine was nevertheless an attractive target for boycott for the Ghanaian government, which 
objected to the sensationalism and anti-CPP slant of Drum’s Ghanaian edition. As far as Nkrumah 
was concerned, Drum was publishing “material that was not only unhelpful but also unhealthy.” The 
conclusion of Drum owner Jim Bailey, who rushed to Accra to try to reverse the ban, that “this 
banning was nothing to do with Sharpeville” was an exaggeration, but not by much. After securing a 
commitment from Bailey to – as Nkrumah saw it – “improve the quality of the paper,” the 
Ghanaian prime minister recommended to his cabinet on April 28 that the boycott be lifted – 
though ultimately they delayed lifting the ban until June 28, apparently so that the government 
would not lose face.36 
In the meantime, pressure from non-governmental bodies in Africa for the independent 
African states to end all trade with South Africa continued to mount. In April calls for sanctions 
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were issued by both the Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa, which was 
convened by Nkrumah in Accra to discuss French nuclear tests in the Sahara, and by the conference 
of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization in Conakry, Guinea.37 But what finally appears to 
have changed Nkrumah’s mind on sanctions was South African foreign minister Eric Louw’s 
provocative and intransigent behavior during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in 
London in May 1960. When Sir Abubakar Balewa – the premier of not-yet-independent Nigeria who 
happened to be in London at the time for constitutional talks – publicly raised the possibility of 
excluding South Africa from the Commonwealth, Louw called a press conference at which he 
pointed to Ghana’s open invitation to him to visit as evidence that apartheid was not a cause of 
international tension. Embarrassed, the Ghanaian government promptly canceled the invitation. On 
Nkrumah’s return home he effectively repudiated the policy of constructive engagement he had 
pursued for the previous three years: Ghana could not “sit down and wait indefinitely” for a change 
of heart in South Africa, Nkrumah now declared, and should consider the possibility of economic 
sanctions.38  
When Nkrumah had convened the first Conference of Independent African States in Accra 
in April, the Ghanaian premier had ignored Michael Scott’s suggestion that the delegates should 
discuss economic sanctions against South Africa. Now, however, when the second Conference of 
Independent African States met in Addis Ababa in June 1960, Ghanaian foreign minister Ako Adjei 
was the first speaker to call explicitly for sanctions, announcing that Ghana was “prepared, in 
concert with the other African states, to take appropriate measures to organise an economic boycott 
of South Africa.” The proposal was supported by Tambo, Dadoo, Mahomo, and Molotsi, all of 
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whom had traveled to Ethiopia for the conference. In a closed session of the conference, Mahomo 
presented a memorandum on behalf of the South African exiles calling on the African states to “act 
collectively on a boycott of South African goods” by the end of July, and to press for sanctions “on 
an international basis” at the UN.39  
In the changed circumstances since Sharpeville, the other independent African states now 
joined Ghana in abandoning their earlier skepticism and opposition to sanctions. The conference 
delegates not only adopted the South African exiles’ demand, but significantly elaborated upon it: 
Tambo later recalled that “our specific requests were not as detailed and as extensive as the 
measures adopted by the conference after discussion. Because the African states regarded the South 
African situation as their own problem, they did not hesitate, on their own, to explore methods 
other than those detailed by us, whereby South Africa could be forced to change its policies.”40 
Though press reports suggested that there had been a “prolonged struggle” in the closed session – 
the fact that Nasser’s United Arab Republic maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa was 
apparently a source of particular controversy – the conference ultimately adopted a resolution that 
called on member states “to sever diplomatic relations or refrain from establishing diplomatic 
relations as the case may be, to close African ports to all vessels flying the South African flag, to 
enact legislation preventing their ships from entering South African ports, to boycott all South 
African goods, to refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government 
and companies registered under the laws of the Union of South Africa and to prohibit all South 
African aircraft from flying over the air space of the Independent African States.” 
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The resolution also suggested that the Arab states prevent oil companies from selling Arab 
oil to South Africa, invited African members of the Commonwealth to secure South Africa’s 
expulsion, and recommended action by the United Nations under Article 41 of the UN Charter – 
the article authorizing the Security Council to call upon UN members to apply measures such as 
“complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, 
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Another resolution 
took up the suggestion Michael Scott had first made seven years earlier: Ethiopia and Liberia, the 
two African former members of the League of Nations, were authorized to initiate contentious 
proceedings at the International Court of Justice regarding South Africa’s international obligations in 
the former League mandate of South West Africa.41 Ernest Gross, an American lawyer and former 
diplomat who was hired to manage the case after being flown out to Ethiopia during the conference, 
later explained that “the essential purpose at the outset when the matter was decided by the Addis 
conference… was to bring pressure on the United States and Britain. The African states knew that 
the U.S. and Britain were reluctant at the very least to act against the South African government, but 
that they would find it difficult to continue being inert in the face of an ICJ ruling against the South 
African Government.”42 
 Having abandoned its earlier opposition, the Ghanaian government now became the most 
enthusiastic proponent of the sanctions campaign. Though the SAUF representatives in Addis 
Ababa had expressed the hope that all the African states would impose a collective boycott of South 
African goods by the end of July, Ghana was in fact the only African state to comply with the 
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resolution by that date. With effect from August 1, Nkrumah’s government revoked the existing 
general license to import goods from South Africa, and closed Ghana’s air and seaports to South 
African craft. The Ghanaian government also added a further measure of its own: a requirement that 
all South African citizens entering or transiting through Ghana sign a declaration of opposition to 
apartheid.43 On the same day as the new Ghanaian regulations took effect, Malaya – which had taken 
the lead in denouncing South Africa at the Commonwealth meeting in May – also announced an 
official embargo. Within Africa, other independent states were slower to implement the Addis 
resolution: over the subsequent two years official trade embargoes were announced by Ethiopia 
(November 1960), Nigeria (February 1961), Liberia (June 1961), Sierra Leone (July 1961), the United 
Arab Republic (September 1961), Somalia (March 1962), and Madagascar (September 1962).44  
The governments of the Soviet bloc, meanwhile, vigorously denounced apartheid, but were 
cautious about sanctions. On March 24, 1960, three days after Sharpeville, Heinrich Rau, the East 
German minister of trade, raised the issue of the ICFTU’s boycott campaign in a memorandum to 
East German leader Walter Ulbricht. Characterizing the campaign as a “devious game of rightist 
trade union leaders,” Rau accurately diagnosed that the ICFTU was using the boycott to try to win 
support in Africa and Asia, but also – less plausibly – suggested that it was a plot being undertaken 
“in the hope that the socialist countries will follow the boycott, which would make room for 
[western governments and firms] to step in and expand their business accordingly.” 
Notwithstanding this conspiratorial interpretation, Rau believed that the socialist world needed to 
take action in response. Ulbricht endorsed Rau’s suggestion that the East German labor federation 
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propose that the WFTU declare its support for a boycott by affiliated transport unions.45 The 
WFTU General Council, whose policies closely tracked those of the Soviet Union, ignored the East 
German proposal, however. WFTU leaders apparently feared that to call for a boycott by workers 
might increase pressure on the Eastern Bloc governments to impose sanctions themselves.46 
In principle, the Soviet Union and its supporters remained opposed to trade embargoes and 
were committed to expanding commerce with all states, regardless of their political orientation. In 
the case of South Africa, moreover, Soviet bloc states were not enthusiastic about ending their 
lucrative trade relations. In August 1960, Dadoo traveled to the Eastern bloc to lobby for 
governmental sanctions, and secured commitments from the ruling parties of both the Soviet Union 
and East Germany to review their trade with South Africa. But neither government took any further 
action. In October the SACP Central Committee circulated a lengthy memorandum to the ruling 
parties of the Soviet bloc, setting out the strategic rationale for sanctions and expressing anxiety that 
the bloc’s lack of enthusiasm for the idea was damaging the reputation of socialism among 
opponents of apartheid. “It has become a matter of concern to the whole progressive and radical 
movement in South Africa that, thus far, the government and popular organisations… of the 
socialist countries have not openly identified themselves with the boycott movement,” the memo 
stated. “Continued silence on this campaign can only create a bad impression which it will be 
difficult to correct.”47  
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In response to these appeals, Soviet and East German officials informed the SACP that they 
were reducing or ending trade with South Africa. But trade in fact continued: Soviet diamonds, for 
example, continued to be sold to the South African De Beers group via a British front company.48 In 
practice, the Soviet bloc states thus pursued a dual track policy in the early 1960s, providing 
rhetorical and material support and training to the SACP and its ANC allies, while covertly avoiding 
strict implementation of the trade sanctions that the SACP and the ANC insisted were a vital form 
of assistance to their struggle. 
At the United Nations, consideration of sanctions was delayed by Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjold’s preoccupation with the crisis that erupted following the independence of the 
Congo from Belgium in June 1960. In its resolution passed immediately after Sharpeville, the 
Security Council had requested Hammarskjold to hold consultations with the South African 
government, but his trip was repeatedly postponed, and in the event he did not visit South Africa 
until January 1961. When he arrived in Johannesburg, representatives of the Congress Alliance were 
able to smuggle a memorandum to him concealed in a bouquet of flowers delivered to his hotel. The 
memo called on Hammarskjold to meet with recognized anti-apartheid leaders as well as with the 
government, and asked him to inform the Security Council that “the majority of the South Africa 
people are looking to that body for substantial assistance in their struggles for the realisation of true 
democracy in our country.” Hammarskjold met only with black South Africans who were those 
handpicked by the government, however. He held a series of six meetings with Verwoerd, but, as he 
reported to the Security Council, the two men could not find a “mutually acceptable arrangement.” 
The Secretary-General expressed the hope that despite the “lack of agreement” he could continue 
the consultations in a follow-up visit. In the event, however, he remained preoccupied with the 
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Congo crisis until his death in a plane crash in September 1961. There were no further efforts to 
resolve the crisis in South Africa through the good offices of the UN Secretary-General: the next 
time a UN Secretary-General visited South Africa would not be until 1972.49 
Following Hammarskjold’s failure to alter the South African government’s course, the UN 
General Assembly considered the issue of apartheid twice in 1961, first in April (as part of the 
Assembly’s ongoing Fifteenth Session that had begun in September 1960), and then again in 
November during the Sixteenth Session. On both occasions, western opposition to sanctions was 
assisted by a split in the Afro-Asian Group at the UN. India maintained its own unilateral trade 
embargo, but now actively opposed to a UN resolution calling for multilateral sanctions. The Indian 
government had become much more cautious about raising issues in the UN in the years since 1946 
and was especially concerned not to create precedents that might later be used against India itself in 
the context of its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir.50 In both April and November the resolutions 
drafted by the “African Group” of UN delegations, which asked all states to impose trade, transport, 
and diplomatic sanctions, failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority to pass. Instead, in both 
cases, a “moderate” resolution drafted by India passed almost unanimously. The Indian drafts 
avoided any mention of sanctions, instead suggesting that member states “take such collective and 
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separate action as is open to them in conformity with the Charter to bring about an abandonment” 
of South Africa’s racial policies.51 
The British and American governments continued in 1960 and 1961 to seek to minimize 
disruption to their relations with South Africa, and lobbied hard in support of the Indian-drafted 
resolutions. Despite the efforts of anti-apartheid activists, neither the U.S. nor the U.K. was under 
much pressure to impose sanctions. The primary form of grassroots anti-apartheid activity in both 
countries was the continuation of the consumer boycotts that had been launched or agreed upon 
before Sharpeville. The ACOA had been hesitant about launching a consumer boycott when the 
idea was spreading around the world in 1959-60, as we have seen. Bounced into action by the AFL-
CIO’s decision in February 1960 to organize a boycott, the ACOA Executive Board approved the 
idea on March 14, but had taken no further action by the time of the massacre at Sharpeville a week 
later. Sharpeville, however, as Houser later recalled, “turned the [boycott] effort into a mighty 
propaganda vehicle.” In May 1960 the ACOA began circulating a petition that noted that those in 
South and South West Africa who opposed apartheid had “called for a universal boycott” and called 
on signatories to commit “not [to] purchase South African goods until such time as the South 
African government abandons her racist policies and conforms to United Nations resolutions on 
these issues.” The petition was published as an advert in the New York Times on May 31, together 
with the names of more than two hundred of the thousands who had already signed.52  
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An “Emergency Action Conference” convened by the ACOA, which met that day and the 
next, identified rock lobster tails as the South African import to the U.S. that lent themselves to a 
“convenient boycott.” The Committee conducted extensive research on the lobster trade in the 
subsequent months. “Lobster,” concluded the Coordinating Committee of ACOA’s emergency 
South African campaign in September, “is the most identifiable product of South Africa in America 
and… could become a symbol of protest.” The Committee resolved to send delegations to shops, 
restaurants, and the lobster trade association to request that they stop selling South African lobster. 53 
The ACOA continued throughout the early 1960s to incorporate the boycott of lobster and other 
South African consumer products into its publicity materials on South Africa, though the lack of 
such products in the U.S. meant that campaign never gained significant traction. As Houser wrote 
ruefully in his memoirs, “It was hard to mount a serious campaign aimed only at South African rock 
lobster tails.”54 
 In Britain, where a much wider range of identifiably South African consumer products were 
sold – including fruit, canned foods, wines, and cigarettes – the AAM adopted a similar signature-
based method of promoting the boycott to that used by the ACOA in May. The consumer boycott 
was relaunched in September 1960 as a “Penny Pledge Campaign”: British consumers were asked to 
donate a penny to the AAM to “purchase” a pledge card stating that they would boycott South 
African goods until apartheid was ended.55 The campaign was endorsed by both the Labour and 
Liberal Parties, but fell far short of the one million signatures Vella Pillay had suggested they aim for. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 “Minutes: Co-ordinating Committee of the South Africa Emergency Campaign,” 19 September 1960, File 103/21, 
ACOA Records, Proquest History Vault; R.M. Miller to James Scott and Richard Rettig, “Report of Meeting on 
Committee on South Africa,” 27 September 1960, Folder: ‘1956-1967 American Committee on Africa (ACOA),’ Box 
266, United States National Student Association (USNSA): International Commission Records, Hoover Institution. 
54 Houser, No One Can Stop the Rain, 128. 
55 Dennis Chapman to the South African United Front, 5 September 1960, File 973, AAM. 
 202 
By the end of 1960 – the last time the number of signatures was recorded in the AAM Executive’s 
minutes – the total stood at seven thousand.56 
Anti-apartheid activists now emphasized that a consumer boycott would not in itself have a 
significant economic or political impact in South Africa. Or, as a February 1963 editorial in Fighting 
Talk put it, “the well-meaning British drinker’s decision to switch from South African to French 
sherry” was “not a matter which shakes the edifice of South African apartheid.”57 Though the profits 
of some South African producers of fruit, canned foods, wines, and cigarettes were affected by the 
consumer boycott campaigns in the west, such identifiably South African consumer products 
represented only a small proportion of the country’s exports. The AAM’s July 1960 “Memorandum 
on Sanctions” concluded by acknowledging that despite the publicity and support that had been 
generated by the Boycott Movement’s campaign, South African exports to Britain in the first three 
months of 1960 had been higher than they had been in the same period in 1959.58 
Rather than a means of exerting economic pressure, all boycott advocates now agreed that 
the consumer boycott was essentially a “moral gesture” – the term that had been emphasized in the 
Labour Party’s publicity material for the original March 1960 boycott month. Noting the extensive 
coverage of the boycott in the South African press in early 1960, as well as Louw’s blustering 
response to it, the Anti-Apartheid Movement claimed that the original consumer boycott had had “a 
tremendous impact in the mind of white South Africa,” and had also given “hope and inspiration” 
to the Congress movement inside the country.59 Neither of these ideas about the role of the boycott 
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was entirely abandoned after Sharpeville. But leading boycott advocates now agreed that, as the 
AAM hammered home in its “Memorandum on Sanctions,” such “moral gestures and protests” as 
the consumer boycott and the ongoing efforts to organize a sports boycott were “not enough” in 
the post-Sharpeville situation.60 
The main purpose of advocating continuing consumer and sports boycotts was neither their 
material nor their moral impact on either the supporters or opponents of apartheid, but rather the 
role that such boycotts could play, as Vella Pillay wrote in the draft AAM Programme of Action, as 
“an exercise in political education” in the west.61 A consumer boycott, the ACOA likewise argued 
“would educate many Americans for the first time about the mechanics and evils of apartheid.”62 The 
main impact of the Boycott Movement’s original month of action in March 1960, the AAM now 
suggested, had been to raise awareness in Britain of conditions in South Africa. The AAM argued 
with some plausibility that it was precisely because of this heightened awareness in the weeks before 
March 21 that when the massacre at Sharpeville occurred, the reaction in Britain was “so immediate 
and passionate.”63 In the post-Sharpeville period, anti-apartheid strategists understood the consumer 
boycott primarily as a means of creating “a climate of opinion in which large scale action can take 
place.”64 They had limited success in this regard. Refusing to buy South African products became an 
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ingrained habit for many on the British left. Simon Hoggart, a journalist for the liberal Guardian 
newspaper, later recalled that by the 1970s “a liberally minded person in Britain would no more have 
bought South African wine than served his guests strychnine. Anyone who bought it – and some 
wine merchants kept a small selection – was, in the view of most people one knew, little better than 
a Nazi.”65 But the popularity of the consumer boycott among certain sections of the British 
population did not translate into significant pressure on the U.K. government to enforce sanctions. 
Indeed, while the Labour and Liberal Parties officially endorsed the ongoing consumer boycott, they 
stressed that boycotting South Africa was an issue that “must be left to the individual to decide” and 
made clear that they did not support governmental action.66 
 In 1960, some opponents of apartheid had briefly entertained hopes that western 
governments’ opposition to sanctions could be circumvented by an industrial boycott by organized 
labor, especially dockworkers. Though the ANC Emergency Committee’s original April 1 statement 
had called only for governmental sanctions, the Congress movement’s external representatives 
quickly became just as interested in the possibility that the same impact could be achieved through 
the action by the international trade union movement. As soon as he arrived in Britain and met with 
members of the Anti-Apartheid Committee in mid-April, Dadoo, as we have seen, suggested not 
only campaigning for the UN to impose sanctions, but also asking the trade unions not to handle oil 
destined for South Africa. Meanwhile, Ronald Segal, who had flown to Europe with Dadoo, traveled 
immediately to the ICFTU headquarters in Brussels to press for coordinated industrial action. In 
July 1960 the AAM’s “Memorandum on Sanctions” stressed that international trade union action, 
such as dockworkers refusing to unload ships carrying South African goods, could “defeat the South 
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African government.”67 As Tom Mboya had in 1959, the AAM envisaged a united, world-wide effort 
that would bring trade with South Africa to a standstill. 
 Anti-apartheid activists were optimistic that this was achievable, given the prominent role 
the ICFTU and many of its affiliates had played in launching consumer boycotts in the first months 
of 1960. Moreover, the  ICFTU World Congress resolution had, as we saw in Chapter 2, raised the 
possibility of “reinforcing the consumers’ boycott by industrial boycotts.” As part of the ICFTU 
campaign, affiliates in Cyprus and several islands of the Caribbean announced that they would refuse 
to unload ships from South Africa – an action that the St Kitts and Nevis Trades and Labour Union 
had resolved upon as early as 1950.68 In April 1960, in what the AAM called “the outstanding 
example of industrial action taken so far,” dockworkers in Trinidad refused to unload an American 
merchant ship, African Lightning, which was carrying canned fruit, grain, batteries, brassware, and 
other products from South Africa. Eventually the ship was forced to return to Durban with its cargo 
still on board.69 Segal’s talks with ICFTU officials in Brussels at the end of April also gave grounds 
for optimism: he was told that the ICFTU was “seriously considering” organizing an industrial 
boycott, but that it would “depend largely on the response of the British trade union movement.” 
And in Britain in the weeks after Sharpeville numerous local trades councils and union branches all 
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over the country passed resolutions condemning the massacre and calling on the TUC to organize 
industrial action.70 
 Both the ACOA in the U.S. and the AAM in Britain actively pursued the possibility of an 
industrial boycott in the middle months of 1960. Frank Montero, chairman of the coordinating 
committee of ACOA’s emergency South African campaign, organized meetings in New York with 
representatives of the International Longshoremen’s Association and the Teamsters Union to push 
the idea.71 In Britain, Segal, Rosalynde Ainslie, and other members of the AAM committee spoke at 
union branch and trades council meetings and met privately with British labor leaders. Initially they 
found the response “very encouraging”; Ainslie reported in late July to Tennyson Makiwane of the 
ANC’s External Mission that there was a “fairly good chance” that the TUC conference in 
September would approve a resolution mandating TUC officials to request the ICFTU to organize 
an industrial boycott.72 
 Though there may have been some enthusiasm for the idea at the union grassroots, 
however, the leadership of the labor movement remained unalterably opposed. The executive of the 
International Transport Workers’ Federation, which would be bear primary responsibility for a 
worldwide industrial boycott, considered the issue in April 1960. It reported to the ICFTU that the 
dockers and seafarers unions had concluded that any attempt by their members to impose an 
industrial boycott would encounter “insuperable practical difficulties.” The Transport Workers’ 
executive suggested instead that it would be “better to adopt a strongly-worded resolution” 
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condemning the South African government – the kind of response now seen by anti-apartheid 
activists as wholly inadequate. The leadership of the British TUC also reiterated its own opposition 
to industrial action.73  
Given the opposition of the leaders of the International Transport Workers’ Federation and 
the of the labor movement in Britain, the ICFTU secretariat concluded that an ICFTU call for an 
industrial boycott would meet with “no widespread response.” Despite a further plea from Tom 
Mboya for a “token” one month industrial boycott, the secretariat’s position was endorsed by the 
ICFTU executive in June 1960, at its first meeting since the World Congress six months earlier.  
While noting that it was “still necessary for the peoples of the free world to maintain pressure on the 
South African government to abandon its racial policies,” the ICFTU Board decided to leave it up to 
its affiliates to decide whether to make a further appeal for consumer boycotts beyond the fixed-
period boycotts that had already taken place. The Board also carefully shifted primary responsibility 
for further action from its own shoulders to those of governments, stressing that “the imposition of 
economic sanctions” – that is, a boycott by governments, not by organized labor – “would be the 
most effective way of exerting pressure on the South African government.” By March 1961, Walter 
Reuther of the United Autoworkers – the primary American supporter of organized labor’s 
involvement in boycotting South Africa in the previous two years – was already referring in the past 
tense to “the period when the boycott of South Africa was an urgent topic.”74 
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 British and American anti-apartheid activists soon recognized that there was no likelihood of 
a worldwide picket of ships carrying South African exports. The issue disappeared from the 
discussions of the AAM Executive after the TUC annual conference in September 1960. By early 
November, the AAM leadership had apparently concluded that to call publicly for an industrial 
boycott would meet with no response and would simply harm its relationship with the labor 
movement: AAM representatives warned representatives of the South African liberation movements 
that if in future they made a public call for an industrial boycott, the AAM would not feel obliged to 
support them.75 In the U.S., Montero reported to the ACOA’s committee on South Africa in 
September that there could be no sustained industrial boycott by dockworkers in New York, though 
he stressed that more limited industrial action could be “important symbolic action” and would 
generate “great publicity.”76 This happened for the first time two years later, in San Francisco on 
December 17, 1962, when Mary Louise Hooper – now the ACOA’s representative on the west coast 
– organized a community picket of the Dutch freighter Raki by local members of CORE and the 
NAACP. Though dockworkers did not join the twenty-one picketers themselves, more than one 
hundred members of Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union agreed not to 
cross the line, leaving the ship’s cargo of South African coffee, hemp, asbestos and lobster tails 
unloaded for the day. Whereas in 1960 the African Lightning had been forced by the Trinidad 
dockworkers to return to South Africa, however, the Raki was unloaded the following day. Hooper 
explained that the community picket had been planned for one day only, in order “to bring the 
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problem to the attention of San Francisco.”77 Like consumer boycotts, industrial boycotts had thus 
become not an end in themselves but another form of consciousness raising. 
 By 1963, the campaign for the economic isolation of South Africa launched three years 
earlier had had neither the economic nor the political effects that its advocates had hoped for. The 
economic crisis after Sharpeville that had made sanctions advocates so optimistic was quickly 
reversed, and the country entered a long period of sustained economic growth. Boycotts and 
sanctions had only a limited effect on this: an assessment by the South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs in mid-1964 concluded that there had been a “steady and substantial” increase in 
South African exports since 1960, but that this growth in exports was two per cent lower than it 
would have been without the boycott campaign.78 Whatever the political impact might have been if 
the kind of total embargo envisaged by sanctions advocates been imposed, the proliferation of 
boycotts and international criticism after Sharpeville only served to reinforce the National Party’s 
support among whites. In 1960, Verwoerd achieved the long-standing ambition of Afrikaner 
nationalists when a narrow majority of whites voted in a referendum for South Africa to sever its 
links with the British monarchy and become a republic. Though this led to South Africa’s departure 
from the Commonwealth the following year – when Verwoerd withdrew South Africa’s application 
for readmission to the organization as a republic in the face of the anti-apartheid feeling of African 
and Asian members – Verwoerd successfully turned this into a triumph in the eyes of his white 
supporters at home. In the 1961 general election the National Party further strengthened its 
position, winning not only a majority of seats in parliament but also, for the first time, a majority of 
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the (white) popular vote. The newly-formed Progressive Party, committed to a qualified franchise, 
was almost wiped out: all but one of its MPs lost their seats. 
 
II. ‘A vital factor operating against the enemy’: Sanctions and the Turn to Violence 
When the South African liberation movements and their overseas supporters began demanding 
sanctions in 1960, advocates both inside and outside the country had argued for a sanctions regime 
as a means of assisting a peaceful transition from apartheid. ANC President Albert Lutuli, who was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1961, continued to call for sanctions on this basis. In 
his autobiography, published that month, Lutuli argued that sanctions represented “our only chance 
of a relatively peaceful transition”: a nonracial democracy, he suggested, would never “come willingly 
from the whites. Even so, it could be made to come peacefully,” since it was economic ostracism 
that “jolts them the worst.”79 Many African diplomats at the UN and anti-apartheid activists in the 
west made similar arguments throughout the first half of the decade. In a press statement released in 
May 1962, for instance, the AAM argued that “international pressure in the form of an immediate 
arms embargo and economic sanctions on South Africa” was “the only possible alternative to 
violence – on the scale perhaps of the Algerian war.”80 
 By 1961, however, Nelson Mandela and other Congress and SACP leaders had come to the 
conclusion that there was no chance of peaceful transition, and decided to incorporate violent action 
into their strategy. Mandela and others had begun discussing the possibility of adopting violent 
methods in prison after Sharpeville. Subsequently, the first formal deliberation and decision on this 
issue was taken at the biennial congress of the SACP, held in Johannesburg in December 1960. 
Crucially, the twenty or so attendees included at least three members – Nelson Mandela, Walter 
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Sisulu, and Moses Kotane – of the five-man National Working Committee that became the effective 
leadership of the ANC after the Congress re-organized to operate underground following the lifting 
of the State of Emergency.81 The conference adopted a resolution that “a violent people’s struggle” 
was probable in the future, and that the Party therefore had a duty to “prepare the people for the use 
of armed force against armed counter-revolution.” The resolution concluded: “We are not pacifists. 
We recognise that the use of armed force against the state, directed by the leading organizations of 
the people, is a necessary complement of mass political agitation in such situations as that now 
developing in South Africa.” The discussion of this resolution was brief, and it was passed without 
opposition, presumably because of its vagueness.82 
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  While the SACP thus formally began to prepare for the possible future use of force in the 
first half of 1961, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu took the lead in attempting to secure the 
support of the ANC and the Congress Alliance for their position that “the state had given us no 
alternative to violence.” They faced considerable opposition, but ultimately – at tumultuous back-to-
back all-night sessions in June 1961 in Tongaat, Natal, first of the ANC National Executive and then 
of the Joint Executives of the Congress Alliance – a compromise was reached. The ANC and the 
Congress Alliance would themselves remain committed to non-violence but that Mandela would be 
permitted to form an independent military organization, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and would not 
be disciplined or condemned by the Congresses for doing so. Mandela, representing the ANC, 
became the first commander-in-chief of the new organization. Joe Slovo, representing the 
Communist Party, became chief-of-staff.83 
The arguments of those leaders of the ANC, the SACP, and the Congress Alliance who 
pressed for a turn to violence were underpinned by two interlocking beliefs. First, they believed that 
the government’s violent repression of non-violent acts of resistance was successfully deterring 
grassroots supporters from participation in the Congress movement’s non-violent campaigns. After 
the government’s brutal breaking of strikes during the Sharpeville crisis, an attempt by the ANC 
Emergency Committee to organize a week-long stay-at-home beginning on April 19, 1960, had 
fallen completely flat. A year later, when Congress leaders attempted to organize a three-day stay-at-
home to coincide with South Africa becoming a republic in May 1961, the government had sent the 
police and army into African townships. Disappointed by the popular response in these 
circumstances, the ANC leadership had called off the strike after the first day. The leading white 
communist Rusty Bernstein later recalled how in these circumstances he and his comrades came to 
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the conclusion that “any minute now people are not going to heed our call to come out on general 
strike because people are not bloody stupid, if they come out on strike every time we call them, and 
every time there is more dead bodies as a result of it, the time is coming when we are going to make 
the call and nobody is going to answer except us.”84 
Secondly, the advocates of using force believed that there was significant pressure from 
black South Africans for them to do so, and that if they refused the consequences might be 
disastrous for the future of both the Congress movement and the country. ANC leaders had 
received requests for weapons from grassroots supporters throughout the 1950s. These demands 
now became even more frequent. There was an upsurge of violence in rural areas, including the 
Pondoland region of the Transkei, where in 1960 opponents of the state’s attempt to impose new 
“Bantu Authorities” on the region launched violent attacks on government-appointed chiefs and 
headmen. Leaders of the Mpondo revolt repeatedly requested that Congress movement leaders 
provide them with firearms.85 In urban areas the Sharpeville crisis prompted the formation of several 
groups of ANC youth members disillusioned with their leadership’s insistence on non-violence. In 
Durban, for instance, according to future South African president Jacob Zuma, he and others in the 
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ANC Youth League “started buying bush knives to slaughter whites to start [a] revolution.”86 
Moreover, the PAC, with its celebration of spontaneous mass action, had always had a much more 
ambiguous relationship to non-violence than the ANC. While most of the PAC leadership was 
incapacitated in prison in 1960-61, local supporters identifying themselves as Poqo (“alone” or 
“pure”) began reorganizing underground in some areas. Poqo members’ envisaged an insurrection 
based on the indiscriminate use of violence. One Poqo flyer distributed in the Langa township 
outside Cape Town in December 1961 declared, for instance, that “The white people shall suffer, 
the black people will rule. Freedom comes after bloodshed. Poqo has started.”87 
In these circumstances Mandela and his comrades concluded that violent resistance would 
break out whatever they themselves chose to do, and might take a form that would threaten both 
future race relations and the ANC’s leading role. The attacks envisaged by Poqo and by ANC 
supporters like Zuma’s group in Durban were exactly the kind of indiscriminate, racialized violence 
that leaders of the Congress movement had long feared. Mandela now came to the conclusion, as he 
explained at his trial in 1964, that “unless responsible leadership was given to canalize and control 
the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity 
of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced even by 
war.” Congress leaders feared, moreover, that if they did not lead the violent resistance they believed 
to be inevitable, the Congress Alliance would be sidelined by the PAC or another group prepared to 
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embrace violence enthusiastically. Looking back at this period in 1969, the ANC’s official account of 
its “Strategy and Tactics” commented that “without activity of this [violent] nature our whole 
political leadership may have been at stake both inside and outside the country.”88 
Mandela and his allies thus concluded that some kind of violent action was necessary. But 
there were still many different forms that such action could have taken. The SACP Conference in 
December 1960 had described armed force as a “necessary complement of mass political agitation.” 
According to the chair of the Party’s Johannesburg District Committee, Bob Hepple, for instance, 
he and some of the other conference delegates envisaged the continued prioritization of “organising 
the urban working class,” accompanied by the “secondary activity” of setting up armed “armed units 
in townships and rural areas to protect people from police attacks and to harass the authorities.”89 
But although the argument that violent action was a way of enabling the continued prosecution of 
mass political struggle was an influential one in the formal discussions of violence within the SACP 
and the ANC, the men who came to form the leadership of MK quickly embraced much more 
expansive plans, in which violence was not “secondary” or a “complement” but the primary means 
by which apartheid would be ended.  
From an early stage, Mandela, Slovo, and their comrades on MK’s founding “High 
Command” envisaged an unfolding struggle that would culminate in full-scale guerrilla warfare. This 
has often been obscured by the fact that MK’s first armed actions, starting on December 16, 1961, 
took the form of sabotage of non-human targets, primarily bombings of unoccupied government 
buildings and electricity pylons. The MK manifesto distributed as a leaflet that night declared that 
the purpose of sabotage was to “bring the government and its supporters to their senses before it is 
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too late, so that both the government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the 
desperate state of civil war.”  
The claim that this was the strategic objective of MK’s initial attacks was repeated by 
Mandela in his famous address at his trial in 1964, and has generally been accepted in subsequent 
studies.90 According to Slovo, however, “No one believed that the tactic of sabotage could, on its 
own, lead to the collapse of the racist state.” Rather, “sabotage was to form only the opening phase 
in the unfolding of armed struggle.”91 During the six-month tour of Africa Mandela made in the first 
half of 1962 to canvass external support for MK, Mandela, Tambo, and Robert Resha submitted 
what Mandela later called a “comprehensive and serious memorandum” to the Ghanaian 
government. Umkhonto we Sizwe, the memo explained, “constitutes the first phase of a 
comprehensive plan for the waging of guerilla operations. Extensive preparations in this direction 
have already been made…”92 Those preparations included sending six leading MK cadres to China 
for training in guerrilla warfare in October 1961, more than a month before MK launched its first 
sabotage attacks.93 
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That Mandela, Slovo, and their comrades understood the sabotage campaign as the first 
stage of an unfolding and escalating armed struggle does not, however, explain why they adopted this 
approach. In his influential book on Guerrilla Warfare, Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara, for 
example, stressed that sabotage was an “arm of guerrilla warfare” – an argument that Mandela 
carefully noted down while he was preparing for the launch of MK.94 But neither the guerrilla 
fighters in Cuba, nor those in China, Israel, the Philippines, and other violent struggles that Mandela 
studied in 1961 had adopted sabotage of property as a separate and distinct phase preceding other 
forms of violent action. In adopting this approach, MK was almost unprecedented.  
The first reason for this was, as Slovo wrote later, that sabotage was “a politically useful 
bridge between the period of non-violent campaigning and the future people’s armed struggle.” By 
expressing in their manifesto the hope, “however forlorn,” that sabotage actions would bring the 
government and its supporters to their senses and avert a civil war, the MK High Command sought 
to ensure that observers understood that responsibility lay with the regime for the future civil war 
that MK was in fact already planning to launch.95 Establishing this was important not only to avoid 
alienating sympathetic whites within South Africa, but also in order to maintain support in the west, 
where much of the support network that had developed for the Congress movement in the course 
of the 1950s had rested on the ANC’s commitment to non-violence. Given the strategic importance 
that MK’s commanders continued to assign to economic sanctions, they attempted to initiate the 
new armed struggle in a way they judged most likely to retain, rather than deter, the support of 
liberals in the west. 
Moreover, advocates of the turn to violence judged, correctly it appears, that sabotage 
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against property that was carefully targeted to avoid loss of life was the most for which they would 
be able to secure the acquiescence of those on the liberal-nationalist wing of the Congress who 
advocated for the continued exclusive use of non-violent methods. During the debates at the 
tumultuous back-to-back all-night meetings in June 1961, several of the most senior participants, 
including Lutuli and Monty Naicker of the SAIC, argued passionately against the adoption of violent 
tactics. No records of the meetings survive, and it is unclear from participants’ later accounts 
whether or not the possibility of a future escalation to guerrilla warfare was explicitly discussed.96 But 
what is apparent is that the eventual compromise was reached only on the basis that MK would use 
sabotage exclusively against non-human targets. Indeed, a sabotage campaign with the stated 
objective of influencing the electoral preferences of white voters could be presented as having 
considerable continuity with previous ANC strategy.97 
The leading advocates of violence who had no faith in that model of change were divided 
amongst themselves over how they expected their guerrilla war to end. For Mandela himself, the 
purpose of guerrilla warfare was to force the National Party government to negotiate with the ANC. 
Previously, as we have seen, the idea that the party of apartheid could itself be brought to the 
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negotiating table had been treated by almost all Congress leaders as totally implausible, but Mandela 
now believed that it could be achieved through the use of violence.98 During an underground 
meeting in Cape Town in mid-1961, when he was preparing for the launch of MK, Mandela was 
pressed by Denis Goldberg, who would subsequently join MK’s Regional Command in the Western 
Cape. “When is the armed struggle over?” Goldberg asked, “What is the demand? What are we 
fighting for?” “Until they negotiate,” Mandela replied. “The point is to negotiate to put an end to 
Apartheid.”99 
This perspective was reinforced during Mandela’s visit in March 1962 to Morocco, where he 
spent three days in discussions with Dr. Chawki Mostefaï, a member of the Algerian negotiating 
team then in final talks with the French to end the war in Algeria and secure the country’s 
independence. Mandela recorded in his diary at the time that Mostefaï had explained that “The 
original objective of the Alg[erian] revolution was the defeat of the French by Military action as in 
Indo China [at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954]. Settlement by negotiation was not visualised.” 
But, Mostefaï stressed, “in the course of the war they realised that a pure military victory over the 
French would be well nigh impossible.”100 In prison in 1964, Mandela explained to fellow prisoner 
Neville Alexander that he had concluded from his discussion in Algeria that “there was no point in 
trying to overthrow the South African apartheid regime: we had to force them to the negotiation 
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table.”101 
Mandela’s belief that the purpose of launching guerrilla war was to compel the South African 
government to negotiate was shared by others, including Bram Fischer, the chairman of the SACP. 
Indeed, the SACP’s official program, adopted by its biennial underground conference in 1962, 
declared that “The illusion that the White minority can rule forever over a disarmed majority will 
crumble before the reality of an armed and determined people,” and suggested that in these 
circumstances “the possibility would be opened of a peaceful and negotiated transfer of power.”102 
Other leading figures never shared this view, however, and instead believed that the ultimate 
objective of MK’s war was the armed “seizure of power.” For men including Joe Slovo and Govan 
Mbeki (who joined the High Command in 1962), the model was not the negotiated independence of 
Algeria, but the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959, or of Mao in China in 1949. This 
perspective became increasingly dominant in MK after Mandela was arrested and imprisoned in 
August 1962.  
Two months after Mandela’s arrest, the ANC’s underground leadership organized a national 
conference of around fifty delegates across the border in Lobatse, Bechuanaland. Chaired by Mbeki, 
and attended by Tambo and other members of the External Mission, as well as delegates from 
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around the country, this was the ANC’s first conference since it had been banned and forced 
underground. It was an emotional gathering. The External Mission’s subsequent report recorded 
how “Men who had last met each other in the treason trial or in the various jails during the state of 
emergency, embraced each other, shook hands. Many delegates described the whole thing as a 
dream.”103 The conference overturned the awkward compromise reached in Tongaat in June 1961 
and formally recognized MK as “the military wing of our struggle.” It acknowledged the sabotage 
campaign as only MK’s “elementary phase” and looked ahead to “the advanced stage of guerrilla 
warfare.” And it declared that the ANC’s objective was “the seizure of political power.”104 The 
“seizure of power,” never previously articulated as the Congress movement’s strategic objective, 
quickly became a favorite phrase in ANC, SACP, and MK circles. “The concept of some form of 
‘seizure of power’ by an armed force,” Rusty Bernstein later wrote, “gradually became the main 
political current of thinking in the ANC and the SACP.” What seizing power meant, Bernstein 
acknowledged, was “never precisely defined.” But leading participants recall a widespread belief in 
this period that victory would mean MK troops marching victoriously into Pretoria.105 
Whether they believed that the ultimate objective was negotiation or the armed seizure of 
power, all members of the MK High Command came to agree that armed struggle should be 
prioritized as the primary form of resistance to apartheid.106 But MK’s leaders nevertheless 
continued to place as much emphasis on the need for sanctions against South Africa as those who 
remained committed to ending apartheid non-violently. MK’s commanders certainly did not believe, 
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as Lutuli did, that sanctions offered the chance of a peaceful transition. Indeed, Mandela may have 
been reacting to the recent publication of Lutuli’s autobiography when he warned in a speech in 
February 1962 in Addis Ababa, during his tour of Africa, that “it would be fatal to create the illusion 
that external pressures render it unnecessary for us to tackle the enemy within.” But in developing 
the armed struggle to the point that it could drive the government to the negotiating table, Mandela 
believed that sanctions could play a crucial role.107 
In Mandela’s public statements throughout the period he was forming and leading MK, he 
repeatedly called on the nations of the world “to sever economic and diplomatic relations” with 
South Africa. In his speech in Ethiopia he discussed in detail the “movement for the boycott of 
South African goods and for the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions against South 
Africa” over the previous three years. “This increasing world pressure on South Africa,” Mandela 
declared, “has greatly weakened her international position and given a tremendous impetus to the 
freedom struggle inside the country.”108 Mandela’s belief in the importance of international pressure 
was reinforced in his discussions with the FLN’s Chawki Mostefaï in Morocco in March 1962. 
Mostefaï explained that initially, when their objective had been military victory, the FLN had 
“concentrated all their energies on armed warfare and neglected the task of mobilising international 
opinion on their side.” It was only when they came to the conclusion that outright military was 
impossible that they had established offices in New York, London, and elsewhere, and began to 
mobilize international support. Mostefaï advised the ANC not to make the same initial mistake, 
Mandela recalled: “Dr [Mostefaï] advised us not to neglect the political side of war while planning 
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the military effort. International public opinion, he said, is sometimes worth more than a fleet of jet 
fighters.”109 
Those in the MK leadership who were committed to the seizure of power attached, if 
anything, even greater importance, to sanctions. This was articulated clearly in “Operation 
Mayibuye,” a plan for an immediate move to guerrilla warfare drafted by Slovo and Mbeki in early 
1963. Operation Mayibuye held out no prospect of a negotiated transition: “the white state has 
thrown overboard every pretence of rule by democratic process. Armed to the teeth it has presented 
the people with only one choice and that is its overthrow by force and violence. It can now truly be 
said that very little, if any, scope exists for the smashing of white supremacy other than by means of 
mass revolutionary action, the main content of which is armed resistance leading to victory by 
military means.” Drawing inspiration from Che Guevara’s account of the success of the Cuban 
revolution, the plan envisaged the landing by air or sea of four groups of thirty guerrillas in four 
different areas of South Africa. The guerrilla operations of these groups would draw in further 
recruits and ultimately spark a “general uprising.”110 
Though the authors of Operation Mayibuye acknowledged the difficulties for a successful 
guerrilla struggle posed by geography, the power and resources of the South African state, and the 
African population’s lack of arms and military training, they argued that these difficulties were 
counterbalanced by the prospect of sanctions and external support for the guerrillas. “In no other 
territory where guerrilla operations have been undertaken,” Slovo and Mbeki wrote, has the 
international situation been such a vital factor operating against the enemy.” Specifically: 
Although we must prepare for a protracted war we must not lose sight of the fact that the 
political isolation of South Africa from the world community of nations and particularly the 
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active hostility towards it from almost the whole of the African continent and the Socialist 
world may result in such massive assistance in various forms that the state structure will 
collapse far sooner than we can at the moment envisage. Direct military intervention in 
South West Africa, an effective economic and military boycott, even armed international 
action at some more advanced stage of the struggle are real possibilities which will play an 
important role. 
If the South African state could be effectively isolated from the rest of the world, it would have “to 
rely in the main on its own resources” to resist the onslaught of the guerrillas. To ensure this, the 
plan provided for the establishment of a Political Authority in a “friendly territory” whose role 
would be not only to raise financial support and organize internal and external propaganda, but also 
to agitate for UN military intervention in South West Africa, to ensure “a complete enforcement of 
boycott,” and to enlist “the support of the international trade union movement to refuse handling 
war materials and other goods intended for the South African Government.”111 
In their optimism that “a complete enforcement of boycott” was possible, the authors of 
Operation Mayibuye were greatly encouraged by fact that on November 6, 1962, the Seventeenth 
Session of the UN General Assembly passed the first UN resolution calling for sanctions. India’s 
role in sabotaging the African draft resolutions in 1961 had been unpopular with African 
governments. The Indian government decided against playing such a role again in 1962, perhaps 
influenced by its need for African support in international fora after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian 
War in October 1962. Without a competing “moderate” resolution to siphon away support, the 
African Group’s sanctions resolution secured the two-thirds majority it needed to pass. The 
operative paragraph requested member states to take the following measures to bring about the 
abandonment of South Africa’s racial policies: 
(a) Breaking off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
or refraining from establishing such relations; 
(b) Closing their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag; 
(c) Enacting legislation prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports; 
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(d) Boycotting all South African goods and refraining from exporting goods, including all 
arms and ammunition, to South Africa; 
(e) Refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government of 
South Africa and companies registered under the laws of South Africa.112 
The resolution was greeted with jubilation by Congress activists in South Africa. MK units in Port 
Elizabeth and Durban carried out bombings that night in celebration.113 So important did the ANC 
and SACP leadership inside the country believe the resolution to be that ANC Secretary General 
(and SACP Central Committee member) Duma Nokwe wrote to Tambo to inform him that the 
movement was establishing an “Information and International Relations Division” inside South 
Africa. Its role was to “expand and buttress the movement for sanctions”: its initial focus would be 
on coordinating campaigns to “stop nations dragging their feet, or defying” the UN resolution. The 
energy that went into this effort in early 1963 – in exactly the same period that Operation Mayibuye 
was being drafted and MK was making logistical preparations for the move to guerrilla war – 
reflected the strategic significance that the internal leadership of the ANC and the SACP attached to 
the imposition of sanctions.114 
 The leadership of the PAC did not share this view. As Pan Africanist leaders were released 
from prison in 1961-62 they reassembled under the leadership of Acting President Potlake Leballo 
in Basutoland (now Lesotho), the landlocked British protectorate in the middle of South Africa. 
Nana Mahomo and Peter Molotsi continued to lobby for sanctions abroad after the dissolution of 
their “United Front” with the ANC in 1962, and they were now joined by Patrick Duncan, the 
fervently anti-communist former member of the Liberal Party who became the PAC’s first and only 
white member. But the PAC headquarters was focused on preparing for immediate popular 
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insurrection inside the country, in which they did not expect international economic action to play a 
significant role. The attitude of most Pan Africanist leaders was summed up in the comment of 
Zeph Mothopeng, a member of the PAC executive, to a visiting journalist in 1962: “Essentially the 
struggle’s here; the world won’t help. The world backs the winning horse.”115 Some Poqo branches 
had already begun carrying out attacks: in November 1962 two hundred and fifty men armed with 
home-made weapons had attacked the police station in Paarl, outside Cape Town. In 1963 Leballo 
began instructing PAC and Poqo members underground in South Africa to prepare for a nationwide 
uprising: on a given day – later fixed as April 7 – each branch would launch simultaneous attacks on 
police stations, power installations, and other strategic points, and begin killing whites 
indiscriminately for four hours.116 
 Neither the guerrilla landings envisaged by the authors of Operation Mayibuye, nor the mass 
insurrection envisaged by Leballo ever took place. In response to the liberation movements’ turn to 
violence, the South African government drastically increased its repressive capabilities in 1962-63. 
Freedom of speech was increasingly restricted and detention without trial was introduced. Police 
torture became routine. In March 1963, the police arrested one of the couriers carrying Leballo’s 
instructions to branches inside South Africa and used the address list to detain more than three 
thousand Poqo suspects. In July, police raided MK’s de facto headquarters at Liliesleaf Farm, 
Rivonia while a meeting to discuss Operation Mayibuye was taking place, and arrested everybody 
present.117 
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III. ‘A policy of total economic sanctions against South Africa is feasible and practical and 
can be effective’: the climax of the campaign for UN sanctions 
The mass arrests of Poqo supporters and the effective decapitation of the leadership of MK marked 
the beginning of the end of attempts to initiate armed resistance from within South Africa. As the 
South African government’s ruthless police operations continued over the next eighteen months, 
both the ANC and the PAC had effectively ceased to exist inside the country by the end of 1964. 
But the MK and Poqo arrests also occurred at the exact moment that international attention to the 
apartheid issue was entering what U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa G. Mennen “Soapy” 
Williams characterized as a “new and decisive phase.”118 
The main impetus for this new phase was the formation of the Organization of African 
Unity in May 1963 by the heads of state and government of the thirty-two African countries that 
were now independent. The OAU’s founding meeting in Addis Ababa, which came after three years 
of acrimonious division of African states into rival groupings, was the first full Conference of 
Independent African States since the meeting in the same city three years earlier that had given the 
sanctions campaign its first major boost at state-level. Now the 1963 conference, which called for an 
“effective boycott” of South Africa and appealed to all states to apply the General Assembly’s 1962 
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sanctions resolution, had an even greater impact.119 Those African states that had not previously 
made formal announcements of cessation of trade with South Africa now did so. Concerned not to 
damage their relations with the newly-coordinated African bloc, many governments in Asia and the 
Eastern bloc followed suit. The OAU also resolved to raise the issue in the Security Council, the 
only international body that could make sanctions mandatory for all states. On July 11, the same day 
that the South African police were arresting the MK leadership at Rivonia, all thirty-two African 
delegations at the UN submitted a letter to the Security Council formally requesting a meeting on 
apartheid.  
 The prospect of renewed consideration of South Africa by the Security Council, for the first 
time since the Sharpeville crisis, created serious dilemmas for the U.S. and U.K. governments. At 
least some British and American policymakers had in fact come to conclusions about the most likely 
means by which the National Party government could be removed that were very similar to those of 
the authors of Operation Mayibuye. They viewed this prospect with alarm, not optimism, however. 
Edward Heath, the British Lord Privy Seal, wrote in June 1963 that in his view “the Nationalists will 
deal ruthlessly and successfully for many years to come with internal risings and indeed guerrilla 
warfare. Only the combination of these with external sanctions could topple them. And finally what 
happens when they are toppled?” The MK High Command and the ANC’s External Mission were, 
of course, working to topple Verwoerd by exactly this combination of guerrilla warfare and 
sanctions. But as Heath’s final question indicated, the prospect of civil war in South Africa and the 
eventual victory of forces in which the SACP played a leading role was one the British and American 
governments were desperately concerned to avoid.120 
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In the view of the British government, then, sanctions would produce an undesirable 
outcome at great cost to the British economy. Internal government papers were explicit that “Our 
main reason for opposing sanctions is the damage which would be caused to our own interests”: 
most importantly, British policymakers feared that a cut-off or decline in British exports to South 
Africa would cause unemployment in Britain and a deterioration in the U.K.’s already precarious 
balance of payments. Britain’s economic and defense stake in South Africa was so extensive that 
British policy continued to be based on the need to “maintain a reasonable working relationship 
with the South African Government because of our special interests” while seeking to avoid “giving 
any impression that Her Majesty’s Government has any sympathy with the policy of apartheid.”121 In 
practice, this focus on maintaining a “working relationship” with the existing government meant that 
Britain remained unwilling to take any action that might antagonize South Africa’s National Party 
rulers.  
U.S. policymakers were frustrated by the British position. American economic interests in 
South Africa were much more limited than those of Britain, and, in the context of the Cold War, the 
U.S. was much more concerned than Britain to maintain good political relations with the other 
independent African states. American policymakers were equally concerned to avoid the racial 
polarization, violent conflict, and opportunities for communist influence that, like the British, they 
believed would be the likely result of the kind of total sanctions regime sought by the African states, 
the liberation movements, and their allies. But they also feared that their opposition to sanctions 
would be a damaging irritant in U.S.-African relations so long as apartheid continued, and so were 
prepared to be much more active than the British in seeking alternatives to sanctions that would 
contribute to ending apartheid. Under President John F. Kennedy, American government policy in 
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fact aimed at achieving a scenario similar to the one that had already become popular among many 
advocates of sanctions: the “creation of a coalition of moderate Nationalists and [white] opposition 
moderates on a basis of agreement on a program for the gradual incorporation of the non-white 
population into the political, social and economic fabric of the country.” But U.S. policymakers 
believed that total trade sanctions would impede rather than enhance the likelihood of such a 
scenario. Instead, they sought to “encourage the [white] moderates and split the right” through a 
combination of diplomatic pressure on the government and quiet encouragement of the white 
opposition.122  
At the same time, American policymakers were concerned to minimize the damage to 
relations with African states that this opposition to sanctions would cause and, in particular, to avoid 
vetoing an economic sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council. As the African governments 
were well aware – and hoped to exploit – the U.S. government prided itself on never having 
exercised its Security Council veto and had in the past castigated the Soviet Union for frequently 
doing so.123 Acutely aware of the worldwide attention and criticism of ongoing segregation in the 
United States, American policymakers were especially anxious not to be placed in the position of 
having to veto a resolution on an issue concerned with race. Discussing the issue with Macmillan in 
June 1963, weeks after he had announced his intention to submit a new civil rights bill to Congress, 
Kennedy commented that “it would look odd if he was preaching desegregation at home and voting 
in favour of apartheid abroad.”124  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 United States Information Service, Country Plan: South Africa, October 1963, Folder: ‘INF - INFO ACTIVITIES 
(INTERNATL) 1965: INF 1 Gen Policy. Reports. USIA,’ Box 4029, Central Foreign Policy File (CFPF) 1963, RG59, 
USNA. 
123 “Note on African Unity, the United Nations, and the Role of Ghana,” 17 July 1963, SC/BAA/385, Ghana PRAAD; 
Mazower, Governing the World, 270. 
124 “Record of Meeting,” 30 June 1963, PREM 11/5113, UKNA, Kew. See also Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: 
Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 152-202. 
 231 
 These dilemmas came to a head when the African states requested a Security Council 
meeting in July. Within the U.S. government, Assistant Secretary Williams advocated strenuously 
that the U.S. should support an arms embargo against South Africa in the deliberations at the UN: it 
was, he argued, “the least the United States can do to maintain our position of influence with the 
Africans and our ability to prevent more and violent action on their part.” A modified version of 
Williams’ position was initially accepted within the U.S. government. Warning that the South African 
problem was a “heavy burden” that threatened America’s global strategic interests and that “a rough 
time was ahead” in the Security Council, Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed the South African 
ambassador on July 17 that the U.S. might support a non-mandatory Security Council embargo on 
arms that could be used to enforce apartheid. Rusk also warned the ambassador that the U.S. was 
considering ending all arms sales to South Africa after the end of 1963, but that this would not be 
part of the UN resolution.125 
The U.S. delegation in fact proved unable to maintain this position in what one official called 
“the fast moving events in the Security Council” in early August. The initial draft resolution 
submitted by the African states had included a boycott of South African goods, and in negotiating to 
get all economic and diplomatic sanctions removed from the draft, the United States conceded a 
non-mandatory embargo on all arms, which the U.S. itself would observe. Suspecting that the 
Americans would “waver” on this point, British policymakers had already decided not to exercise 
their own veto. A survey of the British High Commissioners to the African members of the 
Commonwealth had concluded that a British veto of an arms embargo resolution that was not also 
vetoed by the U.S. would provoke serious retaliation against Britain. Britain would therefore allow 
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the passage of a non-mandatory arms embargo resolution in the Security Council, by abstaining, if it 
was “the price of avoiding economic sanctions.” Since the resolution was non-mandatory, Britain 
was not required to end all arms sales to South Africa. The British government announced that it 
would cease selling weapons that could be used domestically to enforce apartheid, but would not 
halt arms sales for South Africa’s external defense.126  
Though Britain and the U.S. were thus able to use the concession of the voluntary arms 
embargo resolution to avoid a veto in August, the African Group at the UN immediately renewed its 
pressure for further Security Council action that this time would be both mandatory and cause much 
more substantial damage to the South African economy. Rather than calling for a total cessation of 
all trade, the African governments focused their attention on an embargo on oil sales: since South 
Africa had no domestic oil sources, oil embargo advocates believed this measure could quickly cause 
massive economic dislocation. The British and American governments apparently expected that the 
African states would force an oil embargo resolution to a vote in the Security Council, and that 
despite Anglo-American lobbying efforts, they would be unable to secure the five abstentions 
necessary to kill the resolution without a veto. Still acutely aware of the “high political cost of casting 
our first veto on a racial issue,” the Americans in fact planned to abstain, safe in the knowledge that 
British would veto alone: Kennedy had somewhat disingenuously tried to reassure U.K. Foreign 
Secretary Alec Douglas-Home in October that “the UK should not be too disturbed at the idea of a 
veto.”  British officials were of course disturbed by the prospect that a veto would do “irreparable 
damage to our relations with African and other Commonwealth countries,” but still saw this as 
preferable to a Security Council mandatory oil embargo, given Britain’s economic interest in South 
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Africa.127  
Ultimately, however, Britain was saved from vetoing by the African states’ unexpected 
acceptance of a Norwegian counter-proposal. Under domestic pressure to take more forceful action 
against apartheid, but fearful that the issue of sanctions against South Africa could undermine the 
UN in the way that sanctions against Italy had undermined the League of Nations, the Scandinavian 
governments sought to find a middle-ground between the Anglo-American and African positions. 
On December 4, 1963, the Security Council therefore unanimously adopted a Norwegian-drafted 
resolution requesting the UN Secretary General to establish “a small group of recognized experts to 
examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa through full, peaceful and 
orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all inhabitants of the territory as a 
whole, regardless of race, colour or creed, and to consider what part the United Nations might play 
in the achievement of that end.” Secretary General U Thant appointed Alva Myrdal of Sweden to 
chair the Group of Experts, whose other members were Sir Hugh Foot of Britain, Edward Asafu-
Adjaye of Ghana, Josip Djerdja of Yugoslavia, and Dey Ould Sidi Baba of Morocco. E.S. Reddy, a 
UN civil servant from India who also served as Principal Secretary of the “Special Committee on the 
Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa” that had been created by 
the General Assembly’s November 1962 resolution, was appointed to serve as the Group’s 
secretary.128 
 The ANC leadership was initially deeply skeptical of the Group. Oliver Tambo accurately 
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perceived British and American support for its establishment as a delaying tactic to avoid sanctions, 
and was concerned by its apparent focus on allaying white South African fears of political change.129 
But the five-month period of the Group’s deliberations in fact marked the apogee of the anti-
apartheid campaign for a UN sanctions regime. Myrdal herself was sympathetic to the idea of 
sanctions. Her “personal idea,” she wrote in February 1964, was that sanctions should not be 
thought of as a “punishment” or a “squeeze” but were comparable to a credible nuclear threat: if the 
Security Council demonstrated such a “determined preparedness to introduce swift, massive 
measures” to cripple the South African economy, she believed that the South African government 
would quickly concede the Council’s demands even before sanctions were actually imposed.130 
Reddy, meanwhile, was able to use the connections he had built up through the Special Committee 
to ensure that the Group of Experts heard directly from representatives of the liberation movements 
and other non-governmental opponents of apartheid. At Reddy’s instigation Myrdal reached out to 
Tambo to reassure him about the Group’s intentions, and the “Experts” subsequently held 
consultations with Tambo, Nana Mahomo, Yusuf Dadoo, and others. Mary Benson, the former 
secretary of the Africa Bureau, who had published a sympathetic history of the ANC the previous 
year, was recruited to do research and drafting for the Group.131   
The investigations by the Group of Experts also coincided with the “International 
Conference on Economic Sanctions Against South Africa” convened in London from April 14 to 17 
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by Ronald Segal, the former magazine editor who had been one of the earliest South African 
advocates of external economic boycotts, and who had settled in Britain after his escape with 
Tambo after Sharpeville. With the assistance of the AAM and the ANC, and sponsorship from 
several African governments, Segal succeeded in bringing together more than two hundred and fifty 
delegates and observers – including official delegations from thirty countries and “unofficial 
delegations” from another fourteen – to discuss the papers he had commissioned from academic 
experts on various aspects of sanctions.  
Unsurprisingly given their diverse backgrounds, the various experts and delegates envisioned 
sanctions working in different ways. Two of the expert papers made explicit that were at least two 
quite distinct possible objectives: “to bring pressure to bear on the current regime so drastically to 
modify its policies that world public opinion is satisfied” or “to produce, by economic means, such a 
situation in South Africa that anti-Government elements are able to acquire power and so bring 
about a revolution in the social order.”132 The conference as a whole did not settle on a single model 
of change: one of the “commissions” into which conference delegates divided for discussions 
concluded that sanctions were “the sole hope of ending the apartheid system in South Africa 
without the use of force” while another concluded that “it would be unrealistic to suppose that 
violence can be avoided” and that the purpose of sanctions was to enable violent resistance to 
apartheid to triumph more quickly.133 But though they differed on how sanctions would work, the 
conference delegates agreed that “a policy of total economic sanctions against South Africa is 
feasible and practical and can be effective.”134 
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The report submitted by the Group of Experts to the Secretary General on 20 April 1964 
proved to be a “happy surprise” for Tambo and other advocates of sanctions. Its primary 
recommendation was that the South African government should call a National Convention, “fully 
representative of the whole population of South Africa,” to negotiate the country’s future. The 
report advised, moreover, that the Security Council should initiate a study of the logistics of 
imposing effective and universally-implemented economic sanctions. Quoting extensively from the 
papers delivered at Segal’s conference in London the previous week (to which the UN experts had 
been given advance access), the Group’s report argued that sanctions should be imposed by the 
Security Council if the South African government refused to cooperate in calling a National 
Convention.135 
The combination of the report of the Group of Experts and the papers delivered at Segal’s 
conference, meant, wrote Tambo in May 1964, that “a powerful case for action by the Security 
Council” could now be made out.136 Hopes that such international action was imminent were further 
reinforced by the outcome in June 1964 of the Rivonia Trial of Nelson Mandela and the MK 
leadership captured at Liliesleaf Farm. When Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, and the other convicted 
defendants received life sentences, many anti-apartheid activists were convinced that it was the 
international mobilization around the trial that had saved them from the gallows. The defendants 
themselves, Govan Mbeki wrote during the trial, had been “tremendously encouraged by the world-
wide support which our cause is receiving” and had been “reading with great interest the 
demonstrations of solidarity shown.” In a letter to Ruth First, who was now in exile in Britain, one 
white radical still in South Africa captured the mood of optimism the international response to the 
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trial engendered: Now we have entered the post-Rivonia era, and I feel it’s a point where the tide is 
turning in our favour… I have been thinking about it a lot, and have never felt as optimistic as now. 
The reaction to the trial internationally, was historic, and I think the reason for our blokes not 
getting the death penalty… I’ve always been one of those who felt the outcome of the struggle at 
home will decide things etc, and felt too much reliance on overseas pressure was a danger. But now 
I’m beginning to think that this is a unique situation, that the part played abroad is as vital as the part 
played here. The trial has shown it…”137 
What one ANC activist called the “tremendous effectiveness” of the international campaign 
to save the lives of the Rivonia accused thus further raised expectations in mid-1964 that the 
combination of pressure from the African states at the UN with public mobilization in the West 
could bring about the imposition of a UN sanctions regime with the support the Western powers. 
Even the Rivonia triallists sentenced to life imprisonment remained optimistic. The defense lawyers 
believed that out of the eight defendants convicted Ahmed Kathrada had the best chance of 
overturning his conviction on appeal, but Kathrada decided against, preferring, he explained, “to 
take his chance on liberation five or ten years hence when the liberation movement changed the 
government.138 
In fact, however, April 1964 turned out to have been the high water mark of the campaign 
for UN sanctions against South Africa. Hilda Bernstein, whose husband Rusty was at the time one 
of the accused in the Rivonia trial and who herself was on the Central Committee of the SACP, had 
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predicted in January 1964 that for the western powers “a choice between South Africa and the rest 
of Africa will have to be made. They may yet choose to abandon their evil partner [to UN 
sanctions], or may find themselves knocking at the doors of all of Africa [in vain].” ANC policy 
focused on seeking to force the western powers to make exactly this choice: writing later in the year, 
another ANC writer argued that there was a “need for intensified activities at the United Nations 
and outside to win changes in the policies of the Western countries,” above all by making “western 
support of apartheid… completely incompatible with other western aims and activities in Africa.” 
Specifically, the ANC called on the African leaders who met for the OAU’s second summit in Cairo 
in July 1964 to increase the pressure on the western powers by imposing a secondary boycott of 
western firms that traded with South Africa, modeled on the secondary boycott operated by the 
Arab League against Israel.139 
African leaders were extremely wary, however, that such action would cause greater damage 
to their own economies than to those of Britain and the U.S. The Cairo Summit established a 
“Bureau of Sanctions” modeled on the Arab League’s “Central Boycott Office,” and assigned it “to 
collect and disseminate information about governmental and private financial, economic and 
commercial institutions, which trade with South Africa.” But there was no agreement on what 
should be done with this information. Indeed, some African governments, including the government 
of Nigeria, refused even to circulate a questionnaire to American firms in Lagos about their relations 
with South Africa, fearing that this would damage Nigeria’s ability to attract foreign investment. 
Other African governments did approach western firms that operated in their countries and ask 
them to minimize trade with South Africa. But none were prepared to implement a secondary 
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boycott to compel such action. The Central Intelligence Agency reported reassuringly to the U.S. 
government immediately after the summit, that “the great majority of the frail new African states 
can probably be expected to move only slowly and with close regard for the effects on their own 
interests” of a secondary boycott.140 
 Confident that the African states lacked the economic leverage to impose a secondary 
boycott, the British and American governments continued their efforts to avoid being placed in the 
position of having to veto a sanctions resolution. After the unanticipated and unwelcome 
endorsement of sanctions by the Security Council’s own Group of Experts, the U.S. and the U.K. 
settled next on a delaying measure over which they had much tighter control. The U.S. therefore 
proposed to accept the Group’s recommendation of a study of the logistics of imposing effective 
and universally-implemented economic sanctions, and to agree that the Security Council should 
establish an “Expert Committee on Measures” in order to do this. This time, however, the “Expert 
Committee” was to be composed not of independent – and uncontrollable – “experts” but of 
representatives of each of the member states of the Security Council at the time. In this way, as one 
State Department official argued, the western powers would be able to “avoid losing control of this 
issue,” while also buying further time.141 The Committee on Measures met thirty-eight times between 
July 1964 and February 1965, when it adopted – by a narrow 6-4 vote – a majority report that 
satisfied the U.S. desire for “a report which did not foreclose the possibility of sanctions but which 
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set forth plainly the enormous problems attendant” on such a policy.142  
Even before the Committee on Measures had reported in March 1965, the high hopes 
entertained by sanctions advocates in April-June 1964 had been begun to ebb. As early as October 
that year E.S. Reddy wrote from the UN to warn Tambo that “the situation is going to get worse, 
and there will not be very ‘effective’ international action for quite some time to come.”143 The idea 
that effective international action against apartheid meant a UN-backed regime of governmental 
economic sanctions had rapidly come to the forefront of external anti-apartheid campaigning after 
Sharpeville. More gradually, between 1960 and 1963 most African and Eastern Bloc states had 
formally imposed unilateral trade sanctions themselves. But despite securing a General Assembly 
appeal for multilateral sanctions in November 1962, the advocates of sanctions were unable to find a 
way to secure the acquiescence of South Africa’s major western trading partners in such a regime.  
Writing in February 1965, Maindy Msimang, the ANC’s Administrative Officer, who had 
just been placed in charge of the Congress’s sanctions campaign, dismissed the General Assembly’s 
November 1962 sanctions resolution as “nothing more than an emotional expression of anger.” “I 
become convinced,” Msimang concluded, “each time I have to plough through the history of 
sanctions that the mistake, for which the apparent ineffectiveness of sanctions can be accounted, is 
that sanctions have hitherto been conceived and directed at State level.”144 Having failed to secure 
state-level sanctions through the UN, in the second half of the 1960s the Congress movement would 
come to accord much less strategic significance to external economic pressures. Western anti-
apartheid activists, meanwhile, would redirect their focus from states to non-state actors. 
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New Targets, New Tactics, 1965-1970 
 
At noon on March 19, 1965, several hundred protesters picketed the gleaming skyscraper that 
housed the world headquarters of Chase Manhattan Bank, in the heart of New York’s financial 
district. Many of the picketers wore buttons or carried signs reading “CHASE MANHATTAN – 
PARTNER IN APARTHEID.” Holding hands, with their arms crossed in front of their bodies, 
they sang freedom songs from the American civil rights movement and handed out flyers to passers-
by requesting depositors to withdraw their accounts from Chase. The demonstration had been 
planned by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), an organization then just establishing itself as 
one of the leading groups of the American “new left.” The protest was co-sponsored by groups 
including the National Student Christian Federation (NSCF) and three organizations prominent in 
the domestic civil rights struggle in the United States: the Congress of Racial Equality, the Northern 
Students’ Movement, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). While the 
picketers marched and sang outside, a delegation from the sponsoring groups met inside with the 
vice chairman of the bank, to present their demand that Chase “cease all loans to the racist South 
African government.” When the bank official rejected their ultimatum, forty-nine protesters staged a 
sit-in, blocking the sidewalk in front of the entrance to the building. Ignoring police instructions to 
move on, they locked arms and continued singing “We Shall Overcome.” As they were arrested they 
went limp, forcing police to carry them to the waiting paddy wagons.1 
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 The sit-in at Chase Manhattan that March afternoon may not have been “one of the truly 
most exciting political events of the decade,” as one of the SDS organizers had predicted the 
previous month.2 In the United States it was overshadowed by the civil rights protests that preceded 
it and the protests against the Vietnam War that followed. Even histories of the external struggle 
against apartheid either do not mention it, or reference it only in passing.3 But the sit-in nevertheless 
represented the beginning of a significant shift in both the targets and the tactics of anti-apartheid 
activism in the west. Over the previous four years opponents of apartheid in the U.S. and Britain 
had been focused on securing the participation of their governments in a UN regime of sanctions on 
trade with South Africa. Grassroots anti-apartheid activities intended to generate public support for 
this demand had focused on trade too: consumer boycotts targeted imported South African goods 
and symbolic industrial boycotts targeted ships carrying cargo from South Africa.  
Campaigns targeting western firms that had direct or indirect investments in South Africa 
had not been a significant element of the struggle against apartheid before 1965. In late 1963 and 
early 1964 the Anti-Apartheid Movement in London and the American Committee in Africa in New 
York had both published exposés of the extent to which British and American firms with 
investments in South Africa were “partners” or “collaborators” in apartheid. But these exposés were 
intended to generate outrage that would put pressure on the U.S. and U.K. governments to impose 
comprehensive trade sanctions. Neither called for a general policy of disinvestment.4 Indeed, far 
from calling for the withdrawal of investment, AAM publicity materials in 1964 presented trade 
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sanctions as the “the last weapon short of violent revolution which can bring an end to apartheid” 
and therefore as the best means of preventing the loss of British investments in South Africa. 
“Incomes from investment in South Africa would obviously cease during the limited period of 
sanctions,” the AAM argued. But that investment itself would not be endangered, as it might be if 
trade sanctions were not imposed and civil war consequently broke out.5 
From 1965, opponents of apartheid in the west began to shift away from their previous 
focus on pressuring western governments to participate in a regime of comprehensive trade 
sanctions that would quickly devastate the South African economy. SDS’s protest at Chase took 
place less than three weeks after the publication of the inconclusive report on sanctions by the UN 
Security Council’s “Expert Committee on Measures.” As the sanctions campaign at the United 
Nations stalled, both the independent African states and the South African liberation movements 
became rapidly disillusioned with the UN as an institution and with trade embargoes imposed by 
western governments as an effective weapon in the struggle against apartheid.  
The liberation movements now came to focus increasingly exclusively on armed struggle as 
the only means by which apartheid could be ended. This was the beginning of the period when the 
attitude of the ANC and the PAC was characterized – as former Drum magazine writer Lewis Nkosi 
put it – by “indifference or hidden hostility… to any form of struggle which is not directly 
concerned with the gun.”6 Anti-apartheid activists in the west grappled with how to respond to the 
challenges posed by their inability to influence their own governments and by this new attitude on 
the part of the liberation movements. In the U.K., for instance, the AAM’s annual report observed 
in September 1967 that “many of the [Movement’s] assumptions about the possibilities of winning 
advances in Britain’s policies, about the adequacy and effectiveness of economic sanctions as an 
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instrument of international policy, [and] about the role of the United Nations in this respect” had 
now come “under heavy scrutiny and questioning.”7 The campaign for the boycott of South Africa 
might have ceased to be such a prominent feature of external anti-apartheid activity at this point. 
That it did not was due in large part to the initiatives of new left groups like SDS in the United 
States, and the Haslemere Group and the Young Liberals in Britain. These groups shared the 
established anti-apartheid organizations’ disillusionment with efforts to exert direct influence on 
western governments. Their concern about the domestic and global power of multinational 
corporations, and their commitment to challenging that power through “direct action” reshaped and 
reinvigorated the campaign to boycott South Africa by shifting its immediate target from 
governments to non-governmental bodies. 
 
 
I. ‘The UN has been revealed as a weak, indecisive body’: The Collapse of the Campaign for 
a UN Sanctions Regime 
 
In 1964 opponents of apartheid had been optimistic that the Security Council would soon accede to 
the demands of the African Group at the UN and impose a mandatory regime of comprehensive 
trade sanctions against South Africa. These high hopes dissipated rapidly after the Security Council’s 
Committee on Measures published its inconclusive report in March 1965. In September 1967, a 
report from the Organization of African Unity’s “Liberation Committee” remarked that when the 
OAU had had been formed four years before, there had been a general belief among African 
nationalists that colonialism and imperialism were “on the retreat.” “To-day, however,” the report 
went on, “the movement for the extension of freedom and independence and the whole process of 
decolonisation has met with serious set-backs.” Others shared this assessment. An August 1966  
secret report by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was titled “South Africa on the Crest of the 
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Wave.” South Africa had made “a phenomenal recovery in almost every respect from the nadir” 
after Sharpeville, the report concluded. The threat of further pressure was receding rapidly. And the 
National Party had further consolidated its grip on power, winning more seats than ever (126 out of 
166).8 
Despite their disappointment with the report of the Committee on Measures, the African 
states had planned to call a Security Council meeting to discuss the imposition of sanctions in the 
second half of 1965. But this never happened: the Council – and the African delegations at the UN 
– were preoccupied first with the war in August-September between India and Pakistan over 
Kashmir, and then with the “Unilateral Declaration of Independence” (UDI) by white settlers in the 
British colony of Southern Rhodesia.9 The foreign ministers of Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, 
and Tunisia, whom the OAU heads of government had deputed to handle the South African issue at 
the UN, then decided to wait for what they expected to be a favorable decision in the ongoing South 
West Africa case at the International Court of Justice. As we have seen, the African leaders who had 
decided to launch the case in 1960 had always viewed it as an additional way of securing western 
governments’ participation in a sanctions regime against South Africa, since Article 94 of the United 
Nations Charter empowered the Security Council to enforce compliance with ICJ judgments. No 
one had expected the case to drag on for six years, however, and for much of that period, African 
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leaders had taken little interest in the drawn-out proceedings.10 But the four foreign ministers now 
hoped that – given the U.S. government’s commitment in this period to upholding the Court’s 
authority – a favorable decision by the ICJ would enable them “to tie the problem of South Africa 
and South West Africa in asking the Security Council to impose sanctions against South Africa.”11  
This was precisely the situation that both the British and American governments were 
determined to avoid. The British government, less invested in the authority of the Court and with 
much larger economic interests in South Africa, remained prepared to veto any Security Council 
resolution imposing sanctions. The U.S. government meanwhile hoped it would be possible to avoid 
undermining the ICJ so blatantly. Expecting that the Court would rule that South Africa’s 
administration of South West Africa was not being conducted in accordance with the original 
League of Nations mandate, American policymakers planned to deflect calls for immediate Security 
Council action by pressuring the South African government sufficiently to alter its policies in South 
West Africa as to render the question of enforcement measures irrelevant.12  
In any event, the expected showdown over the ICJ ruling never occurred. To the surprise of 
policymakers in both Washington and in African capitals, when the Court finally announced its 
judgment in July 1966, the justices reversed one of their earlier decisions and ruled 8–7 that Ethiopia 
and Liberia did not, after all, have legal standing to challenge South Africa’s administration of South 
West Africa. Though wrangling over the status of South West Africa continued in the General 
Assembly, the ruling effectively marked the end of the African states’ effort to secure a Security 
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Council-mandated sanctions regime. In November 1966 the four foreign ministers reported to the 
annual summit of OAU heads of state and government that they had concluded after the ICJ’s 
judgment that calling a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss South Africa should be 
“deferred to a more propitious time.” In the event, the Security Council did not formally meet to 
discuss the issue of South Africa’s domestic racial policies again until 1970.13 
 In part this decision reflected mounting disillusion with the United Nations as an institution. 
The high hopes entertained in the early 1960s that the emergence of a postcolonial majority in the 
General Assembly would be sufficient to transform the UN into a vehicle for promoting African 
states’ interests and agendas were dashed on the rock of the vetoes held by the permanent members 
of the Security Council. A February 1967 joint report by the Algerian and Zambian foreign ministers 
on the ongoing Rhodesian crisis concluded that efforts to secure majority rule through the Security 
Council were “fruitless”: “by its very structure,” the report concluded, the Security Council was “a 
hopeless forum.” By that time, both the ANC and the PAC had likewise abandoned any hope that 
the UN could be a significant factor in their strategies for liberating South Africa.14 Indeed, this 
disillusionment had set in among the leaders of the liberation movements even before the ICJ ruling, 
in which the four OAU foreign ministers had continued to place some hope. “The UN, from which 
much was expected, has been revealed as a weak, indecisive body,” observed exiled Congress leaders 
Yusuf Dadoo, Joe Matthews, and Joe Slovo in an analysis of the “Problems of the Congress 
Movement” in mid 1966. Not only had the campaign for sanctions against South Africa stalled, but 
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the UN’s failure to restrain the massive escalation of American involvement in the Vietnam War 
during 1965, to end Rhodesia’s UDI, and to “protect the territory of member states against 
aggression by Israel” during the Six Day War of June 1967 all highlighted to Congress observers 
“the weaknesses of the world organization” and the unlikelihood of a Security Council-mandated 
sanctions regime.15 
 Within the PAC there had always been much greater ambivalence about the significance of 
the UN and about the campaign for international sanctions. But in the course of 1964-65, the 
individuals within the organization who had taken the greatest interest in securing international 
action were removed from leadership positions. As the PAC was forced by the authorities in 
Basutoland to move its headquarters from the British-ruled protectorate to independent Tanzania in 
1964-65, members of the leadership group around Acting President Potlake Leballo came into 
conflict with those who had been staffing the Party’s diplomatic apparatus. Nana Mahomo and Peter 
Molotsi, who had represented the PAC abroad almost singlehandedly in the two years after 
Sharpeville, were among the early victims of the factionalism that would ultimately cripple the PAC 
as a political force. Both men were suspended after disputes with Leballo over the administration of 
the Party’s finances. Patrick Duncan, who had later joined Mahomo in lobbying for sanctions in the 
west, was removed from his position as PAC representative in Algiers for allegedly carrying out “a 
one man crusade against the People’s Republic of China.” (Duncan had apparently pointed out that 
China – on which the PAC was becoming increasingly dependent for external support – was 
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purchasing maize from South Africa despite publicly claiming to adhere to sanctions).16  
The tensions in the PAC over the role of the UN were resolved in late 1966, after two 
members of the PAC executive, A.B. Ngcobo and Peter Raboroko, presented papers at a UN 
seminar in Brazil that called for the UN to intervene militarily in South Africa to end apartheid. The 
PAC leadership suspended Ngcobo and Raboroko, and released a statement repudiating their call 
for military intervention. It was a “contradiction in terms,” the PAC statement declared, “to enlist 
the aid of imperialist dominated body like the UNO for the purpose of waging an anti-imperialist 
struggle.” The history of the UN’s military interventions in Korea in the early fifties and in the 
Congo in the early sixties – as well as the UN’s record of “abstentionism” when called upon to act in 
southern Africa, Dominica, Vietnam, and elsewhere – showed that the organization’s “control 
machinery” was “dominated by the imperialist nations.” Indeed, the PAC now argued that paying 
too much attention to the “impotent” UN was harmful to the liberation struggle, since “all the talks 
[sic] of the imperialists in this body is designed to divert the oppressed masses from the 
revolutionary road, so that they may place their destinies in the hands of their enemies, and merely 
use the UNO as a safety valve of their grievances.”17 
Of course both African diplomats and the leaders of the liberation movements had always 
been aware of the UN Charter’s institutionalization of great-power privilege. What had changed was 
their estimation of the African states’ ability to generate sufficient leverage to compel the veto-
wielding great powers to accede to their demands. The four OAU foreign ministers implicitly 
recognized this weakness when they reported to the OAU summit in November 1966 that they had 
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concluded from informal soundings that the Security Council’s permanent members were “not yet 
prepared to go any further than they have gone so far against South Africa.”18 As we have seen, 
African governments had already shown by the end of 1964 that they were unwilling to countenance 
the economic losses that would be incurred in a secondary economic boycott of the U.S. and Britain. 
The Rhodesian crisis the following year revealed that even outside the economic sphere the OAU 
was unable to co-ordinate secondary boycott action against the western powers. Immediately after 
the Rhodesian UDI, the OAU Council of Ministers resolved that all member states would break 
their diplomatic relations with Britain if the British government had not suppressed the rebellion by 
December 15, 1965. But of the OAU’s thirty-six members, only nine (Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, and Tanzania) subsequently broke relations when 
the deadline passed.19 
 The amount of leverage the African states could wield was even further reduced by the 
string of military coups, in Algeria in June 1965, Congo-Kinshasa in November 1965, Dahomey in 
December 1965, and the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria in January 1966. Most 
notably of all, in February 1966 army officers in Ghana overthrew Kwame Nkrumah, once the 
figurehead of African independence. In Washington, senior National Security Council official 
Robert Komer welcomed the coups as signaling “the beginning of the second phase of modern 
African history.” For Komer, this new phase was “a healthy one, because the dreams and myths 
which accompanied independence are being replaced by the realization that austerity and hard work 
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are required for survival.”20 Certainly the coups shattered anti-apartheid activists’ hopes that the 
OAU would play a significant role in liberating South Africa, further undermining the ability of the 
African states to act collectively against apartheid. From the UN, E.S. Reddy reported that the coups 
had a “disastrous effect” on all the African delegations, and that the African Group “ceased to be a 
dynamic force.” Even convening meetings of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid 
became difficult.21  
In Africa itself, the coups further exacerbated conflicts among the postcolonial states. In 
October 1966 Ghana’s new military government detained the entire Guinean delegation while it was 
en route to the OAU Council of Ministers, in retaliation for Guinea granting asylum to Nkrumah 
and some of his supporters. In a similar incident a year later, both the Guinean foreign minister and 
Achkar Marof, Guinea’s ambassador to the UN and the chairman of the UN Special Committee on 
Apartheid, were arrested when their plane landed in Cote d’Ivoire on their way back from the 
General Assembly. Unsurprisingly, the OAU’s influence in international politics declined amidst 
such tensions. Already in March 1966, one member of Zambia’s delegation to the OAU was 
dismissing the organization as “a toothless bulldog” that was “unwittingly snarling at its own 
reflection in the water, whilst the carrion crows of imperialism and neo-colonialism dig their beaks 
and claws into its wounds.”22 
 The South African liberation movements were if anything even more damning in their 
assessment of the postcolonial African states. In the early sixties South African activists’ optimism 
had been inspired in large part by the decolonization of much of Africa and the support 
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independent Africa was expected to give to the liberation struggle. But in 1966 opponents of 
apartheid faced “a fundamentally new situation,” as Dadoo, Matthews and Slovo observed in their 
analysis of the “Problems of the Congress Movement.” This new situation included the fact that 
“Compared to the position in 1961-62 Africa has been shown to be an unstable factor as an aid and 
assistance to our struggle”: the OAU was divided, “progressive governments” like Nkrumah’s had 
been overthrown, and large-scale material assistance had not been forthcoming.23 The PAC, which 
had benefitted from Nkrumah’s support but was promptly expelled from Ghana after his 
overthrow, was even more strident in its denunciation of the “deterioration” of the OAU, a body 
“in which such high hopes had been placed at the time of its inception.”24 
Both the ANC and the PAC attributed this deterioration to “imperialism,” a concept that 
they now came to invoke routinely to characterize the international role of the western powers, and 
above all the United States and Britain. The flurry of African coups in 1965-66 – characterized by 
Azania News, the PAC’s official journal, as “tele-guided and stage-managed by imperialism” – were 
seen by members of both liberation movements as part of “a world-wide wave of reaction and 
counter-revolution.” In such circumstances, little could be expected from the OAU in the struggle 
against apartheid. Reporting on the “all-time low ebb” of the annual OAU summit of heads of state 
and government in November 1966, the editor of Azania News commented that several African 
leaders attending the conference were “the marionettes of the imperial powers” – while General 
Joseph Ankrah, Nkrumah’s successor as president of Ghana – was “a music hall general lashed to 
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the chariot of imperialism.”25 The ANC and the PAC continued to rely heavily on the goodwill of 
certain African states, especially Tanzania and Zambia, which hosted the headquarters and much of 
the diplomatic and military apparatuses of both movements. But they believed the material 
assistance they received from the OAU’s Liberation Committee was totally inadequate.26 And they 
no longer expected that the OAU’s members would be capable of acting collectively to bring about 
serious economic damage to South Africa.  
  Both the ANC and the PAC continued to view the various bodies of the United Nations as 
useful forums in which they could try to shape international public opinion, and, above all, to 
publicize their need for material assistance. But – as the official PAC statement repudiating Ngcobo 
and Raboroko put it – “Until the balance of world forces in the UNO is corrected to correspond to 
the realities of the world outside, we do not a assign a greater role than this to the world body.”27 
The leaders of both liberation movements shifted their attention elsewhere. As early as February 
1965 E.S. Reddy complained to ANC deputy president Oliver Tambo that “you are not pushing 
your own issue [at the UN] but leaving it to others.” Over the remainder of the decade Reddy 
repeatedly expressed his frustration that the UN had “not been used enough” by the southern 
African liberation movements. Neither the ANC nor the PAC maintained a permanent office in 
New York, and in several years in the second half of the sixties neither movement bothered to send 
representatives to attend the annual sessions of the General Assembly. Reddy complained to Tambo 
that for more than two years after the Security Council’s last meeting on South Africa in June 1964, 
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he had received “very little advice from your people on what can usefully be done by the UN.”28 
 By 1966-67 many elements of the anti-apartheid coalition that had united around the 
demand for sanctions were coming not only to recognize that they were unable to mobilize the 
leverage necessary to achieve a sanctions regime, but also to question whether a sanctions regime 
would – even if imposed – be effective in helping end apartheid. This was primarily a consequence 
of the Rhodesian crisis. For many opponents of apartheid, the attractiveness of sanctions as an 
instrument was tarnished almost immediately by the British government’s decision to impose 
sanctions against the rebel colony instead of using military force to suppress UDI, as the OAU 
demanded. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s refusal to suppress the settlers’ rebellion with 
force led many African leaders to accuse Britain of colluding with the rebel regime. Wilson’s 
advocacy of sanctions instead of military intervention came to be seen as an element of that 
collusion and thus helped to discredit the very idea of sanctions as a response to the white minority 
regimes in southern Africa. 
Moreover, sanctions – imposed first by Britain and later made mandatory by the Security 
Council – failed to bring about a quick end to Rhodesia’s UDI. Just as many advocates of sanctions 
against South Africa had expected that they would contribute to a rapid collapse of apartheid, 
Wilson had characterized the imposition of sanctions as a “quick kill” operation that would end the 
rebellion “within a matter of weeks rather than months.” When this did not happen, many 
opponents of apartheid began to doubt whether sanctions would be any more effective in 
undermining the South African regime. In March 1967, for instance, the AAM circulated a paper by 
R.B. Sutcliffe, a radical economist at the University of Oxford who had studied the Rhodesian 
economy. Sutcliffe argued that not only was it unlikely that the western powers would impose 
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sanctions against South Africa, but also that – even if they did – South Africa was likely to be able to 
“survive” a sanctions regime. Sanctions, Sutcliffe suggested, might be able to compel the South 
African government to make changes to specific policies, such as to stop supplying oil to Rhodesia. 
But the rebel Rhodesian regime’s ability to withstand the sanctions imposed after UDI suggested 
that “When a whole political system, the existence of a privileged racial oligarchy, in short a whole 
social and political order is at stake, as it has been in Rhodesia, then the damage to the order that can 
be inflicted will probably not diminish resistance to the imposers of sanctions.”29 
 Observing the apparent failure of sanctions against Rhodesia, ANC and PAC leaders came 
to assign much less strategic significance to sanctions than they had previously. “Imperialism will not 
overthrow itself,” argued one writer in Azania News in May 1967. The failure of the oil embargo to 
bring about the collapse of the Smith regime showed that the PAC “must cast away illusions that 
economic sanctions are the answer to liberation even if they include oil. Revolutionary force and 
violence is the only answer.”30 After ANC fighters joined guerrillas from the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) in launching an incursion into the Wankie (now Hwange) game park on 
Rhodesia’s western border in August 1967, the Central Committee of the SACP expressed an almost 
identical conclusion in an internal Party circular: “The first few months of guerrilla struggle, though 
restricted in scale, have already done more to shake the Smith regime than two years of United 
Nations ‘sanctions’ which have been flaunted with impunity by the Republic of South Africa and 
other imperialist powers, including Britain herself.” For the Central Committee there was a clear 
“lesson”: “African and world support and solidarity is a valuable and essential element in the 
campaign against apartheid. But South African fascism can only be defeated and overthrown on 
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South African soil by the oppressed people of our country, united in mass revolutionary action and 
armed struggle.”31 
 As the ANC and the PAC regrouped in east Africa in 1965-67, the strategies of both 
movements thus became increasingly exclusively focused on launching a guerrilla war in South 
Africa that would culminate in the armed “seizure of power.” In the case of the PAC, the Pan 
Africanists’ longstanding emphasis on spontaneous mass violence was now expressed in Maoist 
terms, as they became reliant on China for material support. When the PAC held a “reorganization 
conference” in Moshi, Tanzania in September 1967, in an effort to resolve its factional infighting, 
Potlake Leballo and PAC military commander T.T. Letlaka peppered their speeches with references 
to Mao, “the outstanding expert on People’s War.” Letlaka, for instance, approvingly quoted Mao’s 
dictums that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” and that “the seizure of power by 
armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of 
revolution.” At the conclusion of the conference, the PAC National Executive reiterated its 
conviction that “only an armed struggle, anchored firmly in the masses, can achieve liberation.”32 In 
Azania News, PAC members derided “negotiation as a means of solving political disputes” and the 
idea of a “peaceful transition,” while rhapsodizing about revolutionary violence. One typical article 
from late 1966 concluded with the declaration that “Our politics must be analytical, correct, 
developable [sic], revolutionary and violent. It must speak the language of the gun, it must create the 
gun, it must be inseparable from the gun, it must be the gun itself, the gun must emit fire, and the 
fury of the flames of that fire must devour the enemy; for the essence of war is precisely in the 
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extinction of life. The PAC is no novice in the line of revolutionary violence.”33 
 Within the Congress movement, any remaining ambiguity over whether MK’s armed 
struggle was envisaged to culminate in an eventual negotiated settlement or an outright military 
victory was now decisively resolved in favor of the latter. The arrest of South African Communist 
Party chairman Bram Fischer in November 1965 after 290 days underground not only marked the 
end of the last desperate efforts by Congress and SACP leaders to organize resistance from inside 
South Africa (Fischer had refused to go into exile and had exhorted others – often in vain – to do 
likewise). The arrest and imprisonment of Fischer also represented the removal from active politics 
of perhaps the last influential Congress movement leader outside prison who remained wedded to 
Mandela’s conception of armed struggle as a means of driving the government to the negotiating 
table. Congress and SACP leaders now routinely referred to their strategic objective with phrases 
such as “seizing power by armed revolution” or “the armed overthrow of the white supremacy 
state.”34 Indeed, Ronnie Kasrils – a founder-member of Umkhonto we Sizwe and subsequently a 
leading member of the SACP in exile – later commented that in the period between the adoption of 
the SACP’s program in 1962 and the mid-1980s, he could not recall “any serious discussion I ever 
took part in about the question of negotiations.” In a letter to supporters in late 1967, Oliver Tambo 
explained that what could have been settled in the past by “calm and peaceful discussion,” now had 
to be “resolved by the oppressed masses in wide-spread armed conflict.”35 
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It was, moreover, in this period that – as the political scientist Howard Barrell put it in his 
study of ANC operational strategy – “armed activity came to be viewed not only as the primary 
means by which eventually to overthrow the South African state but also as the major means by 
which to advance in each phase of escalation towards that goal.” Ronnie Kasrils termed this the 
ANC’s “militarist deviation,” when Congress strategists became “too carried away” in their search 
for “that magic formula of the guerrilla in the bush.” These were, recalled Kasrils, “the heady days 
of the successes of guerrilla war.” ANC strategists were impressed by the successes of struggles 
elsewhere, and believed that they would be able to replicate them in South Africa. The struggles that 
inspired them included that in Vietnam – where South Vietnamese and American troops were 
unable to defeat the guerrillas of the National Liberation Front – but also those in the Portuguese 
colonies neighboring South Africa, where liberation movements were already engaged in guerrilla 
warfare (and, in the case of Mozambique, where FRELIMO had been able to establish control over 
a significant “liberated zone”).36  
ANC and PAC leaders continued to be strongly influenced by the foco theory of Che 
Guevara that had been an important inspiration for the authors of Operation Mayibuye in 1963, and 
according to which a small number of guerrillas could create the conditions necessary for a 
revolution. This influence was explicitly acknowledged by the PAC: in his speech to the PAC 
conference in Moshi in 1967, Leballo declared that Fidel Castro’s victory in Cuba showed that “bold 
and audacious action by a very few revolutionary patriots, making an armed intervention at the right 
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times, were able to change adverse subjective conditions into favourable ones.”37  
In contrast, ANC and SACP strategists affirmed in their writings their belief that – as the 
SACP Central Committee put it in 1965 – achieving the “armed overthrow” of the state would 
require more than “activities of a purely military character.”38 But in practice, with Congress 
structures inside South Africa completely smashed, the only activities the ANC attempted were 
indeed purely military. In retrospect, for instance, Kasrils believed that the ANC should have tried to 
infiltrate political organizers back into the country to try to reorganize the ANC underground. But at 
the time both the ANC and the PAC were focused on trying to send in armed fighters back into 
South Africa in order to spark an immediate guerrilla struggle. Though the ANC-ZAPU incursion 
into Wankie in 1967 was defeated by the Rhodesian army, the ANC continued its efforts in 1967-68 
to send guerrillas through Rhodesia. In 1968 a small PAC detachment attempted to reach South 
Africa through Mozambique, but was intercepted by Portuguese colonial forces.39 
 
II. ‘Making African revolt somewhat easier’: The First Anti-Corporate Campaigns 
The widespread disillusion about both the likelihood and the effectiveness of an intergovernmental 
sanctions regime against South Africa, and the liberation movements’ increasingly exclusive strategic 
focus on guerrilla warfare, posed fundamental questions about the future activities of anti-apartheid 
solidarity groups in the west. In Britain, the PAC’s representative in Europe, Matthew Nkoana, 
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raised many of these issues explicitly as early as June 1965, in a memorandum to the AAM. Nkoana 
charged that far from coordinating its international anti-apartheid activities with the “internal action 
for the liberation of the country,” the AAM’s activities were conflicting with that internal action. 
Despite the liberation movements’ turn to violence in the early 1960s, AAM publicity materials in 
the middle of the decade continued to portray sanctions as the last best hope of a “peaceful 
solution.”40 From Nkoana’s perspective this was a “fallacious notion”: the AAM needed to start 
from the premise that the resolution of the problem by force was both necessary and inevitable, and 
to see its own role as preparing the British public for this and encouraging the public “to support it 
in every way possible.”41 
 Nkoana charged, moreover, that British solidarity with the struggle against apartheid needed 
to “find more effective expression in practical ways” than the AAM’s existing activities. In particular, 
Nkoana argued, the AAM must accept that consumer boycotts of South African goods, “however 
desirable they may be, are well-nigh impracticable. If such boycotts are intended to be effective, the 
only possible way of putting them into effect would be to concentrate our efforts on organising 
dockers to refuse to unload South African ships.” This would require “long patient work” in the 
trade unions. For Nkoana, such work also represented the only hope of compelling the British 
government to take action against South Africa. Without a “properly educated working class,” 
Nkoana suggested, there was no chance of the government defying British capital and taking 
effective action against apartheid.42 
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 In their reply to Nkoana, AAM president David Ennals and secretary S. Abdul neatly 
summarized the approach the AAM had taken since 1960. They were categorical in rejecting 
Nkoana’s demand that they refocus their activities on winning support from the British public for 
the armed struggle. The AAM would respect whatever strategic decisions were made by the South 
African liberation movements, but “what we cannot do is make the question of armed revolution in 
South Africa the basis of all our actions in this country.” Rather, “the pursuit of the armed struggle 
and the complicated international tasks that arise from it must remain wholly within the province of 
the South African organizations and their representative offices abroad.” Regarding Nkoana’s revival 
of the suggestion of an effective industrial boycott, Ennals and Abdul drew attention to the factors 
that had led the AAM to shelve this idea in the months after Sharpeville: the “complexities of British 
trade union politics” meant, they wrote, that industrial action against apartheid was a difficult issue 
requiring “the most painstaking care, patience, and understanding.” And on the AAM’s consumer, 
sporting and cultural boycott campaigns, they explained that the AAM did not claim that these 
boycotts were “effective,” or even, in the case of the consumer boycott, “practicable.” But they were 
“the best and most effective opportunities for educating public opinion,” and thus for creating the 
necessary conditions for securing changes in UK government policy.43  
Indeed, in the course of 1965 the AAM tried to develop these various non-governmental 
boycott campaigns further. The consumer boycott campaign was expanded to include picketing of 
Co-operatives and chain-stores like Marks and Spencer that stocked South African goods. The 
cultural boycott was extended to include an academic boycott for the first time. Prompted by the 
South African government’s banning of two well-known anti-apartheid academics, in November 
1965 the AAM organized a declaration signed by more than five hundred professors and lecturers 
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from thirty-four British universities, protesting both the banning orders specifically and racial 
discrimination in South African higher education in general, and committing the signatories not to 
“apply for or accept academic posts in South African universities which practise racial 
discrimination.”44 On the sports front, in June 1965 the AAM organized pickets and protests outside 
games played by the touring South African cricket team. The protests attracted considerable media 
attention and succeeded in generating sufficient controversy that that neither the Queen nor the 
Prime Minister attended any of the team’s games against England.45 
 Whereas Nkoana believed that there was no point lobbying the British government to take 
action against apartheid, at the start of 1965 the AAM remained optimistic that the approach it had 
pursued over the previous five years might finally bear fruit in the form of British participation in a 
UN sanctions regime. The victory of Harold Wilson’s Labour Party in the October 1964 general 
election ended thirteen years of Conservative Party rule, and raised the prospect that the AAM 
might be able to exert greater influence on government policy than at any previous time in its 
existence. Labour had, of course, played a central role in the boycott campaign in 1960 that led to 
the formation of the AAM, and as Leader of the Opposition in 1963 Wilson had given outspoken 
support to the AAM’s campaign for a British arms embargo. A number of individual Labour MPs 
had been closely associated with the AAM, and two of them, Barbara Castle and Tony Benn, now 
joined the government as ministers. In the “Long Term Programme” it drafted at the end of 1964, 
the AAM Executive declared that “the broad sympathy with the anti-apartheid struggle of the new 
Labour Government offers us the opportunity of real advance for our policy in 1965.” The AAM 
recognized that Wilson’s cabinet did not support economic sanctions against South Africa, but 
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believed that it would be “more sensitive to the demands of public opinion” than its Conservative 
predecessor. The Movement therefore adopted a two-pronged approach, focusing simultaneously 
on influencing public opinion through the sports, cultural, and consumer boycotts and on 
developing “an effective lobbying relationship with the new government.”46  
In contrast to the AAM’s optimism in 1965 that it could secure changes in the new Labour 
government’s policy, the American Committee on Africa had by then come to the conclusion that 
there was no chance that the administration of President Lyndon Johnson was going to participate 
in either a multilateral or a unilateral program of governmental sanctions. In early 1964, the ACOA 
had established a “Consultative Council on South Africa” to serve as a coordinating body for 
American churches, civil rights groups, student organizations, and labor unions opposed to 
apartheid: in its founding statement the Council that “all nations and their citizens have a 
responsibility to take action against apartheid. The United Nations is the main instrument through 
which such action should take place.” American organizations could help by “urging appropriate 
policies on the U.S. Government.”47 Over the first year of its existence, however, the Consultative 
Council began to abandon this exclusive focus on governmental action. Significantly, for instance, 
when the Consultative Council began in late 1964 to plan a major conference early the next year, 
ACOA Executive Secretary George Houser was persuaded by other groups to change the proposed 
conference theme from his original idea – “The South African Crisis and U.S. Policy” – to “The 
South African Crisis and American Action.” The change, Houser explained, would expand the focus 
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beyond government policy to the question of “what various individuals or segments of the 
population might do to meet the critical issues in South Africa.”48  
This was a question in which a number of American groups were taking an interest in late 
1964, including Students for a Democratic society, which had been established by radical student 
activists two years earlier. SDS’s manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, had expressed concern that 
American foreign policy was being “decisively affect[ed]” by economic investment, and had 
mentioned South Africa as one of the parts of the world where this was the case. In 1962, the group 
established a Peace Research and Education Project (PREP) to investigate American foreign and 
military policy. SDS’s initiative on South Africa was the brainchild of Paul Booth and Todd Gitlin – 
“the Bobbsey twins of peacenikdom,” as one fellow activist called them – who took over as the 
coordinators of PREP in the fall of 1964. Booth and Gitlin felt that the project was lacking “an 
action program in the Third World area” and decided to launch a program of action against 
apartheid. The SDS program would be different from the activities of other groups, such as ACOA’s 
Consultative Council, Booth explained, in its “clear focus on U.S. Big Business interests in the 
Union of South Africa.”49 
Booth and Gitlin’s anti-apartheid program represented the internationalization of strategies 
and tactics developed by activists in the domestic civil rights struggle in the U.S. Pickets, boycotts, 
and sit-ins against firms perceived to be upholding segregation in the American south had been a 
feature of civil rights activism in the northern United States since the first sit-ins by black activists at 
segregated lunch counters in North Carolina in February 1960. In researching American business 
interests in South Africa, Gitlin was especially influenced by the work of Jack Minnis, the research 
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director of SNCC, whose pamphlet on The Care and Feeding of Power Structures had been published by 
SDS in 1963. Starting from the assumption was that “those who control the economy of the nation 
are the only ones who have the power to change things for the benefit of black people,” Minnis’s 
pamphlet provided advice on how to do research on corporate interests in order to identify the 
“power structure” in a given community – and how to use that information to achieve political 
change. Even the specific target chosen for SDS’s anti-apartheid campaign was borrowed from 
Minnis: The Care and Feeding of Power Structures opened with a case-study of a July 1963 picket of the 
Chase Manhattan Bank headquarters in New York by a dozen civil rights activists protesting Chase’s 
floating of bond issues for the building of segregated facilities by the municipal authorities of 
Savannah, Georgia.50 In the course of his research, Gitlin discovered that Chase Manhattan was one 
of a consortium of ten prominent American banks that offered a revolving line of credit to the 
South African government. 
 SDS’s objectives in organizing the March 1965 picket and sit-in at Chase were threefold. 
First, the protest was intended to generate publicity for SDS itself, then still a relatively small and 
little-known organization, and to galvanize new supporters into action. Gitlin wrote in February that 
it was “clear that this issue is one that strikes responsive chords in the guts of many otherwise 
passive people.” Second, the protest would publicize SDS’s analysis of the corporate interests that it 
believed to be dominating American society: the anti-apartheid campaign would, Booth explained, 
“make just the point that we are trying to make about where in the U.S. the crucial decisions are 
made.” Thirdly, while the protest itself could not be expected to cause Chase or other American 
firms to end their loans or disinvest, it would contribute to the necessary first step of focusing public 
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awareness on the issue of American investment in South Africa.51  
 Crucially, the publicity materials SDS distributed at the Chase protest distinguished between 
two different forms of external economic action that could help end apartheid. One was a 
governmental “attempt actively to injure the economy by denying it essential materials” – in other 
words the trade sanctions that had been the primary objective of western anti-apartheid activists in 
the preceding years. But the other, to which anti-apartheid activists had previously devoted little 
attention, was “a withdrawal of support from the South African economy through cessation of loans 
and investment,” something that could be achieved either by governmental action or “by voluntary 
action on the part of individual corporations and banks.” SDS argued that both forms of economic 
action could contribute to the struggle against apartheid. Given that the National Party would 
probably “hold bitterly both to its policies and to power,” SDS argued that there was little chance of 
peaceful change in South Africa. External economic action was desirable because it would “make 
African revolt somewhat easier” by “seriously weaken[ing] the government’s ability to meet a 
widespread resistance.”52 This was, of course, the conception of how economic sanctions could 
contribute to the struggle that had been adopted by leading ANC strategists after their turn to 
violence earlier in the decade. But SDS was one of the first western groups to embrace this position 
explicitly and publicly. 
Though Gitlin and Booth had intended the sit-in at Chase in March 1965 to be the first 
salvo in an ongoing campaign, the SDS leadership’s focus on South Africa turned out to be short-
lived. Before the sit-in at Chase the PREP executive had argued that an expanded campaign against 
American corporations involved in South Africa had “more long-range potential than the crisis 
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response program on Vietnam.” But this calculation changed after the massive escalation of 
American involvement in war in Vietnam began in February 1965. A month after the sit-in, SDS 
organized the first mass national protest against the Vietnam War in Washington. The march 
succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of its organizers, attracting between fifteen and twenty-five 
thousand protesters and dramatically raising SDS’s national profile. SDS’s national leadership 
dropped South Africa as a campaigning issue and turned its attention to Vietnam.53 
SDS’s protest at Chase nevertheless helped to initiate a transformation of anti-apartheid 
activism in the United States. The influence of the protest was clear at the Consultative Council’s 
conference on “The South African Crisis and American Action,” which began in Washington on the 
same day as the sit-in at Chase in New York. The final resolution of the conference called on firms 
to make no further investments in South Africa, and to “seize every opportunity to disengage 
themselves from South Africa.” To encourage such disengagement the resolution urged American 
individuals and organizations to “refrain from investing or depositing in those financial and business 
institutions actively involved in the South African economy.” And in a further reflection of the 
influence of the sit-in at Chase, conference delegates also committed themselves to use not only “the 
time-honored tools of the democratic process” but also “the new-found weapons of the civil rights 
struggle, including direct non-violent action.”54 
To the frustration of some of the more radical members of the Consultative Council, 
George Houser himself was hesitant about organizing a campaign to implement these new 
commitments.55 Though they had now abandoned any hope that the U.S. government would impose 
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trade sanctions, ACOA leaders remained more comfortable continuing with the kind of 
governmental lobbying they had long engaged in. In a meeting at the State Department in March 
1965, for instance, Houser tried to persuade Secretary of State Dean Rusk that a step like 
discouraging or prohibiting investment in South Africa would be in the U.S. government’s own 
interest: it would improve the United States’ standing in the world and would “not hurt the U.S. 
much economically.”56 In subsequent years, ACOA representatives continued to meet with senior 
U.S. government officials to press these kinds of proposals. But the Committee lacked the leverage 
to secure the acceptance even of these much scaled back demands. After Houser and a delegation 
from the Consultative Council met with National Security Adviser Walt Rostow and Counsel to the 
President Milton Semer in March 1966, Semer described the meeting as “friendly and routine.”57 
But while the ACOA itself did not immediately organize a follow-up campaign to the protest 
at Chase, SDS’s brief anti-apartheid campaign had significant aftereffects elsewhere. After the sit-in 
had directed the attention of students in New York towards the revolving credit line offered by the 
consortium of American banks, Charles Powers and David Hornbeck, two divinity students at New 
York’s Union Theological Seminary spent the fall 1965 semester studying the role of business in 
American foreign policy toward southern Africa. They discovered that First National City Bank 
(now Citibank), the bank at which they – like most other students and institutions in the 
Morningside Heights area of New York – had accounts, was also a participant in the consortium 
that offered a revolving line of credit to the South African government. In early 1966, they launched 
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a campaign to compel the bank to disengage from South Africa.58  
During the SDS protest the year before, picketers had handed out flyers requesting 
depositors to withdraw their accounts from Chase, but the immediate focus had been on the direct 
action of the sit-in and the idea of a boycott had not been pursued further. Now the newly-formed 
Morningside Heights Committee on South Africa focused on persuading individuals and institutions 
in the area to boycott First National City Bank. In 1964, as we have seen, the ANC and its 
supporters had called without success for the governments of independent African states to launch a 
secondary boycott of western firms that traded with South Africa. Though it was geographically 
limited to a particular part of New York City, the campaign against First National City Bank in 
Morningside Heights was the first sustained effort to organize a secondary boycott of a western firm 
connected to South Africa, not by foreign governments, but by non-governmental actors in the 
firm’s home country. The Morningside Heights Committee succeeded in persuading a number of 
local student organizations to participate in the boycott, including the student council of Barnard 
College, which closed its $20,000 account. The campaign culminated on April 20, 1966, when 
around seventy students crowded into the local First National City Bank branch in Morningside 
Heights to close their accounts, while another three hundred protesters marched outside.59 
Powers and Hornbeck had always conceived of their Morningside Heights campaign as “a 
catalyst for more effective protests.” Their short campaign attracted coverage in the New York Times 
and other news media, and their suggestion that the campaign be continued by others with greater 
resources and geographic reach now prompted ACOA to launch its first big campaign for American 
firms to disengage from the American economy. After establishing its own “Southern Africa 
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Committee” in 1964, the National Student Christian Federation had joined ACOA’s Consultative 
Council and had agreed to co-sponsor the SDS protest at Chase. Following a suggestion from the 
Morningside Heights Committee, ACOA and the NSCF now jointly formed a new “Committee of 
Conscience Against Apartheid” in July 1966 to expand the bank campaign beyond Morningside 
Heights. Chaired by the prominent labor leader and civil rights activist A. Philip Randolph, the 
Committee of Conscience too framed its campaign as a “pilot project” and a “only a beginning,” 
that would serve the purpose of “pointing to at least one form of practical action that can be taken” 
by Americans opposed to apartheid. The Committee established December 9, 1966 – the day before 
Human Rights Day – as a target date by which it hoped individuals and organizations would 
withdraw their accounts from Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank.60 To help establish its 
legitimacy, the Committee of Conscience recruited more than one hundred high-profile sponsors 
from diverse walks of life, including civil rights activists, entertainers, members of congress, religious 
leaders, and academics. Armed with an impressive letterhead listing these sponsors, the Committee 
then contacted institutional depositors, especially churches and labor unions, asking them to pledge 
to withdraw their accounts. To generate publicity and secure pledges from individuals, the 
Committee organized press conferences, meetings and rallies at churches and colleges, and 
demonstrations and leafleting in front of local bank branches and at the U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations. 
The Committee of Conscience’s campaign climaxed on December 9, 1966, with a picket and 
rally by around three hundred protesters at Chase Manhattan’s headquarters. By that date, the 
organizers had received more than two hundred pledges from organizations and individuals to 
withdraw more than $22.2m from checking, savings, and custody accounts with the two banks 
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(more than $20m of this total was accounted for by the closure of two accounts by anonymous 
supporters of the campaign). Among the organizations that withdrew their accounts were a number 
of church and religious bodies, including the liberal Christian journal Christianity and Crisis, the 
Methodist Office to the United Nations, and the Mother A.M.E. Zion Church of New York. The 
Morningside Heights Committee and then the Committee of Conscience had held meetings with a 
representatives of a number of the church boards and agencies that had their national headquarters 
at the “Inter-Church Center” in Morningside Heights. But the slow-moving bureaucratic procedures 
of the major church boards, which controlled accounts worth many millions of dollars, meant that 
none of them withdrew their funds before the bank campaign reached its climax on December 9.61  
 In campaigning against Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank in 1966, the ACOA 
embraced the distinction SDS had made the year before between actively seeking to damage the 
South African economy by governmental trade sanctions and withdrawing support from it. Houser 
had already come to the conclusion that the ACOA could not “realistically call for an overall 
program of economic sanctions with any hope of success.”62 To continue to do so, he believed, 
would be to condemn the American Committee to impotent irrelevance. Instead, in 1966 the ACOA 
began to frame its objective as American “disengagement” from South Africa. Houser stressed that 
disengagement was “not synonymous with sanctions”: sanctions needed to be multilateral to be 
effective, he argued, whereas disengagement was a process that could be undertaken unilaterally. 
And disengagement would not cause the massive and immediate economic dislocation that sanctions 
advocates had envisaged earlier in the decade. Houser cautioned that he was not claiming that 
disengagement would “magically change things in South Africa.” During the bank campaign he 
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argued that even in the unlikely event that the campaign was successful and both Chase Manhattan 
and First National City Bank withdrew from South Africa, it would “probably have very little effect” 
on apartheid. Indeed, Houser explained, the campaign was “not based on the thesis that even if all 
of the economic power of the United States was brought to bear in support of the policies of 
disengagement the architects of apartheid would feel that they had to accept new policies.”63 
 Rather, the new focus on “disengagement” by the organizers of the bank campaign reflected 
their increasing acceptance of the inevitability of violent conflict in the struggle against apartheid. In 
1964-65 representatives of the ACOA and of the NSCF’s Southern Africa Committee had – like the 
AAM in Britain – presented their anti-apartheid activities as efforts to bring about peaceful change 
in South Africa. But over the next two years leaders of both bodies came to the conclusion – as SDS 
had in 1965 – that there was minimal likelihood of this. William Minter, the Southern Africa 
Committee’s chair, explained that as the Committee’s members became increasingly pessimistic 
about “the existing powers in both Southern Africa and the Western world,” the Committee 
“moved to an expectation and an acceptance of violent revolution as the probable end result of the 
existing conditions.”64 Even Houser, a pacifist who had gone to jail as a conscientious objector 
during the Second World War, was now arriving at this conclusion. After visiting Africa in May and 
June 1967 to consult with leaders of the ANC, PAC, and other southern African liberation 
movements, Houser reported to his colleagues that there was an “increased emphasis on the 
necessity of violence in the liberation movements.” There would be, he now predicted, a “long and 
violent struggle” in southern Africa, and the ACOA must adjust its activities accordingly.65  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 George Houser, “A Rationale for the Protest Against Banks Doing Business with South Africa,” Folder 1, Box 4, 
International Council for Equality of Opportunity Principles Manuscript Collection, Special Collections Department, 
Temple University, Philadelphia. 
64 Minter, “Action Against Apartheid,” 179-88. 
65 George Houser, “A Report on a trip to Africa,” 11 May - 10 June 1967, Folder 11, Box 36, Scheinman Papers. 
	  
 273 
 Above all, Houser, Minter, and their colleagues were concerned about the role that the U.S. 
government might play during a future conflict in southern Africa. This concern came to the 
forefront of American anti-apartheid activism in the context of the ongoing escalation of the 
American war in Vietnam, which many opponents of the war believed was being fought in order to 
secure American economic interests. American anti-apartheid activists became concerned that as 
violent conflict escalated in southern Africa between the white minority regimes and the liberation 
movements, the United States might intervene there too in order to protect the interests of 
American corporations. Campaigning for disengagement was a way to try to reduce the vested 
interests of the United States in the maintenance of the status quo in South Africa, and thus to 
reduce the likelihood of American intervention. Organizers of the bank campaign, for instance, 
presented it as a form of action that would help to “prevent involvement in a crisis such as 
Vietnam.”66 
The immediate objective for opponents of apartheid, as Minter argued during the bank 
campaign in a working paper on anti-apartheid strategy, was to “prepare both the climate and 
organization” for the time in the future when events in southern Africa would force the U.S. to 
respond in one way or another. For Minter, this meant maintaining “a primary focus on the policy 
of the U.S. Government, as the body which will have to respond at that time.” The problem, 
however, was that the government was a “distant” target: “The chances for direct confrontation are 
few and tangible results usually nil.” What activists needed were “more immediate targets, and the 
possibility of getting some minimal results, or a response, positive or negative.” Campaigns for 
disengagement by specific bodies, like Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank, offered 
exactly these kinds of opportunities to generate interest and attention by focusing on “immediate 
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In Britain, the leaders of the AAM were coming to similar conclusions as they became 
disillusioned with the chances of achieving significant changes in U.K. government policy. Far from 
seeing its influence increased under a Labour government, as the AAM had expected, the Movement 
quickly found that Labour MPs were much less willing to take up anti-apartheid protests in 
parliament now that this involved attacking their own party leadership.68 Harold Wilson’s 
government was just as concerned as its Conservative predecessor not to take any action against 
South Africa that could harm the fragile British economy. In February 1965 Lord Rhodes, a new 
Labour minister in the Board of Trade, went as far as to declare that the government was “proud” to 
trade with South Africa.69 The British government’s response to the Rhodesian UDI in November 
1965 compounded AAM leaders’ anger and disappointment, especially as it revealed the extent of 
Wilson’s desire to avoid antagonizing the South African government. Wilson’s government 
strenuously resisted the argument that economic sanctions against Rhodesia could only be made 
effective if they were expanded to encompass South Africa as well. Well aware that the effectiveness 
or ineffectiveness of sanctions against Rhodesia would influence the debate over sanctions against 
South Africa itself, the South African government was continuing to supply Rhodesia with oil and 
other products in defiance of the UN. But the scale of Britain’s economic stake in South Africa 
meant that Wilson refused to challenge this. In a private meeting with South African foreign 
minister Hilgard Muller, Wilson reassured Muller that while British policymakers “heartily disliked 
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apartheid policy and would say so publicly from time to time,” they were also “realists” and “had no 
desire to see international action taken against South Africa that might precipitate a major upheaval 
in southern Africa or lead to a major crisis in [British] relations with South Africa.”70 
In the short-term – the time-scale in which anti-apartheid activists had expected to achieve 
results – the AAM’s approach of combining governmental lobbying with non-governmental 
boycotts to mobilize public opinion had evidently failed to achieve its objectives. The consumer, 
sports, and cultural boycotts helped to increase the profile of apartheid as a public issue, but they 
had fallen far short of generating sufficient public pressure to produce significant shifts in 
government policy, even when Labour was in power. Instead, as a discussion paper drafted for the 
AAM Executive put it in November 1966, the Movement now faced “a Britain in which 
disenchantment with African affairs is widespread”: by the middle of the decade the optimistic 
interest in Africa that had led the Labour Party to designate 1960 “Africa Year” had dissipated 
amidst the political and economic turmoil of many of the postcolonial states on the continent.71 An 
AAM fundraising letter sent to South African exiles living in Britain in 1966 gives a sense of the air 
of despondency that hung over anti-apartheid activism in Britain at this time: “You are not the only 
person who has felt a sense of impatience and futility at the limited range of anti-apartheid activities. 
Too often they seem ineffectual, boring, repetitious. The same placards on sticks outside South 
Africa House (and it’s always raining); or [a] march around Trafalgar Square; a letter signed by a 
handful of notables that some clerk, in any case, refuses to accept; depriving your family of the best 
fruit while everyone around you buys Outspan… It doesn’t seem to make any great impact, and in 
spite of ourselves we become aware of our own diminishing enthusiasm.”72  
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The letter stressed that there was, however, “no alternative.” Intensifying the consumer, 
cultural, and sports boycotts would not “topple Verwoerd – but all the small, constant, deadly dull 
and vitally necessary anti-apartheid activities gradually work away at the public conscience both 
inside South Africa and here and everywhere; so that when the time comes we have laid the basis for 
those massive campaigns about which we dream.” But the AAM’s disillusionment with the Labour 
government was complete. In July 1967, leading members of the Movement’s executive noted 
despondently that “the accession to power of the Labour Government has instead of reducing our 
problems, as we optimistically forecast, only magnified them.”73 The AAM now also published a 
thirty-page pamphlet examining Labour’s Record on Southern Africa which concluded that in 
government Labour had shown itself “no different” than the Conservatives.74   
Some of the AAM leaders’ despondency was relieved by the news that the ANC had 
launched its incursion into Rhodesia that August. The reports of ANC guerrillas fighting in the 
Wankie campaign now led to a complete reassessment of the AAM’s attitude towards the armed 
struggle in South Africa. The 1967 Annual Report, published just one month after the first clashes in 
the ANC and ZAPU’s Wankie campaign, declared that armed struggle had now been “revealed for 
all the world to see as the most important instrument for change in the sub-continent.” Just two 
years earlier, Minty and Ennals had told the Nkoana of the PAC that international tasks relating to 
the armed struggle were the exclusive responsibility of the liberation movements. But after the 
excitement generated by the Wankie campaign, the AAM now identified building “an atmosphere of 
sympathy and support for the courageous resistance fighters” as one of its central tasks.75  
In this new context, AAM leaders began to reframe their objectives in a way that paralleled 
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ACOA’s shift to focusing on “disengagement”: the AAM now framed their objective as “ending 
British collaboration with the forces of apartheid economically, militarily, politically and culturally.” 
In part this entailed a continuation, or renewed emphasis, on the AAM’s longstanding non-
governmental boycott campaigns – of South African consumer goods, sport, and culture. But it also 
led the AAM to begin tentatively to explore new forms of action: the 1967 annual report suggested 
exposing British firms that collaborated with apartheid, both by producing publicity materials on this 
topic, and by “picketing and other means which are locally appropriate.”76 In December 1967 the 
AAM made its first attempt to organize this kind of activity, targeted at Cyril Lord and Garfield 
Weston, two British firms with large investments in South Africa. The effort was short-lived, 
however: a report by the AAM Executive some years later commented that the campaign “fizzled 
out almost before it was off the ground.”77 
 As in the United States, it was groups associated with the New Left that subsequently re-
energized and re-directed anti-apartheid activity in Britain. Though very different in background, the 
two groups that played central roles, the Young Liberals and the Haslemere Group, were both 
pessimistic about Britain’s system of parliamentary democracy and the traditional forms of protest 
associated with it, and were committed to finding other ways of achieving political change. The 
Young Liberals were formally the youth wing of the Liberal Party, Britain’s third largest political 
party (in the 1966 general election, the Liberals won nine seats in parliament, behind the 
Conservative Party’s 304 and Labour’s 317). After a small group of leading Young Liberals decided 
in 1966 to convert the largely quiescent organization into a radical youth movement, the group 
became a prominent focus for student radicalism. By the end of the decade the Young Liberal 
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leadership had concluded there was no chance of achieving their objective of “libertarian socialism” 
through the “sterile farce of existing parliamentary democracy.” Instead, they embraced non-violent 
direct action as “as the only way of mobilising people and achieving change.”78  
This commitment to direct action was shared by the Haslemere Group, formed in January 
1968 at a conference of forty “young and disillusioned” members of a variety of British 
organizations, mostly in the international aid and development sector. Those attending the 
Haslemere conference included, for instance, members of Oxfam, the Overseas Development 
Institute, and Christian Aid, as well as religious and political groups (including the Young Liberals). 
The conference published a Haslemere Declaration whose thesis was best summed up by the quotation 
from Tolstoy that was used as an epigraph: “I sit on a man’s back choking him and making me carry 
me and yet assure myself and others that I am sorry for him and wish to lighten his load by all 
possible means – except by getting off his back.” Haslemere Group members believed that poverty 
in the third world was caused by exploitation by rich countries, and that overseas aid from the west 
was at best an inadequate form of conscience-salving and at worst another form of exploitation. 
They instead committed themselves to explicitly political action. Such political action would not be 
“polite, respectable and ineffective” lobbying, the signatories of the Declaration declared, since they 
had “lost all faith in the ability of our governments to respond realistically to the desperate human 
need of the poor world.” Instead, the Group adopted a program based on research, political 
education, and direct action against specific targets “at points where the practice of exploitation 
touches the experience of ordinary men and women.”79  
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The Young Liberals and the Haslemere Group brought their commitment to direct action 
tactics to the campaigns for the liberation of southern Africa from minority rule. In the case of the 
Haselemere Group, the southern African liberation movements were among the third world 
movements for economic and political independence with whom signatories of the Haselemere 
Declaration aligned themselves. Indeed, the Declaration explicitly mentioned the AAM’s consumer 
boycott as an inadequate form of support for the struggle being waged by the liberation movements, 
declaring that “one cannot balance the life of a young black freedom-fighter against a vow not to eat 
Cape grapefruit.”80 The Young Liberals had become involved in campaigning against the Labour 
Government’s “sell-out” on Rhodesia in 1966, and in 1968 they established their own “Southern 
Africa Commission.” Leading Young Liberals, including international vice-chairman Peter Hellyer 
and international secretary Douglas Marchant, also joined the AAM. They soon became vociferous 
critics of the AAM’s “tactics and political approach”: in October 1968 they provoked a heated 
debate at the AAM’s annual general meeting when they proposed a resolution that “there is nothing 
to be gained by attempting to bring direct pressure on HMG [Her Majesty’s Government]” and that 
“the AAM should bring direct pressure to disrupt southern African business and institutions in this 
country.”81  
The Young Liberal resolution thus encapsulated what Marchant called the group’s “bypass 
tactic” of bypassing “traditional structures and methods of protest.” Marchant argued that “Any 
party in power in this country with the present system must succumb to the pressures inherent 
within a capitalist society.” The AAM should therefore stop lobbying parliament and the 
government, and instead make “a direct attack on the attitudes of the British people as a whole,” 
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through education and direct action. The consumer boycott, the AAM’s traditional means of 
grassroots political education, was dismissed by Hellyer as uninspiring: “an appeal not to buy 
Outspan oranges is perhaps not a cry which will inspire most of the left in this country.” Rather, 
radical students could be mobilized by appeals “based upon extreme militancy.”82 
Though a revised version of the Young Liberals’ resolution was, after extended discussion, 
eventually adopted by the AAM in March 1969, the Movement was reluctant to organize disruptive 
direct action (Marchant and Hellyer’s suggestions had included hoax bomb threats to South African 
Airways, disruption of South African immigration offices, and “industrial sabotage” against British 
firms with South African connections).83 Members of the Young Liberals’ Southern Africa 
Commission therefore began taking matters into their own hands. Initially this was on a relatively 
small scale: in December 1968 Marchant and fourteen Young Liberals staged an hour-long sit-in at 
the offices of the liberal Guardian newspaper to protest its acceptance of advertisements from the 
South African government and South African firms.84 
Soon afterwards, local committees of the Haslemere Group – whose decentralized structure 
left much scope for initiative by local activists – began to take an interest in British firms operating 
in southern Africa as targets for protest and direct action. In mid-1969, the South London 
Haslemere Group launched a campaign to expose the role of Barclays Bank in the third world, and 
quickly came to focus on the bank’s role in southern Africa. The group began leafleting around high 
street branches of Barclays in London, pointing out that the bank had 895 branches in South Africa 
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itself, and was involved in financing the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam, a massive hydro-
electric project in Mozambique intended by the Portuguese colonial authorities to help secure their 
rule in the colony. The Haslemere Group in north-west London, meanwhile, launched a campaign 
against Sena Sugar Estates, a British-owned firm that was the largest sugar producer in Mozambique. 
Haslemere members picketed the firm’s annual general meeting, and one demonstrator was able to 
get inside and state his views before being asked to leave. For the Haslemere activists, both these 
campaigns were forms of political education about the nature of British capitalism that would serve 
to “publicise and polarise, confront and commit.” Like the Committee of Conscience in New York, 
the Haslemere Group did not expect to be able to force their corporate targets to disinvest from 
southern Africa: “The Group do not seriously expect to be able to change the iniquitous courses of 
Barclay’s profiteers,” explained Haslemere newsletter. But they did hope “to get people to 
understand just what it is that their ‘friendly bank manager’ is part of.”85 
In their campaigns on southern Africa, both the Haslemere Group and the Young Liberals 
initially focused on corporate targets. But in 1969, the Young Liberals succeeded in launching a 
massive campaign of direct action against South African sports teams visiting Britain. Since its 
formation in 1960, the AAM had taken a limited interest in the sports boycott that had been initiated 
by Trevor Huddleston, Dennis Brutus, and others in the 1950s. AAM leaders had seen protests 
against South African sports tours to Britain, such as the cricket tour in 1965, as means of directing 
public attention to racism in South Africa and building a constituency for governmental economic 
sanctions. The new emphasis on sport in 1969 was initiated by Peter Hain, a young South African 
exile whose parents, prominent members of the Liberal Party, had taken their family into exile in 
Britain in 1966. Hain was, as he later put it, in “a unique position, an unusual position of both being 
interested in sport, as a lot of white South African males are, and being interested in anti-apartheid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 “action: friendly,” and “notes from an ex running dog,” Paper Tiger: The Haslemere Newsletter, September 1969, 1-2. 
	  
 282 
politics.” After joining the Young Liberals when he arrived in Britain, Hain came to realize that 
sports events were particularly vulnerable to the kind of non-violent direct action to which the 
Young Liberals were committed: activists could stage spectacular disruptions to interrupt or prevent 
play.86 Through the Southern Africa Commission, Hain organized a series of “Young Liberal direct-
action demonstrations” at the games of the Wilf Isaacs XI, an all-white invitational South African 
cricket team then touring Britain, and at a Davis Cup tennis fixture between Britain and South 
Africa. In the most successful of these efforts, more than seventy protesters invaded the cricket 
pitch in the midst of the Wilf Isaacs XI’s game at Oxford, forcing play to be abandoned for the 
day.87 
Working with Dennis Brutus, the president of the South African Non-Racial Olympic 
Committee (SANROC), who was now in exile in Britain, Hain announced in September that he was 
forming a new body, Stop the Seventy Tour (STST) that would campaign for the cancellation of the 
planned 1970 tour of Britain by the South African cricket team. Hain threatened “mass 
demonstrations and disruptions throughout the tour” if it was not cancelled, and warned that all 
future South African sports tours to Britain – including that of the South African rugby team that 
was due to arrive in November – would be “severely disrupted.” Subsequently, in what one scholar 
has characterized as “arguably the most successful mass action in post-World War II British 
history,” STST was able to mobilize up to fifty thousand demonstrators during the twenty five-
fixture rugby tour, over four hundred of whom were arrested as they demonstrated at and attempted 
to disrupt games. One fixture was abandoned and two were forced to change their venues.88 
Subsequently, under heavy pressure from the government, which was concerned to avoid further 
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disruptions to law and order in the midst of the 1970 general election campaign, the English Cricket 
Council announced in May 1970 that it was cancelling the South African cricket tour.89 
The Stop the Seventy Tour campaign highlighted ongoing tensions regarding the purpose of 
sports and cultural boycotts and their relationship to other forms of resistance to apartheid. Hain 
and STST made clear that their immediate objective was the desegregation of South African sport, 
even while apartheid remained in place in other spheres of life. Perhaps reflecting the Hain family’s 
close association with the South African Liberal Party, Hain argued that this was possible and that 
achieving it would be a “lever against apartheid” more broadly.90 STST thus presented its campaign 
as one of opposition to “apartheid in sport” and support for “non-racial sport”; its objection to 
South African sports teams was not simply that they came from the land of apartheid, but that the 
teams themselves were all-white, and had been selected on an exclusive racial basis. When the South 
African Cricket Association responded to the campaign to stop the tour by suggesting that it might 
include one or more black players in the touring party, STST secretary Hugh Geach explained that 
the campaign’s objective was “the complete removal of racialism from S.A. sport – we will not be 
placated by attempts to consider one or two non-whites for selection.” STST would only call off its 
planned demonstrations when it had “cast-iron assurances and evidence that from now on sport and 
cricket in particular will be played non-racially.”91  
 This was, as we have seen, the perspective that had animated the initiators of the sports and 
cultural boycotts in the mid-fifties. But a decade and a half later, in a very different strategic context, 
it was controversial among anti-apartheid activists, even within the STST and Young Liberal 
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leadership. In October 1969, Peter Hellyer and another member of the STST committee were 
among the sponsors of a resolution presented to the AAM’s annual meeting that began by declaring 
that “the continuation of sporting ties between Britain and South Africa bolsters the morale of the 
apartheid regimes and their supporters.” The AAM’s compositing committee revised this statement 
to read that “the continuation of racially segregated sporting ties between Britain and South Africa 
bolsters the morale of supporters of apartheid and delays the development of non-racial sport in South 
Africa.”92  
This framing of the sports boycott as a campaign against racially segregated sporting ties 
won out at the 1969 AAM annual meeting: when one of the most common charges against 
supporters of the sports boycott was that they were “bringing politics into sport” it made tactical 
sense to frame the boycott as a sporting rather than a political issue. But some opponents of 
apartheid were beginning to question the assumption of Hain and Brutus that it would be possible 
to achieve non-racial sport in the context of ongoing apartheid, and that this should be the 
immediate objective of the sports boycott. In a long memorandum submitted to the UN Special 
Committee on Apartheid in 1971, AAM Honorary Secretary Abdul Minty maintained that the sports 
boycott should be continued “until sport inside South Africa is conducted on the basis of merit 
alone and not of colour.” Minty argued, however, that “This may not be possible until white 
domination itself is ended in South Africa. Until there is a non-racial society which will permit open 
sport, we may have to exclude South Africa from all international competitions.”93 Certainly ANC 
leaders did not share Brutus and Hain’s optimism about the evolutionary role that sport could play 
in South African society. During the STST campaign, ANC exiles in London expressed their 
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concern about “dangerous statements” SANROC leaders had made, such as that SANROC would 
disband if the white sports authorities in South Africa agreed to call a non-racial national sports 
convention.94 In the 1960s the ANC had not taken any greater interest in the efforts of Brutus and 
other sports activists to promote the sports boycott than it had in the 1950s, despite important 
successes such as the barring of South Africa from the Olympics. But in 1969-70 the ANC 
leadership was nonetheless impressed by STST’s success in mobilizing widespread public support in 
Britain. ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo commented the following year that the “tremendous 
response to campaigns against all-white South African teams has demonstrated the importance of 
this sphere of activity in our over-all strategy to isolate the South African regime of terror 
internationally.”95 
 
III. ‘Part of the standard equipment of the movement’: Disengagement and Ending 
Collaboration 
It had not been inevitable that the ANC would continue see the isolation of South Africa as a 
significant element of the struggle against apartheid. In April 1969, leading members of the exiled 
ANC gathered in Morogoro, Tanzania for a “consultative conference,” convened in an effort to 
overcome the malaise and infighting that had characterized the Congress since the defeat of its 
incursions into Rhodesia in 1967-68. The Morogoro Conference represented the apogee of the 
skepticism within the ANC that international action – including boycotts and sanctions – could play 
a significant role in the struggle against apartheid.96 After soliciting comments and contributions 
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from ANC members all over the world, the Conference Preparatory Committee commented 
somewhat obliquely that “the question of the correctness of insisting on sanctions has sometimes 
been raised.” But more generally, the Preparatory Committee noted, there was “now a feeling that a 
disproportionate amount of time and resources [are] being expended on external work. Now, more 
and more of the best brains and talent of the movement must be utilised for the armed struggle and 
the internal political developments in the country. The whole movement has to swing decisively 
back to work at home.”97  
This “reorientation” – as ANC president Oliver Tambo later characterized it – was endorsed 
by the conference.98 In order to achieve this, the conference established a new body, the 
Revolutionary Council, which answered directly to the ANC Executive, and whose task was “to 
concentrate exclusively on the internal situation, the furtherance of the armed struggle, and the 
mobilisation of the masses.”99 The statement of the “Strategy and Tactics of the ANC,” which had 
been drafted by Joe Slovo and was adopted by the conference, made no reference at all to the 
international boycott of South Africa. The main focus was on guerrilla warfare as “the special, and in 
our case the only form in which the armed liberation struggle can be launched”: once guerrilla 
operations had been initiated inside the country they would “steadily develop conditions for the 
future all-out war which will eventually lead to the conquest of power.”100 
The prospect of an “all-out war” was not an attractive one for the leaders of the independent 
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African states that bordered white-ruled southern Africa and that would bear the brunt of the fallout 
of such a conflict. Zambia in particular maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the armed 
struggle in South Africa: Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda refused to condemn the use of force 
against apartheid, given the lack of other options for resistance, but remained deeply concerned 
about the possibility that South African forces might retaliate against Zambia for assisting the 
liberation movements. The Zambian government allowed ANC and PAC guerrillas to transit 
through its territory, but refused to permit them to establish military camps. In an effort to further 
relieve pressure on South Africa, B.J. Vorster, who succeeded Verwoerd as Prime Minister in 1966, 
had adopted an “outward” policy of seeking to build up relations with African states, and in 1967 he 
and Kaunda secretly began a tentative correspondence regarding the resolution of the conflict in 
Rhodesia. In April 1969, just before the ANC’s Morogoro Conference, Kaunda’s preference for 
negotiation was endorsed by a summit of East and Central African States in Lusaka. The “Lusaka 
Manifesto” adopted at the summit reaffirmed African leaders’ commitment to the liberation of 
southern Africa from white minority rule, but emphasized their preference that this be achieved by 
“without physical violence”: “We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than 
kill.” Most famously, the Manifesto declared that “If peaceful progress to emancipation were 
possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our 
brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some 
compromise on the time of change.”101 
ANC leaders were horrified by the Lusaka Manifesto, which had been adopted without 
consulting them and was endorsed by the two states, Zambia and Tanzania, on which the ANC was 
most reliant for support. To the ANC, the Manifesto was based on a flawed understanding of white 
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minority rule and how it could be defeated. Unknown to his comrades in exile, Nelson Mandela 
made his own proposal to South African government for a negotiated transition the same month: on 
April 22 Mandela wrote to the Minister of Justice from his prison cell on Robben Island, urging that 
“the obvious solution is to release us and to hold a round table conference to consider an amicable 
solution.”102 But as far as the leadership of the ANC in exile was concerned, dialogue with the South 
African government was an “impossibility”: it was “in the nature of the apartheid system,” argued a 
Congress committee established to analyze the Lusaka Manifesto, that it could not “stretch through 
dialogue or any other ‘voluntary’ change to accommodate the rights of the people.”103 As Joe Slovo 
later explained, leaders of the ANC and the SACP now viewed as “highly questionable” the “old 
thinking” of Mandela and others that violent resistance could lead to a negotiated transfer of power. 
In 1970 the SACP Central Committee explicitly rejected the section of the Party’s 1962 program, 
which had held out this possibility, declaring instead that “The revolutionary overthrow of the white 
state can only be achieved by violent means.”104 The ANC’s official stance was identical: in 1973 the 
ANC executive referred to its “strategic objective” as “the seizure of power and not reforms o[r] a 
negotiated transfer of power.”105 
In accordance with the decisions at the Morogoro Conference the ANC’s top leaders now 
focused even more exclusively on how to launch guerrilla action inside South Africa. Tambo wrote 
to E.S. Reddy at the UN in January 1970 that he had been “not much involved in international work 
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recently,” for his primary focus was now to “confront apartheid at base.”106 Tambo’s main focus 
that year was on “Operation J” (the “J” was for Joe Slovo), an elaborate plan to land a group of fifty 
guerrillas on South Africa’s Indian Ocean coast. The plan was eventually abandoned in 1971, after 
the ship that had been purchased broke down off the Kenyan coast, but until then the preparations 
preoccupied Tambo and the ANC’s other leading strategists. Indeed, Tambo had initially insisted 
that he would lead the landing party himself, though this was vetoed by his comrades.107  
The ANC did not, of course, completely abandon international solidarity activity. Indeed, 
the Preparatory Committee for the Morogoro Conference had insisted somewhat defensively that 
participation in relevant international bodies was not “useless and wasteful” – as some internal 
critics charged – but was necessary in order to ensure that the ANC did not suffer the fate of the 
Mau Mau fighters in Kenya in the 1950s who had been “not understood and not effectively 
supported by the international progressive world.”108 Meanwhile, those exiled members of the ANC 
who were based in “hostile countries” such as Britain and the U.S., now framed their activities as the 
AAM and the ACOA had begun to do. “We have no illusions that sanctions and similar pressure 
methods can provoke any kind of change in South Africa,” ANC representatives in London wrote 
shortly after the Morogoro Conference. But campaigns for the boycott of South Africa were still 
useful as a way of “inhibiting collaboration with apartheid and where possible neutralising 
government and big business support for Southern Africa.” They thus contributed to what the ANC 
now defined as its main objective in these countries: “to prevent intervention on the side of 
apartheid” once the ANC had succeeded in launching a guerrilla struggle inside the country.109 
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 Ruth First, an influential figure in the community of Congress exiles in Britain, was 
increasingly skeptical that the Anti-Apartheid Movement was the best instrument for achieving these 
objectives. The AAM remained too closely tied to “consensus methods and established lobbies,” 
First argued, and its focus on building links with institutions like organized labor and political parties 
had produced no results. It was, for instance, “demonstrable nonsense” to talk of mobilizing 
“international worker solidarity” through the labor unions that were primarily concerned with their 
own members’ standards of consumption. First was impressed by the upsurge of New Left youth 
militancy in the late 1960s. If the ANC wanted to inspire mass militancy, rather than “the traditional 
expressions of displeasure by liberal elites,” she argued, it needed to reorient its outreach towards the 
young radicals who were themselves attacking traditional institutions. It could do this by projecting 
the struggle against apartheid “as central to the struggle against human exploitation everywhere,” 
through, for instance, launching a campaign against the role of American firms like Chase 
Manhattan and General Motors in South Africa.110  
Four months after the Morogoro conference, the “Congress Committee,” a small group of 
U.K.-based South African exiles who functioned as a kind of “foreign policy commission” for the 
ANC, adopted a modified version of First’s proposal. In September 1969 they decided on a 
campaign against western firms involved in the Cabora Bassa dam project in Mozambique, which 
they saw as deliberate effort by the Portuguese to commit the “imperialist powers” even more 
deeply to the defense of the white regimes in southern Africa. To the Congress Committee, the dam 
was thus “a convenient means of isolating small group of companies round a hot issue” that could 
be used to mobilize the kind of direct “action-in-the-streets” that the AAM had failed to generate.111 
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Many AAM leaders, meanwhile, continued to fear that the adoption of direct action tactics would 
discredit and marginalize the movement. After STST started its campaign of disruption of rugby 
games, the AAM maintained a public position of carefully-crafted ambiguity, declaring that the 
Movement sympathized with the objectives of those who engaged in direct action (and noting that 
many of them were AAM members), but stressing that “as an organization” the AAM itself had not 
organized disruptive protests.112 
In November 1969, members of the Congress Committee convened a meeting of “key 
militant British personnel” from new left groups including the Young Liberals, the Haslemere 
Group, and STST, to form a “Dambusters Mobilising Committee” to campaign against the dam.113 
Because of the role of Barclays Bank in financing the dam’s construction, the Dambusters campaign 
soon adopted the existing Haslemere campaign against Barclays as its primary focus. The campaign 
sought to capitalize on the interest in both apartheid and in direct action protest that had been 
generated by the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign. Publicity materials explained that “the economic 
boycott is even more important than the sports boycott.”114  
Like the campaign against the rugby tour, with its twenty-five games all over the country, the 
campaign against Barclays had the advantage of offering multiple sites for direct action protests. As 
Haslemere activist and Dambusters secretary Christabel Gurney put it, “Barclays has thousands of 
branches all over Britain. We couldn’t hope for a better target!” In addition to leafleting and 
picketing branches, Haslemere and Dambusters campaigners suggested a number of forms of direct 
action that could be taken against Barclays branches, including sit-ins, “queue-ins,” and attempts to 
“bugger up Barclays internal workings” by deliberately bouncing checks, jamming telephone 
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switchboards, and placing fake “out of order” signs over night safes.115 Building on the earlier 
attempt to break into the Sena Sugar Estates annual meeting, Haslemere campaigners also started 
purchasing shares in Barclays so that they would be able to enter shareholders’ meetings legitimately. 
Barclays was initially able to block many of these share transfers, so that only three activists were 
admitted to the bank’s annual meeting in April 1970, while others picketed outside. Inside the 
meeting the three raised repeated questions about both Cabora Bassa and Barclays’ branches in 
South Africa, until they were eventually ruled out of order by the bank’s chairman.116 
 In addition to various forms of direct action protest, Dambusters and Haslemere activists 
also called for a boycott of Barclays and for both individuals and institutions to close their accounts 
with the bank. “Boycott Barclays” campaigns were launched on many university campuses, and in 
April 1970 the campaign received the official backing of the National Union of Students (NUS). 
May 1, 1970 was established by the Dambusters Mobilising Committee as the day on which large 
numbers of students would close their accounts, a date carefully chosen to coincide with the 
payment of government maintenance grants to students and when student accounts were therefore 
less likely to be overdrawn. The NUS encouraged its affiliates to include “Boycott Barclays” 
campaigns in their freshers’ week programming at the start of the academic year. This initiative had a 
significant effect on Barclays’ share of the student banking market: the bank’s share of new student 
accounts in Britain dropped from forty-eight percent in October 1969 to thirty-three per cent a year 
later.117 
Despite these losses, Barclays was resolute in refusing to disinvest from South Africa, as the 
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campaign’s initiators had expected. But at the same moment that Dambusters Mobilising Committee 
took up the campaign Barclays in Britain, the objective of the earlier bank campaign in the U.S. was 
unexpectedly achieved. ACOA had declared the campaign “over” after its climactic demonstration 
in December 1966 and had moved on to other projects. But the campaign’s appeal to the major 
churches to cease doing business with the ten American banks that offered a revolving credit line to 
the South African government had unexpected aftereffects, as the request galvanized the slow-
moving church bureaucracies to make concrete decisions on the issue. In February 1968 the United 
Methodist Church Board of Missions withdrew a $10m investment portfolio from First National 
City Bank after the bank refused the Board’s request that it withdraw from the consortium. Other 
major church bodies, including the Department of International Affairs of the National Council of 
Churches and boards of the United Church of Christ and United Presbyterian Church began 
corresponding with the banks and arranging meetings with bank officials to make the same demand. 
In May 1969, the Episcopal Church resolved to withdraw $2 million from Chase Manhattan, First 
National City Bank, and Morgan Guaranty Trust, if the banks renewed the loan.118  
These actions by the churches caused the banks significant concern. In January 1969 a senior 
Chase Manhattan executive flew to Cape Town to meet with Nico Diederichs, the South African 
Minister of Finance: though Chase had been under pressure for several years, the representative 
explained, previously this had been from “groups of no particular standing in the community.” But 
now pressure was coming from “persons of greater standing as well.” The chairman of Morgan 
Guaranty told the South African consul-general in New York that Morgan Guaranty were especially 
concerned about the ultimatum from the Episcopal Church: the Church’s account with them was 
larger than their share of the consortium loan, so they would be “out of pocket” if they continued to 
participate. All of the banks expressed their willingness to continue offering the revolving credit if 
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requested to do so, but to South African officials it was obvious that they “would welcome a 
decision by South Africa” not to seek its renewal. Reluctantly, the South African government agreed 
to this face-saving maneuver. In November the South African Secretary of Finance announced that 
his government would not be asking the banks to renew the loan when it expired in January 1970 
because it was no longer needed. This decision did not impact the South African government’s 
access to international credit. Though the consortium agreement lapsed, several of the participating 
banks secretly agreed to offer new individual credit lines equal to the amount of their previous share 
of the revolving credit.119  
Anti-apartheid activists claimed a major victory. “The significance of our victory in the bank 
campaign,” Houser declared, “is that an informed and aroused American public opinion can end 
U.S. financial and economic support for apartheid.” The ACOA would continue to campaign for 
“total disengagement.”120 In Britain, the AAM now likewise embraced the campaign against 
corporations with investments in South Africa. Though the ANC’s Congress Committee had 
initiated the Dambusters campaign against Barclays in part because of its frustrations with the AAM, 
the popularity of the campaign galvanized the AAM into action. The Movement now adopted the 
boycott of Barclays as its own. The AAM should “move in quickly behind the efforts of the 
Haslemere Group and the Dambusters Mobilising Committee” wrote a member of the AAM 
Executive in early 1970. Ultimately, the boycott of Barclays should “become part of the standard 
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equipment of the movement, like the boycott of South African products.”121 This was a marked shift 
from the focus on mandatory and multilateral governmental sanctions in the first half of the decade. 
Convinced that their role was to facilitate the guerrilla war and armed seizure of power to which the 
liberation movements were now committed, South African exiles and anti-apartheid activists in the 
west would enter the 1970s focused on campaigns for corporate disengagement. 
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Anti-apartheid activists had not adhered to a single, consistent grand strategy in the period between 
1946 and 1970. They would not do so in the period afterwards. There was no straight line from 
where we have left the global anti-apartheid movement in 1970 to the triumphant moment twenty-
four years later, when Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as South Africa’s first president elected in 
non-racial democratic elections. As both the domestic and the international contexts in which they 
operated continued to change, as they continued to attempt to draw lessons from past efforts and 
from struggles elsewhere, and as new actors continued to emerge and contribute new ideas to the 
struggle, anti-apartheid activists continued to experiment and to adapt their tactics and their 
strategies. 
 One thing would remain constant after 1970, however. By that point, the boycott of South 
Africa was no longer simply a tactical weapon. It had become established as the defining principle of 
the self-identified anti-apartheid movement. The particular forms of boycott on which activists 
focused, and the nature of the contribution they were expected to make to the objective of 
overthrowing apartheid continued to change. But for the South African liberation movements and 
those who supported them, the principle of boycott remained constant until the release of Nelson 
Mandela in 1990 and the opening of negotiations between the ANC and the government. That this 
principle was now beyond question was made clear by Mzwai Piliso, a leading member of the ANC 
who represented the Congress at a seminar on the campaign against investment in South Africa that 
was convened by the Anti-Apartheid Movement in London in 1975. After a day of debate, the anti-
apartheid academics and activists had been unable to agree on exactly what they meant by 
“disinvestment” or on what impact they expected disinvestment to have on the South African 
economy. At the end of the seminar, Piliso exploded in frustration. Stating erroneously that “the 
	  
 297 
disinvestment policy had originally been adopted at the request of the South African liberation 
movement,” he declared that to the ANC the campaign for firms to boycott South Africa by 
withdrawing or liquidating their investments “represented an important act of solidarity, the value of 
which did not depend on the details of the economic effect which it might produce.”1 The principle 
that solidarity with the South African opponents of apartheid should be expressed through boycott 
was now inviolable. 
 This had not always been the case. Indeed, there was a high degree of contingency in the 
emergence of boycott campaigns as such a prominent element of the global struggle against 
apartheid. International boycotts were not a prominent element of many of the other anti-colonial and 
anti-racist struggles that were going on contemporaneously between the 1940s and the 1960s. And 
for nearly a decade and a half after India imposed trade sanctions in 1946, most leaders of the 
Congress movement showed little interest in promoting campaigns for boycotts or sanctions against 
South Africa. Even Yusuf Dadoo, who in 1947 called for worldwide sanctions against South Africa, 
subsequently dropped the idea. Outspoken opponents of apartheid outside South Africa, including 
Kwame Nkrumah and representatives of the Indian government, made clear that they opposed a 
campaign for India’s action to be replicated by other states. Inside South Africa, Congress leaders 
focused throughout the 1950s on their domestic campaigns against apartheid, to which external 
boycotts were largely irrelevant and potentially even detrimental.  
When boycotts of South African goods began to break out around the world in 1959-60 this 
was due not to an initiative from anti-apartheid leaders inside South Africa but to the conjuncture of 
the persistent advocacy of two individuals – the British priest Michael Scott and the Kenyan labor 
leader Tom Mboya – with the ANC’s efforts to relaunch its own domestic consumer boycott against 
“Nationalist products.” In a further crucial conjuncture, the external boycott campaigns of 1959-60 
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were just getting into full swing at the precise moment in 1960 when the crisis and State of 
Emergency after the Sharpeville massacre both shut down almost all opportunities for effective 
resistance to apartheid from within the country and suggested that South Africa might be 
economically vulnerable to external action. It was in this specific set of circumstances that the few 
ANC and PAC leaders not in jail embraced the idea of economic boycott as the most important way 
that those outside the country could contribute to ending apartheid.  
The specific targets – and the specific forms of boycott – on which boycott advocates 
focused as being most significant to the struggle against apartheid shifted over time. In the 1950s the 
most notable boycott campaigns to emerge were boycotts of all-white South African sports teams 
and entertainment venues. Although the resolution of the All-African People’s Conference that had 
“set the ball rolling” in December 1958 had called for trade sanctions by African states, the boycott 
campaigns that developed in response in 1959-60 primarily took the form of consumer boycotts of 
South African goods. Tom Mboya also envisaged a world-wide industrial boycott, coordinated by 
the ICFTU, which would paralyze all shipping bound to or from South Africa. But although this 
idea was sporadically revived by opponents of apartheid, the steadfast opposition of many western 
labor leaders ensured that it was never attempted.  
After Sharpeville, opponents of apartheid focused on the campaign for multilateral trade 
sanctions, imposed by governments and coordinated by the United Nations, which would totally 
isolate South Africa from world trade. Other kinds of boycotts, including consumer, sports, cultural, 
and diplomatic boycotts were perceived by their advocates primarily as means of building support 
and momentum for the campaign for trade sanctions. Boycott advocates paid little attention to 
foreign investment in South Africa in the early 1960s. But after the failure to persuade the African 
states to impose a secondary boycott, the collapse of efforts to secure trade sanctions at the UN, and 
the apparent inability of sanctions to end UDI in Rhodesia, anti-apartheid activists in the west were 
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prompted by new left groups to begin to shift their focus to boycotts and direct action against firms 
with investments in South Africa. 
Very few of the advocates of these various forms of action intended or expected them to 
achieve the end of apartheid by bringing about the kind transition to democracy negotiated between 
the National Party government and the ANC that ultimately took place in 1990-94. In 1946, the 
Indian advocates of sanctions had expected that their unilateral action would be sufficient to compel 
the Smuts government to comply with their demand for a roundtable conference, not on the topic 
of segregation as a whole, but on the specific issue of its application to South African Indians. In the 
early 1960s, Nelson Mandela and some of his comrades had believed – before their capture and 
imprisonment – that the guerrilla war they planned to launch, facilitated by sanctions, would force 
the government to the negotiating table.  
But few others believed that the racist hardliners responsible for implementing apartheid 
could ever be compelled to negotiate it away. The initiators of sports and cultural boycotts in the 
1950s had believed that if sport and the arts could turned into pockets of non-racialism within a 
racist society, this would bring about a broader shift in white attitudes. Supporters of consumer 
boycotts in 1959-60 had made a diverse array of suggestions of how they might contribute to ending 
apartheid. After the turn to sanctions in 1960, these ideas coalesced into the belief held by anti-
apartheid activists across the political spectrum that sanctions could bring about a realignment of 
white politics by causing white business and white voters to defect from the National Party.  
By the second half of the decade, however, the liberation movements and their western 
supporters had become skeptical of this model of change, especially after sanctions failed to bring 
about an analogous scenario in neighboring Rhodesia. Both the ANC and the PAC became focused 
on the armed seizure of power through guerrilla warfare. Anti-apartheid activists in the west who 
began to campaign for disengagement by western firms did not expect to be able to compel their 
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targets actually to disinvest, and so initially gave little thought to the question of the economic or 
political impact of disinvestment – a question that would become an issue of major controversy in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Rather, campaigns against corporations were understood as ways to build up a 
constituency that would oppose western intervention on the side of government in the future 
guerrilla war that anti-apartheid activists assumed would ultimately bring about the downfall of 
apartheid. 
The liberation movements never did seize power by armed force, of course. But the 
international boycott campaigns launched to facilitate that objective nevertheless helped to shape the 
eventual negotiated transition in crucial ways. At its climax, as in the period studied here, the story of 
the external struggle against apartheid was one of experimentation and unintended consequences. 
Such a story may be less morally satisfying than one of the successful unfolding of a comprehensive 
master plan for overcoming injustice. And it does not provide a simple template that can be easily 
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